Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-93-187
Wednesday
29 September 1993

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FBIS-EEU-93-187 *29 September 1993*

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Tudjman, Gligorov Meet at UN General Assembly

LD2709201893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Report by Tihomir Vinkovic in New York]

[Text] The 48th UN General Assembly [UNGA] session attended by President Tudjman has started at United Nations headquarters in New York.

President Tudjman today met with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, UN Security Council Chairman Taylhardat, and British Foreign Secretary Hurd. In their talks, Tudjman and Gligorov confirmed the two states' convergence of views on UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] status and the situation in former Yugoslavia. Tudjman and Gligorov have agreed that UNPROFOR's mandate should be politically separate for the regions of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. The sanctions against Serbia can be lifted when it recognizes the newly-founded states on the territory of former Yugoslavia within their present, internationally recognized boundaries,and when it stops aiding Serb rebels in Croatia.

In a brief statement to the press, President Tudjman told reporters that he had informed the Security Council chairman and the British foreign secretary that Croatia cannot consent to the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate in its present form. Croatia also advocates the replacement of UN forces with NATO troops. Croatia will persevere with its decision to reintegrate the occupied regions into its constitutional and legal system by peaceful means, but if all fails, it reserves the right to resolve the issue of the pink zones and the UNPA [UN protected areas] through all the legal and legitimate means at the disposal of an internationally-recognized state.

I gained the impression that both Taylhardat and Hurd understand Croatia's demands and that this will also influence the decisions they reach when resolving the fate of the UNPROFOR in Croatia.

Tudjman Meets UN Representatives

LD2809223593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Report by Tihomir Vinkovic from New York]

[Excerpts] President Tudjman held talks with representatives of Security Council members in the Security Council this morning, local time. [passage omitted] President Tudjman also held talks with Lithuanian President Ulmanis. They agreed to improve interstate cooperation and to establish full diplomatic ties.

The Croatian vice prime minister and foreign minister, Mate Granic, held talks with his Turkish and Norweigian counterparts. In addition to the topic of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] mandate in Croatia, they also discussed Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers were informed about the activities of the working groups envisaged in the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement. Minister Granic asked Turkish Minister Cetin to exert influence on the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina to release the prisoners from their camps—something that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have already done.

President Tudjman is currently holding talks with editors of the prestigious TIME magazine. At 1600, local time, he will address the UN General Assembly.

Romanian Foreign Minister Addresses UN

AU2909102993 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] Last night Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu addressed the 48th session of the UN General Assembly currently taking place in New York.

After presenting the latest democratic developments in Romania, Teodor Melescanu reasserted the Romanian nation's option to reintegrate itself among the family of democratic nations. The Romanian foreign affairs minister stated that Romania is profoundly and sincerely devoted to the spirit of the UN Charter and it is determined to fully support the ideas and recommendations included in the report of the UN secretary general, the Agenda for Peace.

Referring to peace-keeping operations Mr. Melescanu said that Romania is determined to offer its own contribution. In that context, our correspondent at the foreign affairs ministry reports, Teodor Melescanu also said that Romania favors the enlargement of the number of members of the UN Security Council in order to augment its ability to respond to the needs of security and peace that are vitally important for the international community.

Referring to the domain of human rights, the head of the Romanian diplomacy stated that the protection of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic minorities is an organic part of those rights and pointed out the fact that in Romania there are 14 national and ethnic minorities.

Teodor Melescanu reasserted Romania's satisfaction with the Israeli-Palestinian accord which was signed on 13 September.

Assessing the current state of the conflict in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova, the Romanian foreign affairs minister said that no progress has been achieved in the political settlement of that crisis.

Referring to the negative consequences upon Romania's economy of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, Teodor Melescanu saluted the fact that various UN bodies are seriously considering ways to offer compensations. We expect the UN bodies and international financial institutions to respond to the needs of our countries and that we should be supported by offering us solutions to surmount the difficulties we are currently facing as a

consequence of our conduct as loyal members of the United Nations, Teodor Melescanu stated.

Polish Prime Minister Opens CSCE Meeting

LD2809074593 Warsaw PAP in English 1923 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 27—Opening a review meeting of the representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) member states on Monday, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka said the international community should secure respect for the human rights standards.

She added that while the support for the issue of human rights standards is growing, there are still many victims of the human rights violation.

Suchocka noted that the international human rights standards, included in the CSCE documents, played an important role in the political and legal transformations in the eastern and central European countries.

She stressd that the protection of human rights does not hinge on international efforts but depends on actions carried out in various countries. It is more important to prevent the human rights violation cases than to intervene when such acts occur, she added.

The delegates to the three-week meeting, representatives of international and non-governmental organisations will discuss the implementation of the CSCE provisions on human rights, democratic institutions and law-abidingness.

Work on Draft Constitution To Be Speeded Up

AU2809164793 Tirana ATA in English 0910 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 28 (ATA)—In a letter presented to the People's Assembly in yesterday afternoon session, the chairman of the parliamentary group for the draft of the constitution, Mr. Aleksander Meksi, expressed the acceptance of the demands of the motion forwarded by the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party regarding the work of the commission for the draft constitution of the Republic of Albania.

The motion demands that the commission should accelerate the work for the draft of the constitution by convening once a week, informing each month the Presidency of the People's Assembly, proposing the way of approval of the draft of the constitution, publication of the draft and organization of debates over TV, etc.

The motion was approved in principle. During the detailed discussion, only the first two points were adopted.

Bulgarian Minister of Transportation Visits

AU2809164593 Tirana ATA in English 0909 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 27 (ATA)—The Bulgarian minister of transportation, Kiril Ermenkov, paid a three-day visit to Albania and met with officials of Durres Sea Port, merchant fleet, and Albtransport. The Bulgarian guest was accompanied by his Albanian counterpart, Fatos Bitincka. Mr. Ermenkov and Mr. Bitincka discussed about cooperation between the sea ports and fleets and voiced their desire to find out other forms of cooperation in the field of maritime transportation. They agreed to establish permanent links between Durres Sea Port and that of Varna. The two sides confirmed the committment for East-West transportation corridor and agreed to coordinate work with the international financial organizations and foreign partners to establish the corridor.

Before leaving, the Bulgarian minister met with Albanian Premier Aleksander Meksi.

Unemployment, Social Assistance Figures Reported

AU2509155393 Tirana ATA in English 1016 GMT 25 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 25 (ATA)—By Jerina Zaloshnja: The number of persons living on social assistance in Albania is still high. According to experts at the Ministry of Labor and Emigration, 320 thousand people were provided unemployment payments for the period May-July, 1993. During this period another 70 thousand families, or some 300,000 people received economic assistance. However the figures on unemployment and standard of living are not accurate, the experts say. It is hard to tell how many people are involved in private business, because we lack the data necessary to prepare valid statistics. Even though people may have private income, some of them still continue to receive social assistance.

The schedule for most of people who began to get social assistance during 1992 is coming to an end, but some of them of them are expected to be picked up on the economic assistance rolls.

Foreign Minister Meets Counterparts in New York

AU2809164993 Sofia BTA in English 1521 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Report by Iliya Marinov]

[Text] New York, September 28 (BTA)—Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov started a series of bilateral meetings within the framework of the political discussions at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly.

Today Mr. Daskalov met with his Turkish counterpart Mr. Hikmet Cetin. The two sides discussed Bulgarian-Turkish relations and assessed positively their development over the past few years. The two ministers expressed a desire for a further broadening of the contacts between the two countries which could be encouraged by summit level meetings in Sofia and Ankara. Mr. Stanislav Daskalov raised the issue of the property of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Turkey.

Mr. Stanislav Daskalov also met Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky. The two sides stressed the need to seek new forms of trade and economic cooperation, bearing in mind the losses the two countries are suffering as a result of their strict observation of the UN sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro. Mr. Geza Jezsenszki renewed the invitation to Bulgarian Prime Minister Lyuben Berov to visit Budapest and showed interest in Sofia's proposal to establish a mechanism for controlling land transit shipments through Serbia (known as transit transport corridor).

The Bulgarian representative took part in a official luncheon given by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali in honour of the leaders of the delegations and last night he attended the reception at Astoria Hotel given by U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Today Foreign Minister Daskalov is also expected to meet his counterparts of Slovenia, Belarus, Tajikistan and Luxembourg, Mr. Yordan Lozanov, deputy permanent representative of Bulgaria at the UN, told BTA.

Addresses UN

AU2809204693 Sofia BTA in English 2001 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Report by Iliya Marinov]

[Text] New York, September 28 (BTA)—Bulgaria has drafted a resolution of the UN General Assembly expressing understanding for mitigating the effects of the losses this country has suffered from the strict observation of the embargo against Serbia-Montenegro, Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov told BTA. This refers to seeking new forms and ways for mitigating the effects of the losses and for elaborating a mechanism for control over land transit shipments within the framework of Resolution 820 and of the UN Security Council, the foreign minister explained adding that the consultations on this document with other interested countries and UN bodies are continuing.

Another way in seeking to alleviate Bulgaria's embargo-related economic difficulties is to appeal once again to all UN-member states, international financial institutions and specialized UN bodies to take into account the losses Bulgaria is sustaining and to show understanding. This would mean greater understanding at the negotiations between Bulgaria and the International Monetary Fund, at this country's negotiations with the World Bank on a new stand-by agreement and also greater understanding at Bulgaria's foreign debt negotiations with the Paris and London clubs, Mr. Stanislav Daskalov said.

The Bulgarian foreign minister pointed out that the deepening of the crisis in Moscow may not only affect Bulgaria's relations with Russia, but have an impact on the entire world and called for settling the conflict between President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament.

Talks With IMF, World Bank Continue

AU2909110393 Sofia BTA in English 2101 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 28 (BTA)—The Bulgarian delegation to the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington is continuing its talks, the special correspondent of Bulgarian National Television, Ms. Daniela Kuneva, reported. But the negotiations are still at the stage of elucidating the stands of the two sides and of evaluation of the reasons for the present state of the Bulgarian economy and the issue of a new stand-by agreement is still open. According to the governor of the National Bank of Bulgaria, Prof. Todor Vulchev, cited by National TV, judging from the talks held so far, the chances for signing such an agreement are minimal.

At a meeting of the Bulgarian delegation with IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus which was attended by the four IMF executives on whom the decision on Bulgaria depends, Mr. Camdessus was well-disposed to Bulgaria, according to the correspondent. He expressed full understanding for the difficulties of the reform, the effects of the Yugo-embargo and other external influences and supported the financial efforts of Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov, Mrs. Kuneva reported. She described Mr. Camdessus's promise for IMF support for Bulgaria as hopeful news. The other executives taking part in the talks expressed dissatisfaction mainly on two points: the relative share of the budget deficit in the gross domestic product and the policy of almost 100-percent indexation of wages, which further winds the spring of inflation and for which the Bulgarian trade unions were to blame.

According to Michael Wiehen, regional director for Bulgaria in the World Bank, the talks are constructive and normal. The signing of the loan crediting Bulgaria's

private sector may take place in Washington, according to the national television correspondent.

Papers Warn of Ethnic Tensions in South

AU2809120693 Sofia BTA in English 1144 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 28 (BTA)—"There is information that structures of the former underground ethnic Turks' organization which later on gave birth to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), and newly-established groups will resort to open civil disobedience in the area of Yakoruda," says TRUD, citing a special service source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

On September 17 parliament passed a decision, invalidating the results of the 1992 population census in the areas of Yakoruda and Gotse Delchev (Pirin Macedonia) as regards ethnic identity, mother tongue and religion. The report of the commission of inquiry, on which the decision was based, cited Turkicization of the regions' Bulgarian Mohammedans and pressure on the Christian population. The DPS (the ethnic Turks' party) voted against the decision and left the chamber in protest.

After the vote in parliament the DPS began subversive work among the population, says TRUD. Beside psychological pressure, some non-assimilated Bulgarian Muslims were subjected to physical violence too, says the story. The DPS failed to fulfill its socio-economic programme, assimilatory action is falling through, riots are their last resort, the paper cites Evgeni Ekov, secretary of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), as saying yesterday. According to him, the movement's hardliners think it is time the DPS makes greater demands. "If it was not for me, Yakoruda would turn into a second Bosnia," TRUD quotes DPS leader Ahmed Dogan as telling the paper. "We do not have illegal arms, but would advise anyone against playing with fire. The Balkans hardly need a second Bosnia," Evgeni Ekov told TRUD. The VMRO leaders are today expected to meet with President Zhelev to acquaint him with their information of the surge of tension among the Bulgarian Muslim population, the story also says.

The Rodolyubie Union is setting up in southwestern Bulgaria (inhabited by compact population of ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Mohammedans) groups for self-defence against the Islamic sects Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis, operative in this country, 24 CHASA and KONTINENT write. Such groups will be established also in other areas across the nation, say the papers, quoting yesterday's statement by the leader of the Rodolyubie Union on reception of refugees from Bosnia in this country's problem areas. The union has information the Bosnian refugees in Velingrad incite people to holy war, says KONTINENT. The accommodation of Muslim refugees in the regions with mixed population, which already face religion-based problems, bodes new trouble, presidential adviser Plamen Bogoev recently told the paper. Beside a similar structure in Bosnia, the Muslim Brotherhood is preparing a plan to transfer Muslims from former Yugoslavia into Bulgaria, 24 CHASA says, quoting the Rodolyubie leader Mr. Branko Davidov says the infiltration of Muslim fanatics in Bulgaria is assisted by DPS structures and high Muslim clergy, including Nedim Gendzhev and Fikri Sali (both claiming the title of Chief Mufti), says the paper.

BSDP Supports Russian President Yeltsin

AU2709213193 Sofia BTA in English 1939 GMT 27 Sep 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpts] Sofia, September 27 (BTA)—The leadership of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) categorically supports Russian President Boris Yeltsin, according to a declaration, read at a press conference today by BSDP Chief Secretary Stefan Radoslavov. The BSDP Executive Bureau also circulated a letter to the leader of the Socialist International Pierre Mauroy, briefing him on the "misinformation campaign waged by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), intended to convince the Bulgarian public that the BSP will join the Socialist International structures."

Miners may call a strike, the press learnt at a news conference at the St. Konstantin resort today. The miners of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions demand negotiations with the government, said Pencho Tomakchiev, leader of the Federation of Miners' Independent Trade Unions. If the negotiations fail, a strike can break out in mid-October, he said. 82 percent of this country's miners are members of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, according to data of the amalgamation.

The leaders of the parliamentary Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Confederation of Public Organizations for the Social Protection of Pensioners met to discuss draft social security laws, said the BSP Press Office. The Socialists expressed concern over the pressures on pensioners and declared readiness to respond to their concerns.

The Supreme Court today heard the case of four former State Security bosses, accused of fabricating espionage charges back in 1985 against intelligence officer Dimitur Dimitrov, court-martialled and shot to death at Sofia prison in May 1986. The defendants are reserve Lieutenant General Petur Chergilanov (former Military Counterintelligence boss), reserve Major General Kostadin Kotsaliev (former Criminal Investigation Department boss), Colonel Tsvetan Purvanov (chief of a Military Counterintelligence department) and Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Spasov (examining magistrate of the Criminal Investigation Department). Tomorrow will show whether the case will be returned for reconsideration or proceedings will go ahead. [passage omitted]

The Trade Union of the Danube River Fleet and the subsidiary of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation with Bulgarian River Lines, the National River Carrier, in Ruse (northern Bulgaria) sent a joint declaration to the Ministries of Transport and Finance and to parliamentary committees, urging solutions to the problems of Bulgarian River Lines. The declaration says the company's finances have suffered from the embargo on former Yugoslavia.

The school year has started for 38 young Bulgarians from Moldova enrolled at the vocational school of farming in Nova Zagora and the school in Tvurditsa (eastern Bulgaria). The towns have not been selected accidentally, as they accounted for a large exodus of Bulgarian families to Moldova in the late 19th century.

Asparukh Panov, leader of the Bulgarian Delegation to the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, MP of the Union of Democratic Forces, was elected deputy floor leader of the Liberals in the Parliamentary Assembly today.

Bulgaria will take part as a full member in the 10th General Assembly session of the World Tourism Organization in Indonesia from October 4 to 8. This country will be represented by Balkantourist, Balkan Holidays International and other companies. [passage omitted]

Twenty Syrians, mostly women and children, were found in a truck by a highway patrol of Sofia's 5th Regional Department early in the morning yesterday. Most of them had overstayed their visas and were about to leave for Greece. It emerged they had paid 1,000 dollars each, though the driver denied having taken the money, the Press Office of Sofia's Directorate of the Interior said.

Phenol in the air of Silistra on the Danube over the weekend measured 1.5-2 times above the acceptable limit. At separate hours, readings showed a phenol content 3.5 times higher than the limit, said the town's environmental lab. According to experts, the weekends since September 8 have seen renewed pollution from the Metallurgical Works in the Romanian city of Calarasi across the border, reported BTA's local correspondent.

DUMA Editor Attacks West's Support of Yeltsin

AU2809094893 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Sep 93 p 8

[Article by Editor in Chief Stefan Prodev: "Yeltsin Chose the Mailed Fist"]

[Text] What is happening in Moscow? What lies in store for Russia tomorrow? These questions have been disturbing the world for the past two days. The prolonged struggle between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has led to an overt undemocratic decision that brings this great country face to face with a most gloomy prospect. Either one of the warring parties must capitulate unconditionally, or the ghost of civil war will emerge from some smoking gun muzzle. The rock of state has finally disintegrated, and now no one is under any illusion that the disastrous split can be held back by sweet words or the traditional Russian kiss. The time of stalking one another, secret moves, and dirty tricks is over. At the moment, Russia has two presidents and the logic of the political war requires one of them to disappear. The agony is turning into an explosion and, perhaps, the nuclear mushroom may appear. Of all the alternatives, only the most terrible one remains: either the Kremlin or the White House [Russian parliament building]. Between the two, there yawns an abyss whose maw waits to receive its victims. American political specialist Jerry Howe immediately predicted that Yeltsin will be the first victim. His prediction is a very bold one because no one knows what the Dzerzhinskiy Division is thinking. However, no matter who the victim may be, it is clear to all that Russian society—the millions of people who are groping their way between the truth and lies, deceived by their own people and by foreigners—will endure extreme suffering.

Whatever the outcome of this political insanity, the truth remains the same and no one can deny it. The Russian president has committed an act that violated all the principles of classical democracy. By his decision, he suspended the Constitution, prohibited parliament from continuing its work, and seized all the reins of power in his own hands. In normal political language, this is called a coup d'etat. In this case, even the best intentions remain hanging in the air, corrupted by transgression of the law. A wound that will bleed for a long time has been opened in the body of Russian democracy, which even so can hardly walk. Carried away by his human ambitions and longing for state power, Yeltsin seems to have forgotten that force is incompatible with the modern principles of government and that it cannot provide the solution to any political crisis. Violence can only breed violence, and this can already be seen. Nothing can justify violating the powers of a legally elected parliament, even when this parliament is inconvenient or stands in open confrontation to the presidential power. The times in which Boris Yeltsin is ruling have nothing in common with those of Boris Godunov. In this sense, in the judgment of history, he will one day be judged to be not a cruel father but a usurper of lawful order, a destroyer of democracy, and an agent of antidemocratic will. This is what disturbs the true democrats and makes them await his next steps filled with fear and distrust. Even if his act was unavoidable in the political war that has broken out, his name will remain besmirched with the stain of this crude act that put to death belief in the future of Russian democracy. This is horrifying because even the strongest arm cannot justify its strength when it is unlawfully raised against its political opponent! The totalitarian past is full of irrefutable examples of this.

The most prominent Western politicians have already declared that they will support Yeltsin's coup d'etat if it helps the normal continuation of democratic processes in Russia. Clinton was the first to make such a promise. There is something farcical in this. Is it really possible for

an antidemocratic act to guarantee the future of a young and unstable democratic order. The gentlemen of the West are not so naive as to believe in such a miracle. However, now, as always, they set their own interests higher that the official ideas that allegedly guide them. They cannot exonerate the Russian president, but he is their own man, who has to be protected in the name of their own game. Yet again, we are witnesses of the cynical hypocrisy that some call "higher politics." It is no secret that Russia, despite its ruin, continues to be a great power that frightens and inspires respect because of its will to live and its unpredictability. It is, therefore, no wonder that the West is closing its eyes to the facts and, however awkward it may be, is betting on "its own horse" by giving Yeltsin one last chance. He is the only Russian politician that enjoy's the West's trust, if only for the time being. This is sufficient for him to be helped, saved, and delivered from the predicament into which he has put himself. Just as it has already been declared that Poland may be damaged because of its left-wing orientation, so now it will be no wonder for Russia to suffer if the West's Kremlin card loses. See how ready the "fathers of democracy" are to sacrifice democracy in the name of their strategic goals! Ideas are for the people at large, not for those who rule the world.

Of course, we in Bulgaria cannot see from here the processes taking place in Russia in full clarity. They are incredibly complex, so that it is impossible to take sides. This is why criticism of Yeltsin does not necessarily imply support of his opponents. However, this does nothing to quell the worries that I have mentioned here regarding the violence committed against democracy in Russian political life. The coup d'etat, whatever its motives, is a reprehensible act that throws society into insoluble conflicts. It is not fortuitous that the Russian patriarch declared that he is praying to God to save his country from civil war. These are not merely priestly prayers, but the call of a man who knows Russia better than anyone. It is crystal clear that Yeltsin's presidential putsch opens the way to such a horror. He is making the great Russian people face their severest trial. The desire to show one's strength has never been a positive phenomenon. It has always ended with upheaval for millions of people. Are Yeltsin and his foreign supporters really not aware of this elementary truth? Of course they know it, but the battle for power makes them lose their senses. It is part of the most horrific intoxication that can affect man and mankind. It destroys virtues, ideas, ideals, and, as in this case, hopes for serious democratic changes. Irrespective of the assessments and compliments coming from various political leaderships and forces, Yeltsin has done something that cannot be corrected. The victory that he is seeking with all the means at his command will turn out to be his bitterest defeat. The usurpation of a constitution and a parliament is not a worthy act. It is not the beginning, but the end of his fine political career. After him, even the weakest hand will become a mailed fist.

Government Approves 1994 Draft State Budget

AU2809141493 Prague CTK in English 2020 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—The Czech Government has definitively approved the draft state budget for 1994, totalling 379.8 billion Kc [Czech korunas] (12.7 billion USD), and presented it to parliament far in advance of the start of the fiscal year on January 1, 1994, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said at a press conference today.

The draft budget is based on figures up to the end of August, and it is possible that it will be in some way or another nailed down on the basis of more current data before being approved by parliament, Klaus said. The government advises deputies of this possibility in a letter to be sent to parliament together with the budget proposal.

The most important change made to the budget was an increase in the entry for restitution in agriculture. Klaus said that the Ministry of Finance had underestimated this entry. The necessary amount was obtained by lowering non-investment expenditures of all budget chapters, with the exception of that for education, interior and agriculture, by half a percent.

Klaus said that state debts were not discussed in connection with this budget.

The National Property Fund is to contribute 18.3 billion Kc (610 million USD) towards paying off the interest on old debts, Klaus said. He rejected views that the fund should not participate in paying off debts, saying that the returns from privatisation would be utilised to help pay off debts until the fund's resources run out.

Klaus on Protectionism, Foreign Debt

LD2809205293 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Musilek] Prime Minister, Minister of Finance Ivan Kocarnik in Washington yesterday at the session of the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund criticized the protectionist policy of industrially advanced states. Immediately after that, the chief representatives of the Fund, the World Bank, and GATT, appealed for bold steps to be taken with the aim of concluding talks of the Uruguayan Round of GATT, pointing to the danger of increased protectionism. Do you think this is a favorable signal in the sense that, on the part of these organizations, there is no lack of will not to put obstacles in the way of the states of Central and Eastern Europe for their further entry to the markets?

[Klaus] I cannot say anything new about protectionism because we talked about it so many times and we simply reject the word; we reject the principle implemented in practice. I should like to add one thing: If the East is the topic of constant criticism by the West for ethnic conflicts and for nationalism of various types, I always remind the West that protectionism is a form of nationalism and they should not forget that.

As to your question, criticism of the institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, or GATT or their pressure to end the Uruguayan round—that is nothing new . [passage indistinct].

[Musilek] Russia suggested in Washington that a part of its foreign debt be written off. Although this proposal, evidently, will not meet with agreement, do you think it can be expected that developed countries, in an attempt to support the effort of President Yeltsin, will be more inclined to grant Russia certain advantages in comparison with the former Soviet satellites?

[Klaus] I find this difficult to say. In my view, writing off debts is a poor precedent because once it starts, it is then not clear where one should stop, and then all countries in the world could start writing off their debts because, very often, they were committed by a regime or the government which preceded them and they really cannot very well help it. The Czech Republic has had its foreign debt for at least ten years at the existing level and it had not been committed by the regime of today or the government of today. So if someone wrote off the $8,000,000,000, we would certainly be glad. But I do not think that this is the way to go about it and the attempt of Russia, particularly at the moment—well, it does not seem to me that it could be heard by anybody. I would not dare speculate on further development in Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union. It is beginning to show that a number of the smaller ones are beginning to live their own particular kind of life and it may get on the path of some kind of a normal positive development, perhaps faster than in Russia itself.

[Musilek] Last week we talked about gradual weakening of the role of the government in the tripartite talks. The Bohemian-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions, however, has sent you a letter which complains of nonfulfillment of the agreements on the part of the government. Can you say how you will react?

[Klaus] Firstly, I must say that we are merely studying the letter at the moment and I do not consider the letter threatening or requiring immediate reaction. We have agreed that we will meet the trade unionists at the end of October, on 29 October, that is one day after the holiday of 28 October, just as we met in the spring. It will be then that we will discuss these matters. Moreover, it seems to me that the letter of the trade unionists focuses attention on this meeting so I think that the government has a month to examine this letter in detail.

[Musilek] Inasmuch as it seems that the talks of the coalition mini four have been definitively deadlocked there has been a proposal to call a meeting of chairmen of coalition parties on the question of church property.

Premier, do you think that the right time has come for this sort of meeting or will you continue having these talks on a lower level?

[Klaus] I do not want to make any firm conclusions as far as this is concerned because on Friday and Saturday the Executive Council of the Civic Democratic Party will be in session and at its meeting we should like to clarify further strategy in this matter. Personally, I can say, and I think that some ministers of the Civic Democratic Party have said it already, I do not agree that the talks have been deadlocked. On the contrary, I rather think that they stopped at a point which is not liked by some of our coalition partners. That is why they call for a change in the mechanism of the talks. I would say that the above mechanism was far too successful.

Kocarnik Criticizes Western Protectionism

AU2809144393 Prague CTK in English 0730 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Washington Sep 27 (CTK)—Czech Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik criticised on Sunday [26 September] tendencies of some advanced Western countries toward protectionism.

Speaking at a regular session of the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kocarnik said he hoped that advanced countries would display in new political and economic conditions just as much political courage as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in restructuring and liberalising their economies.

He called paradoxical the effort to solve economic problems by putting up barriers to free trade. Kocarnik said that it would be disappointing if the governments of the most advanced and civilised countries applied—for political reasons—measures that are at direct variance with what they had recommended to the others.

In an interview with CTK, Kocarnik said that IMF analyses assessed the economic development in the Czech Republic positively. They mainly praise the reform of the taxation system and a balanced budget, he pointed out.

Meets Russian Minister

LD2809184593 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] The annual session of the IMF and the World Bank opens in Washington today. Attending the event is our delegation, including the State Bank Governor Josef Tosovsky and Minister of Finance Ivan Kocarnik, who yesterday met his Russian counterpart Boris Fedorov. Ivan Kocarnik said the following in reply to our Washington correspondent's question as to what he discussed with the Russian minister of finance:

[Begin recording] [Kocarnik] We wanted to know what was the situation after the personnel changes. Our previous talks, held during Yeltsin's presidential visit, were with Deputy Prime Minister Lobov but he is now out and we found that all that had been agreed in Prague has been put on ice, partly because there are now other things to worry about and partly because of the various personnel changes.

We agreed on three points that, I think, could be important if they are ever realized. First of all, deliberations of experts aiming at making some progress on the issue of the debt will start immediately next week. The second point is to reach some kind of consensus as to what to do with the International Investment Bank, which in fact is a dead bank—all it does is collect our subscriptions but it enjoys very poor status and achieves nothing. The Russian minister of finance expressed the view that it was necessary to do something about the bank, for example its vote and status should be changed to reflect its capital, and so on. The third point agreed, and one that sends a very good signal too, was for the Russians to repay interest owed to the Czech Republic. This amounts to $164 million and although, naturally, the Russians would not pay it in dollars, they are willing to pay in wheat. That's something they have and our market regulatory body is intending to buy some wheat anyway, so it would be great should this idea come off. I think we will make a specific requirement regarding the volume of the wheat immediately on our return.

[Unidentified correspondent] Which of these three points do you consider the most important?

[Kocarnik] Probably the third one to start with, but in principle they all are equally important. [end recording]

Labor Minister Outlines Budget Expenditures

AU2809143593 Prague CTK in English 1846 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—The 1994 budget of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, amounting to 150 billion Czech crowns (5 billion USD), features an 11-percent increase over 1993, Minister Jindrich Vodicka told journalists today.

The budget, which reckons with single-digit inflation, was approved by the government and recommended for approval by parliament today.

Vodicka said that the ministry would receive 7-7.5 billion crowns (230-250 million USD) more than expected from contributions to social security and state employment policy.

The amount will be spent on training apprentices, liabilities connected with scale-down programmes in mining, and other projects.

Vodicka stated that the government had adopted at today's session a proposal on wage regulation measures in financial institutions which would go into force starting October 1.

Wage regulation in manufacturing was introduced July 1.

As there was no regulation in the financial sphere, the wage infection has spread mostly from there, Vodicka said.

Lux Gives Details on Subsidies for Agriculture

LD2809225193 Prague CTK in English 1928 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 28 (CTK)—State subsidies to Czech agriculture are to total some 5.1 billion crowns in 1994. The government approved them September 24, Czech Agriculture Minister Josef Lux said at a press conference today.

Lux stated that 500 million crowns should go to forestry, 350 million for research and development. These subsidies remain at the same level as in the previous year.

Non-investment subsidies to the water resources sector, however, will decrease from 610 million crowns to 200 million because of the cancellation of subsidies for the cost of drinking water.

Subsidies for investment in the water resources sector will, on the other hand, grow by 902 million crowns in 1994 as compared to 1993. A total of 633 million crowns will be appointed for waterworks, and 200 million crowns for the construction of small-scale water supplies. The volume of individual investment subsidies will increase from 2.4 billion crowns to 2.498 billion next year. A total of 1.9 billion crowns has been earmarked to satisfy restitution claims.

Lux said that the government had approved a 500 million crown support to the state fund for market regulation.

Speaking about the state fund for market regulation's decision yesterday to release pork stocks, the minister noted the current growth in pork prices should cease within two to three weeks.

Skalicky Interviewed on Privatization

AU2909100893 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 27 Sep 93 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Privatization Minister Jiri Skalicky by Marcela Doleckova; place and date not given: "The Ministry of Privatization May End Its Activity Within Several Years"]

[Text] [Doleckova] The second wave of privatization is about to take place. What is the main purpose of this stage of privatization?

[Skalicky] The main purpose is to transfer all the property available for entrepreneurial activity into the hands of good businessmen. This process should proceed rapidly and costs should be kept at a minimum. Financial obligations stemming from the past should be met, and burdens eliminated. At the same time, we must take into account economic factors, such as the purchasing power of the population, and political factors. Our privatization process must not be hampered by political obstacles, as has been the case in most post-communist countries.

[Doleckova] Do you believe that the income from privatization will be sufficient to eliminate the burdens of the past?

[Skalicky] I cannot say yes or no, because the phrase "burdens of the past" has a wide meaning. The whole of society will have to help eliminate them. Of course, income from the privatization process will not be enough to cover all that. However, this income may help repair the most serious ecological damage and service certain debts. To a certain extent, privatization should help to restructure—or rather demonopolize—the economy.

[Doleckova] All this is going to be extremely costly, and yet the plan is for privatization to supply more than 18 billion korunas [Kc] to the state budget.

[Skalicky] The National Property Fund was conceived in such a way as to keep privatization income separate from the state budget. The law defines what the income from privatization can be used for. However, this is only one side of the coin. We could say that putting privatization income into the state budget goes slightly against our original intentions. On the other hand, we must ask ourselves what this income should be used for. In any case, this income is part of our publicly-controlled finances.

For legal reasons, the National Property Fund had to be established as an independent legal entity but, in fact, it has remained part of the state sector. In this connection, I must say that at this time, when we want to stimulate certain growth factors, it is convenient to use money from the National Property Fund. This, of course, can be done only to the extent that it will not jeopardize the fulfillment of the Fund's original, fundamental tasks.

[Doleckova] The Fund's income is estimated at Kc25 billion. Are you not afraid that the Fund's main tasks will be jeopardized?

[Skalicky] I am convinced that the Fund's income will be higher. The figure of Kc25 billion is a very conservative estimate. I expect that the capital market will stabilize next year to the point where the Fund will be able to enter this market and acquire more money by selling shares. Direct income from privatization projects is one thing, and the Fund's property, amounting to several billions, is another. This property will be sold off gradually. The main thing is for us to rapidly acquire more money and to be able to cope generally with the temporary difficulties of insolvency.

[Doleckova] From time to time, sparks fly between your ministry and the National Property Fund. Are there bones of contention between you?

[Skalicky] The bones of contention are a natural consequence of the way our two institutions function, and they are no more significant than those between other sectors. The only difference may lie in the fact that, in our case, our common work-related problems are discussed in public to a greater extent.

[Doleckova] There are reports that the National Property Fund wants not only to sell shares, but also to buy them, to improve its own portfolio. Do you agree with this idea?

[Skalicky] Basically, I am of the opinion that the Fund is not an entrepreneurial entity. It was established to carry out government decisions on privatization. I believe that the Fund should focus on rapidly "unloading" its property, and not on improving its own portfolio. I think that the Fund could, for example, start to scrutinize the privatization projects that have already been implemented, and in which the state still has some shares, and gradually sell off the projects that do not need this scrutiny.

[Doleckova] So am I correct in saying that you are against the Fund purchasing shares?

[Skalicky] That is right. There may be exceptions, however. For example, if a company with stock partially belonging to the National Property Fund issues new shares under advantageous conditions to its shareholders, and these shares can be sold later at a good profit, then I see no reason why the Fund should not carry out such a transaction. This is something different from operating systematically to optimize the portfolio owned by an entrepreneurial body.

[Doleckova] The National Property Fund used to sell property before it was technically entitled to do so. Several disputes arose, such as those over the Knizni Velkoobchod [Book Wholesale] and Karlovarsky Porcelan [Karlovy Vary China] companies. Was the Fund's course of action correct?

[Skalicky] We maintain that the legal interpretation that questioned those sales was incorrect. The Fund is entitled to conclude agreements on behalf of the state, but the property is actually transferred from the founder, who has been entitled to administer the property so far, to the new owner.

[Doleckova] Several coupon-holding investors in the first wave of privatization were disappointed by the behavior of the Fund, because during the first privatization wave, which had not yet ended then, the Fund sold some companies to foreign investors who then became majority shareholders. The majority of complaints were made by investment funds, who say they would not buy shares in such a company.

[Skalicky] It was not the National Property Fund but the ministry and the government who decided how many privatization shares should be issued, how many of them should be sold to specific persons, and how many should be transferred to communities, etc. After a shareholders' company had been established and some of the company shares designated for coupon privatization, the government could then decide to sell some of the shares to a foreign partner to increase the company's fixed assets. If such a decision was made, the Fund carried out the approved privatization project, and everything was alright. However, if the Fund did not have official authorization to sell shares to foreign investors, this was a different matter. Nevertheless, we have to realize that, for a long time, the National Property Fund has been owned by only one "shareholder," and this shareholder had to make "business-related" decisions.

[Doleckova] Did the first wave of privatization meet your ministry's expectations? What do you expect from the second wave? Do you consider coupon privatization to be a method of privatizing whatever would otherwise remain unprivatized?

[Skalicky] I definitely do not think that this is its purpose. Coupon privatization will be used to privatize about a third of all the property designated for privatization in the second wave. Our decision to carry out this unique process has several motives. First, there is a moral aspect to it: That is, to enable all the population to participate in privatization. Second, and a more important element, is the fact that we decided to carry out privatization quickly. Moreover, we have to take into account the purchasing power of the public. We do not want to sell all our commercial property abroad. It has become patently obvious that, despite the existence of coupon privatization [which is free of charge], privatization-related loans make up an important part of all the credits granted to the private sector. This means that privatization reduces the overall sum of available credits. The third reason is that large enterprises cannot be privatized quickly. After the first wave of privatization ended, shares were transferred to the new owners, and the size of the private sector rose immediately to 44 percent. The second wave should help increase this percentage.

[Doleckova] There were changes in ownership, but people think that the privatized companies have not changed their behavior.

[Skalicky] Changes in the behavior of enterprises privatized by coupon privatization are certainly slow, and are not as visible as the changes in the behavior of companies privatized by standard methods, such as direct sale to a particular individual or company. In this case, the change of the owner is more visible. We need a longer time to see changes in the behavior of companies that have been privatized by coupon privatization. It is a process that will only gradually become more manifest. Several months have passed since the shares were transferred to new owners, and this is about enough time for the new owners to find out what the situation is in their companies.

[Doleckova] What lifespan will your ministry have?

[Skalicky] It is difficult right now to say when the ministry will complete all the tasks it has. We have to manage not only "large privatization," but we also have a number of less conspicuous duties, such as the restitution laws, the agenda for the property of communities, granting exceptions when terminating state enterprises, administrative tasks ensuing from the final phase of "small privatization," and so forth. I believe, however, that within a few years there will be no need for a dedicated state administrative body dealing exclusively with privatization, that is, our ministry. Another state administrative body will be able to tackle the remaining activities, which will continue for years.

Dlouhy Reacts to Volkswagen's Production Plans

AU2809141093 Prague CTK in English 2047 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—The strategy with which Volkswagen wants to make its production programme more effective will put much greater demands on all its suppliers, Czech Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy said at a press conference today.

The car maker Skoda thus will place much higher demands on domestic suppliers of components. The Czech side will do its best to enable the greatest possible number of domestic firms to supply Skoda. Volkswagen's new strategy, however, plans the use of producers worldwide, and will thus force domestic firms to take a hard look at themselves, Dlouhy said.

We are interested in our suppliers and want them to provide Skoda with as much goods as possible, but it cannot be expected that we are going to have at our disposal any direct tools with which to force it to buy from domestic firms, Dlouhy stressed. It must be made clear to all suppliers that they have to expect such a development, he added.

Volkswagen's new strategy was discussed by Dlouhy and the chairman of the German car maker's board of directors, Ferdinand Piech, in Prague on Thursday [23 September].

The meeting took place in the wake of Volkswagen's cancellation of a 1.4 billion USD investment in Skoda last week.

Volkswagen and Skoda, based in Mlada Boleslav, Central Bohemia, created a joint venture in 1991.

Trade Unions Send Protest Letter to Klaus

AU2909105393 Prague CTK in English 1736 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 27 (CTK)—Czech trade union representatives who met on Saturday [25 September] sent a letter to Premier Vaclav Klaus today expressing the belief that the government cannot view and excuse its non-fulfillment of several points of the General Agreement as mere time slippage and the postponement of several deadlines.

In the non-fulfillment of the General Agreement concluded annually between the government, the unions and employers to ensure their close cooperation in social and economic matters, the unions legitimately see serious negative consequences for groups of employees, the representatives of the Bohemian and Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS) write in the letter, a copy of which was also given to CTK.

They specify certain problems whose solution they see as the basis for work on the next General Agreement and essential for the maintenance of social harmony.

They consider it urgent that amendments are made to minimal wage levels, to regulations concerning the pay of employees in organisations funded by the state budget and some other organisations, and that their wages be brought closer to those in the business sector.

The union representatives call on the government to put bills before parliament on supplementary pension schemes and accident insurance, and ask that money be diverted to social and medical insurance and to unemployment benefit for both employees and employers by the end of 1994 at the latest.

Protest is registered at the government's intention to ban union activity in the civil service.

The letter says it is essential that a bill limiting clash of interests be put forward, and that measures be taken to limit tax evasion and enabling state tax inspection to be improved. It also calls for bills on the sale of flats, the protection of tenants and the creation of a policy to support housing construction, including that of public housing. Requests are made for legislative measures concerning the education of the young generation and the creation of a policy for the development of science and research.

In the letter's conclusion, the unionists express their disagreement with the decision to raise the retirement age, part of the proposed law on pensions.

Military Agreement Signed With Slovenia

LD2709212893 Prague CTK in English 2017 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 27 (CTK)— An agreement on military cooperation between the Czech Republic and Slovenia was signed here by Czech Defence Minister Antonin Baudys and Slovenian Defence Minister Janez Jansa who came for a two-day visit to the Czech Republic today at Baudys' invitation.

The agreement provides for cooperation between the two countries' armed forces in military training, logistics and armaments for the next five to eight years.

The Czech Republic can offer Slovenia certain types of spare weapons and weapons systems from the Czech Army's arsenals. The Czech Republic is a producer of small arms, Baudys told journalists after his meeting with Jansa. He added, however, that this was a question of further negotiations.

He said that the situation in the former Yugoslavia as well as problems connected with army building in both countries were discussed during the meeting. I was pleasantly surprised to what extent our assessments of the security situation in view of the events in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union are identical, Baudys said.

Referring to the signed document, the Slovenian defence minister stressed that it was very rarely that an agreement on cooperation on such level was signed during the first meeting. He said that Slovenia had similar agreements with Hungary and Austria. An agreement with Croatia had also been prepared but given the current situation in Croatia had not yet been signed, he added.

Asked whether or not Slovenia was considering joining NATO, Jansa said that Slovenia was in the same situation as Central European countries. As to the possibility of NATO's intervention into the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jansa said that although such action could not at present solve the situation the threat of NATO armies intervention could serve as a prevention instrument if the conflict spread. He said Slovenia would support such an eventuality. The question is, however, whether NATO intervention would be realistic, Jansa said.

Russia Offers To Repay Interest With Wheat

LD2709232193 Prague CTK in English 2123 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Washington, Sept 27 (CTK)—Russia is willing to supply free wheat to the Czech Republic as a way of serving the whole or a part of the interest on its loan, Czech Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik said today after meeting his Russian counterpart Boris Fedorov.

Russia's willingness to serve the interest is sending an important signal our way, Kocarnik said, noting that it would be the first time ever the Czech Republic was paid back part of its loan to Russia.

Fedorov said this year's wheat harvest will top Russia's needs and expressed willingness to talk the repayment of the debt. Details are to be worked out immediately after returning from Washington, Kocarnik said.

Russia owed five billion USD [U.S. dollars] to the former Czechoslovakia. Two thirds of this figure, or 3.33 billion USD, is the sum it owes to the Czech Republic. The interest alone has grown to 164 million USD from 1990.

At next week's International Investment Bank (IIB) meeting in Moscow, experts will be taking a look at the whole of the Russian debt to the Czech Republic.

The debt talks were dropped after Russian Deputy Premier Oleg Lobov stepped down earlier this month, Kocarnik said.

The Czechs and Russians agree that the IIB is in need of an overhaul to translate the member countries' capital share into adequate voting power, Kocarnik commented. As it is, members now pay their membership fees, but obtain little benefit from the bank.

The Czech Republic is going to suggest that the IIM [as received] should be linked with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which could help the IIM [as received] become more suited to the needs of countries undergoing transformation, Kocarnik concluded.

ODA Favors Ending Talks on Church Restitution

AU2809131793 Prague CTK in English 1214 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), part of the government coalition, believes that the Small Four—a coalition commission dealing with the restitution of church property and the future form of church-state relations—should end its activity, ODA Deputy Chairman Daniel Kroupa told journalists today.

He said the commission made up of lower-ranking members of government coalition parties, had been recently treading water and moving in a vicious circle.

Kroupa said the ODA was convinced that further talks on church property restitution should be conducted on the level of the coalition parties' chairmen. He said the ODA decided on this proposal at its congress last night.

The ODA did not accuse anyone and the proposal was not aimed at alarming its coalition partners, Kroupa said, but at bringing negotiations out of deadlock.

Kroupa said the ODA was planning to come up with a proposal for the settlement of church property restitution at a meeting of coalition party leaders. The ODA considered the issue to be urgent as it hampered the privatisation process and needed to be solved as quickly as possible in a way acceptable to all parties involved, Kroupa said.

Poll Shows ODS, Dlouhy Most Popular

AU2809143793 Prague CTK in English 1647 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—Fifty-three percent of the Czech population view the present regime as better than the previous communist one, and 51 percent expect the country's economic situation to improve, according to a

poll of 1,519 Czechs conducted by the Centre of Empirical Research in early September.

Some 60 percent of citizens are willing to participate in parliamentary elections, and 64 percent would take part in communal elections. The coalition Civic Democratic Party (ODS) maintains its leading position in the election-preference rate, with 30 percent support.

The opposition Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) would receive 14 percent in parliamentary elections, while the popularity of the coalition Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) increased to 13 percent from 11 percent in August.

The poll showed that Czech President Vaclav Havel was trusted by 68 percent of Czechs, while Premier Vaclav Klaus and chairman of the parliament, Milan Uhde, were trusted by 65 percent and 38 percent respectively. Fifty-three percent of citizens trust the government as a whole.

Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy (ODA) remains the most popular politician, favoured by 83 percent of those polled. Transport Minister and former Czechoslovak Premier Jan Strasky (ODS) trails behind with 69 percent, and Premier Klaus (ODS chairman) placed third (68 percent).

From a general standpoint, Czech citizens support the basic trend of Czech social developments. Seventeen percent of those questioned said they were satisfied, 46 percent inclined to this stand.

However, from a concrete point of view, dissatisfaction prevails (56 percent), the poll showed. Apart from the 51 percent of those who expect the country's economy to improve, 25 percent view further economic development skeptically, and 25 percent do not expect any changes. The majority of citizens (87 percent) are convinced that in the course of economic reform certain groups of people gained advantages at the expense of others.

Parliament Deputies Criticize Government

AU2609202793 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Sep 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by Stefan Hrcko and Martin Krno: "Illegally Appointed Commissioners"]

[Text] Bratislava (from our correspondents Stefan Hrcko and Martin Krno)—At the opening of the 22d session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the deputies honored with a minute of silence their deceased fellow Viliam Sojko (Slovak National Party). The parliament spent most of the day dealing with personnel-related issues including interpellations, and questions addressed to members of the cabinet. First, however, the plenum launched the adoption of the detailed draft agenda for the session that included as many as 33 items.

They voted in favor of the motion by Igor Gazdik (Club of Independent Deputies) to remove from the agenda the passing of the vote of no-confidence in certain members of the Slovak Television Council and revoking their membership in that institution. On the instigation of Olga Marhulikova (Party of the Democratic Left), a majority of the deputies asked the government to submit a report to them before the end of the session on the draft new concept of state administration and self-administration. They also passed the motion by Igor Pribulo (Club of Independent Deputies) that the parliament not discuss at this session the government bill on the restitution of church property, especially as it is not at all clear how large the property in question is.

The National Council acknowledged the resignation as deputy of Marian Vanko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), chairman of the Supreme Control Office of the Slovak Republic, and Peter Sokol and Marian Vrabec (both Slovak National Party), deputy chairmen of this office, and that the mandate of deputy Sojko expired as a result of his death. The vacated posts were assumed by the following substitutes: Jana Sudekova (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), Angela Stefanikova, Miloslav Kona, and Igor Maly (all three Slovak National Party). The deputies also acknowledged the resignation of Blazena Koctuchova, Ida Rapaicova, Anton Hlinko, Pavol Haspro, and Jozef Heriban as members of the Slovak Television Council.

Because members of the cabinet were not present in the hall at the time the interpellations and deputies' questions were to begin, on the motion by Frantisek Miklosko (Christian Democratic Movement), the parliament adjourned the session.

After a recess of two and one-half hours, the deputies were able to proceed with this item of the agenda. Miroslav Pollak (Christian Democratic Movement) asserted that Marian Tkac, vice governor of the Slovak National Bank, collaborated with the State Security [StB] under the cover names of Riman [Roman] and Krajan [country fellow], and asked the prime minister that he insist, and not only in this instance, on honoring the screening law. Numerous deputies criticized the members of the cabinet—particularly Vladimir Meciar—for not responding to their interpellations. Milan Knazko (Club of Independent Deputies), for instance, pointed out that he has been waiting since April for an explanation from the prime minister of why he halted the preparations for the sale of 30 billion korunas worth of special (military) technology to a state that is not associated with any politically sensitive region. Andrej Dudas (Party of the Democratic Left) questioned the integrity of the privatization process at the Svikon Svidnik enterprise. He pointed out that the father of the head of the Government Office and the current state secretary at the Privatization Ministry was interested in this enterprise, and so was the president of the Slovak Harvard Fund. Miklosko pointed out that Vladimir Minac promoted in his works in the past the socialist regime. He added that this writer currently contributes to SLOVENSKE POHLADY '93 [Slovak Views '93] and criticized that despite this, the magazine is subsidized by the Ministry of Culture.

Jan Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement) concluded the criticism of the current conditions in society by an appeal that the government submit a specific short-term program for leading Slovakia out of the crisis, or resign. Hvezdon Koctuch (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) reacted to this saying that the economic situation in Slovakia is relatively better than in the former GDR. Jozef Polacko (Christian Democratic Movement) pointed out that the state bodies can only do what the law permits. Nevertheless, no law authorized the government to appoint eight government commissioners for the transformation of the regional state administration and self-administration. Therefore, these appointments are illegal and, on top of that, according to Polacko, their work assignment violates the laws on local state administration in effect. Miklosko recalled that the prime minister has consistently ignored interpellations in the parliament, and that, for seven months now, he kept refusing to sign the law on the payment of the state compensation and family allowances without proving the amount of income every month. He added that this is "arrogance without par." Ernoe Rozsa (Coexistence) complained that the removal of the community-name signposts in Hungarian contravenes the laws in effect, including the Constitution and the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms. A great debate arose over the appearance of Vladimir Meciar on the most recent Kroky [Steps] television program, in which he said, among other things, that an economic miracle is in progress in Slovakia. Mikulas Dzurinda (Christian Democratic Movement) asked the prime minister to publish the economic indicators on which he based his claim. He also asked what means were used to finance the reception given at the Government Office on the occasion of the award of the Femina Ave Prize to Anna Nagy. In the framework of related comments,

Health Minister Viliam Sobona observed that the controversial statement was not made by the prime minister but that it was a quotation of an unnamed high-ranking representative of the IMF.

In the conclusion of interpellations, Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak replied to questions raised by some deputies concerning the Russian-Slovak military [cooperation] agreement. He maintained that similar agreements are commonplace between the states in Western and Eastern Europe. He added that the agreement is in no way binding, it only contains general stipulations facilitating eventual talks on specific issues. After his contribution, Sobona informed that the decisive meeting with World Bank representatives on the loan for the reform of health care in Slovakia will take place this morning. The session of National Council continues today.

KDH Says Meciar's Resignation 'Only Solution'

LD2709231093 Prague CTK in English 1814 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava, Sept 27 (CTK)—The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), an opposition party in Slovakia, believes that Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar's resignation would be the only solution to the current political crisis in Slovakia, says a statement which KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky handed to CTK today.

The KDH considered Meciar's statement on the possibility of a non-confidence vote on the premier which he made during his regular television appearance on Sunday an underhand move, Carnogursky said.

He said that the Slovak premier again made use of his televised speech for demagogic speculations and the pursuit of his own political interests.

The KDH appealed to Slovak Television to make it possible for opposition parties also to regularly express their stands on the political situation, Carnogursky said.

In his regular televised address on Sunday Meciar said that new elections were not necessary for Slovakia because not all other suggested solutions had been applied yet. He also said that Slovakia was a politically stable country which was perfecting its political system.

Moravcik: Treaty Not Aimed Against Third Country

LD2809000893 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, stressed that the Slovak-Romanian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was not a pact against a third country. He reacted in this way to the recent statement of the Hungarian foreign minister who had described as anachronism that section of the treaty concerning the coordination of policy between Slovakia and Romania in relation to national minorities. Speaking to the Press Agency of the Slovak Republic [TA SR] Jozef Moravcik added that a policy coordinated between two governments in relation to minorities did not mean that both countries have allied themselves against a third country.

Meciar Interviewed on Economy, Russian Ties

LD2409214693 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Correspondent] Your remark on television about the Slovak economic miracle has provoked contradictory reactions. It satisfied only a section of the people that the direction our economy is taking is, as you said, the right one and has found a positive reaction amongst foreign experts. On the other hand, your remark met with the hard reality of the dissatisfaction of another section of the population. To use the words of one deputy at the current session of the parliament, by citing acceptable figures while not taking into consideration the alarming ones you have used what is called the pincers method. Prime Minister, where therefore is the Slovak economic miracle?

[Meciar] I am not the original author of the expression. Its author is Mr. Camdessus [IMF official] and he said it on television and on radio. [passage omitted]

When talking about an economic miracle where does it lie? Slovakia is proceeding consistantly along the road of economic reforms. Slovakia has one leg out of the worst. Although a crisis phenomenon is now emerging this due to us having to shift the weight in order to lift the other leg. Let us however consider the facts.

First, Slovakia is the only one of the post-communist countries whose balance of trade is in the black. This is the first time in our history and that change occured under this government. Slovakia exports to the market economy countries more than 60 percent of its output. This is the first time under this government since all our markets previously used to be in the East. Slovakia has restructured its foreign markets. An association agreement with the EC will be signed on 4 October and this will give us certain guarantees. It even has the advantage that the West will free customs tarriffs earlier then we shall. Moreover, our protection policy has been accepted.

However, let us go further. We did not have a national bank in 1992. We had our own currency by 8 February. The exchange of money which took place was not confiscatory despite the fact that the opposition alleged that it was. From 8 February up to, basically, the end of the June we were in an international banking isolation and despite this our currency reserves did not decline. On the contrary, they grew, albeit very slowly. The Slovak Republic was accepted on 1 July as a trustworthy member of the international financial community; 180

countries of the world expressed confidence in us. This is why I do not know why a dozen deputies in this country do not want to express such confidence in us.

Furthermore, steps were previously taken leading toward inflation. The Slovak Government dealt with hyperinflation which does not exist. Again, steps were previously taken leading toward a super-devaluation, a floating exchange rate between our korunna and the dollar. This, however, did not happen. Although we had to carry out a ten percent devaluation this was rather a concession to foreign currency markets and was necessary. The Slovak currency today, seven months since its coming into existence, is one of the few that is stabilized, after the Czech korunna which, however, became stabilized as a result of differenct influence, although I do not wish to go into it in detail.

Doesn't anyone regard this as a success? We are at present gaining confidence of all financial markets and currently Slovakia is assessed out of four groups—somewhere between the first and the second one. Sometimes it comes nearer to the first one, sometimes to the second one, which means that it is in a high category of international creditworthiness. If we at home have failed to understand this or if we do not wish to see this for political reasons only in order to seek mistakes in the government then I am sorry for all those who do this. Slovakia is becoming increasingly a reliable and stable factor. Any questioning of this is unnecessary, improper, and amounts to disrespect for one's own state.

[Correspondent] Various pronouncements have been made on the situation in Russia, some clear-cut and some controversial. One thing gives cause for concern, though, namely that the developments could have a marked impact on our trade contacts: those that are in existence, or those projected. Agreements have been difficult to conclude recently. The situation can also affect ratification of the recently signed Slovak-Russian treaty. Do you suppose that even if the [Russian] domestic political situation develops in a positive way, the recent development will have an adverse effect on our economy?

[Meciar] This year, we have held two rounds of talks with Russia. I visited Russia twice. Each time extremely important agreements on economic cooperation were concluded. We have to start again and create a completely fresh set of economic relations with Russia. We are doing so in a model way. That is why some are jealous of us, saying that Slovakia is without competition in Russia and its status is special.

No sooner does [Minister of Economy Ludovit] Cernak dismiss such comments than a Polish paper expresses criticism, questioning Slovakia's standing with Russia. Who is right, then?

As for the events in Russia, we have been saying from the very start that we support, and will continue to support, those forces which guarantee the development of democracy, market economy, mutual cooperation. We have never doubted this.

I am familiar with a situation like the one arising now [in Russia]. I know many of the circumstances well. I therefore hope that the forces backing Mr. Yeltsin in his struggle will contribute to his success. [passage omitted]

Republic Becomes New Member of IAEA

LD2709200493 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] The 37th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has admitted Slovakia unanimously by acclamation, as the new member of this important international agency within the United Nations system. Slovakia's admission as a regular member signifies another important step along the road of the country's integration within the structures of world organizations.

Government Devalues Forint by 4.5 Percent

LD2809180793 Budapest MTI in English 1651 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 28 (MTI)—Hungary's government, in agreement with the National Bank of Hungary, has devalued the forint by 4.5 per cent as of September 29, 1993.

The measure is to adjust the forint to real exchange rates on international money markets.

Defense Minister To Visit Moscow 29 Sep

LD2809210393 Budapest MTI in English 2031 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Moscow, September 28 (MTI)—Lajos Fur will arrive in Moscow on Wednesday [29 September] for three days—the first visit to Russia by a Hungarian defence minister.

Fur visited Moscow twice before: in 1990, for a session of the then Warsaw Pact's political consultative committee, and in December 1991, three days before the Soviet Union broke up.

Fur will hold talks with counterpart Pavel Grachev on links between the two armies and cooperation in military technology.

They will also discuss the Yugoslav crisis.

On Thursday, Fur meets Hungarian pilots in Krasnodar training to fly MiG-29 jets Hungary received in lieu of Russian debt. On Friday, he speaks at a Moscow staff officers' academy.

Jeszenszky Views Romanian, Slovak Relations

AU2809151793 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 25 Sep 93 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Janos Avar and Gabor Lambert; place and date not given: "The Left Wing Cannot Expect Full Western Support—Interview With Jeszenszky During the Week of Polish and Russian Changes"]

[Text] [MAGYAR NEMZET] As is seen by this week's developments, the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe continues to be changeable and we are living through a period of constant, sometimes dramatic changes. To what extent is it possible to follow this with some kind of foreign political strategy and to what extent is Hungarian diplomacy forced to improvise?

[Jeszenszky] I am surprised if MAGYAR NEMZET does not sense the very definite continuity in Hungarian foreign politics. Hungarian foreign policy is distinguished from that of a number of our neighbors because it is, as is visibly represented by the government since 1989, a fully developed concept. We do not see any elements in the program of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]—which we represented in opposition in 1989 and then in government since 1990—which would need to be revised.

It Takes Two To Make a Bargain

[Jeszenszky] I would also add that we have made a definite change in the orientation of our foreign policy: Instead of the eastern orientation that was forced upon us, we have turned toward the West, while we have correct and friendly relations with our immediate neighbors and Russia on the basis of equal rights. All this has been successful, even if we are far from being able to say that we have achieved all our goals. We are not members of NATO and the European Community, but we are close enough to them and we are no longer received as strange guests in the NATO and EC offices in Brussels. In addition to this, as is proved by my talks with [Russian Foreign Minister] Kozyrev in Moscow, we have managed to reconcile the two extremes. In the case of our neighbors, let us remember that between the two world wars, Hungary was surrounded by an openly antagonistic little entente and our relations with Austria were not very good either. We now have seven neighbors, with four of whom our relations are very good, and even where the political relations are not satisfactory, economic relations are developing spectacularly, as with Romania.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Nevertheless, Hungarian foreign policy has had some surprises.

[Jeszenszky] Naturally, in fact, we can say that it has had disappointments. Certain developments occurred that no one could have predicted, and these certainly limit the possibilities of Hungarian foreign politics. I am partly thinking of the south Slav crisis, but we could also mention that the spirit of the Christmas of 1989 does not prevail with all our neighbors.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Therefore, although continuity can be pinpointed in the strategy, hesitation has been seen in the tactical steps. To what extent were these influenced by the background of Hungarian politics? To what extent can we say that Hungarian foreign policy is still based on six-party coordination? Was the detailed report you gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee before and after your visit to Romania an exceptional example of the cooperation of parties or is this characteristic of the situation?

[Jeszenszky] Allow me not to give diplomatic answers to everything. Let us start by saying that this need for consensus has always existed, and I believe that this is clear as regards my intentions and the direction of Hungarian foreign politics. However, it takes two to make a bargain; therefore, if the quotation does not seem to be too pompous, I would like to refer to [19th century statesman] Kossuth who said that: With them and through them if they will, without them and even against them, if necessary. Therefore I, the unworthy successor, also say to the opposition and other parties that there is a way and a need to strive together for goals in the

admittedly more difficult circumstances, but we will represent and serve these goals even without them. This might not sound diplomatic: However strange it seems (and some people might condemn me for this), coordination is time-consuming. I must say that we often did not have time or I did not consider it necessary to coordinate certain minor issues because it seemed that the consensus already existed on common principles.

We heard such criticism at the acceptance of Slovakia to the Council of Europe, but I still maintain that the politics we followed was the most adequate in the given situation and it had its results. We also had prior coordination—for example, I spoke to Istvan Szent-Ivanyi on the telephone before he left for Strasbourg. The criticism and debate to do with this issue had party political motivations and were part of the preparations for the election campaign.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] After Lithuania, the left wing has also forged ahead in Poland. The situation in Russia is very shaky and confusing. Can all this change the views of the West on Eastern and Central Europe as a region or will it basically remain the same?

[Jeszenszky] It will probably have an impact on Western thinking. It is still difficult to say what will follow from this because much depends on the outcome of the Russian situation. Starting from the premise that Yeltsin wins this first round, the second round in December and the results of the elections will fundamentally influence the decisions we can expect in the next months and in the long run. If we only concentrate on Lithuania and Poland, we must see that, in principle, interstate relations are good and correct, if it can be assumed that these regimes are not antagonistic and serious objections against the domestic practice of human rights do not exist. We can see that Western politics seemingly does not distinguish between the situations where it is proven that the government of a country consists of non-communists or former communists. However, for example THE GUARDIAN very well categorized what forces are in the government in various countries and what other factors are aspiring for government....

Therefore, no one should doubt that the Western institutions, governments, and factors that determine NATO's politics seriously differentiate between those who spied on them a few years ago and considered them as enemies and those who have been their supporters and convinced followers for a long time. In other words, to be concrete: Obviously, we will have correct and good relations with Lithuania and Poland regardless of who is in government, but our relations will not be as confidential as with the former governments and deputies.

To Get to the Goal Together

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Does this mean that you expect a different attitude in the treatment of the region's countries?

[Jeszenszky] This will not be spectacular and it might not be easy to recognize, but I have no doubt that it will influence the thinking and possibly serious long-term decisions.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Can this also apply to Hungary, depending on the outcome of the elections?

[Jeszenszky] First of all—I say this very frankly—I would not bet on the MDF's bad election performance; therefore, the MDF might cause a big surprise. It also has to be seen that what happened in Poland was not a big, landslide-like change in the political taste of electors, which often happens in the United States: Two consecutive elections can bring completely different results. Only 10 percent of the electors voted for the communist successor party in Poland. I do not want to discuss how communist or social democratic this is, how many new, young people it has, and how strong the party reform—a term used by the Western media—is in this party. This 10 percent is not a large number and I believe that something similar can be expected in Hungary. I do not think that many people believe that whatever was spoilt by the communists in 40 years will be remedied by their successors after a four-year rest. A large proportion of people have been disturbed by all the information on the radio and the openness of party politics, which they are not used to. They have never lived in this kind of society. In their confusion, they say that they do not know whom to vote for, so they will not vote. This is why the outcome of the Hungarian elections is so unpredictable now. This is why forecasts are worthless, because it is impossible to predict how many of this 50 percent (the proportion is approximately this in Hungary, too) will go to vote and whom they will vote for under the momentary impressions.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] If we assume this Western differentiation, it will probably have an effect on the Visegrad cooperation. As far as we are aware, the Polish left-wing parties are not very keen on the Visegrad cooperation. In your view, what will happen to these initiatives?

[Jeszenszky] I do not have authentic information on the Polish left-wing parties' views on Visegrad. I assume that they want to continue it. Rather than Poland, it is Slovakia and the Czech Republic that are causing problems. Although at the latest Hungarian-Czech Foreign Ministerial meeting, both sides were satisfied to see that we do not have real problems. Although the Prague government circles use different formulations, we have common efforts regarding the European integration, and it would be completely pointless trying to get admission to the detriment of the other side. The point is that everyone should quickly reach the goal, if possible. Who crosses the tape first is a secondary issue. Therefore, regardless of when and if we will have a Visegrad-type spectacular summit, Central Europe's common goals are clear and so is the fact that the economic progress of three or four Visegrad countries definitely gives them the

right to have their turn in the second round, after the countries of the European Free Trade Association.

The Chances of EC Overtaking

[MAGYAR NEMZET] If the West has these very subtle reservations in connection with Poland, then it is very difficult to imagine that this will not affect our admission because it is unlikely that the West would not want to admit Poland or admit Hungary before Poland.

[Jeszenszky] This is a rather hypothetical question. It is possible that, as an integrating force, the European Community will overtake NATO again. However, it is rather evident that if a country is admitted to the European Community, then it will probably also be a member of NATO. The essence of this for Hungary is that the possibilities do exist and it might also be advantageous for the electors if Hungary can remain on the course that it has followed and we continue to become integrated in the European organizations.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Have we prepared for the danger mentioned by many Western and Hungarian analysts, namely that the forces of expansive empirical restoration get the upper hand in Russia over the democratic forces? This would create a new situation for all neighbors.

[Jeszenszky] Hungarian foreign policy, just as those in the West and the East, takes this into consideration. On my way home from Moscow, I was reading the Russian-language THE NEW YORK TIMES. It had a passage on what is also said in Moscow circles, namely that a tacit supposition exists, if such an unfortunate event took place in Russia, then NATO, putting its current hesitation aside, would immediately ensure the future, stability, and independence of Central European countries. This is a view from Moscow. However, in my view, Hungary's policy should span over a longer term. Therefore, we must not look forward to a turn of events in Russia that would immediately raise Hungary's value for NATO but, considering the historical horizon and our long-term interests, it is obviously more desirable that our integration in Europe takes longer, but we do not have an empire as a neighbor and the eastern border of the country is not a political and social border of systems. I am worried about the reemergence of a completely unstable and dictatorial system, the danger of which cannot be excluded, rather than about an openly communist system in our neighborhood. Therefore, it is in Hungary's interest to have stable countries east of it because it is not good to be a front country from an economic point of view either.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] During your talks in Moscow, did you find that the domestic wrangle will have an effect on the reception of Hungary's request for NATO membership? In other words, can it be expected that, if Yeltsin is forced to make a compromise with his opposition, this will in some way affect Hungary's integration efforts?

[Jeszenszky] First of all, it is difficult to imagine that Yeltsin will make another compromise. He has already attempted this and the result was catastrophic. It resulted in slowing down and paralyzing the political and economic processes. This is unlikely to happen again. However, if Yeltsin gets the upper hand as a result of the trust of the electors and he is able to carry a long-term politics and then an economic reform to success, then the road will also be open for Russia—although not next year—to establish institutional contacts with the European Community and NATO. Naturally, it is in Hungary's short-term interest to be integrated as soon as possible and for the military and security stability to result in the development of economic stability. However, until the Russian situation becomes clear, these will also hamper the process.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The membership of another one of our neighbors in the Council of Europe will be on the agenda next week. Hungary will eventually have to decide how it wants to vote on this issue. Can we learn anything about this?

We Wait With Our Vote

[Jeszenszky] First of all, I cannot give a definite answer to this because I do not know how the Council of Europe's parliamentary general assembly will vote. It is possible to say what the governments are likely to do, but we do not know how the independent representatives will vote. This is the first hurdle that Romania has to take in the process of being admitted. Events like an attack—for whatever reason—on a Gypsy community resulting in casualties are very bad for Romania just now. Thank God this was not a Hungarian-Romanian conflict at all. Even an event like this can decide the result at voting time. Two tendencies have been fighting with each other in the Council of Europe in the past year. The traditional view that was also applied in our case was that the Council of Europe is a very exclusive club that can be entered but only by perfect gentlemen. The other view that has now become more dominant is that confidence has to be given in advance because it is easier to have an influence over a country that is already a member.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Do we hope to gain something by not revealing our voting intentions until the last moment?

[Jeszenszky] We do not want to gain any advantage, but I really am not sure whether a time will come when the Hungarian Government has to decide on how to vote. The date is the question because even if the parliamentary assembly decides to support Romania's admittance, the next ministerial meeting is due in November when the assembly's recommendation can be accepted. It is possible that an extraordinary ministerial committee meeting will be called before the Vienna Council of Europe summit, but this has not yet been decided. I assume that this will partly depend on the proportion of votes, as well as the outcome of the voting at the

parliamentary assembly. If the assembly is divided and the yes vote has a small majority, then it is less likely that the admittance will be seen as urgent. It is also possible that this whole issue will be postponed. The views are not at all divided on the necessity for Romania's membership in the Council of Europe. I dare say that we urge this more than most European countries because one of our neighbors is the issue where the second largest community of Hungarians are living after Hungary. Why should Romania and, together with this, the Hungarians in Transylvania be left out of the Council of Europe? In fact, there are many things that are easier to safeguard, even by the members of the Hungarian minority, if Romania is a Council of Europe member. Naturally, it would be desirable if Romania fulfilled all the requirements for membership without any doubts—if it had a national minority law, a law on schooling that ensured mother tongue education including the university level, and the self-government had a guarantee for actual power and assets. There are also prisoners in Romania whose status is more than doubtful according to many foreigners as well as Hungarians: Only Hungarians and Gypsies are among those convicted for taking part in the lynching after the revolutionary events in December [1989] or the tragic clashes in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], although it is of public knowledge that the masses brought in from the nearby villages who had been made drunk attacked the peacefully demonstrating Hungarians. If several issues had been resolved, we would not only be guessing how Hungary would vote—just as we would not have any doubts about the vote of any other member of the Council of Europe.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What concrete proofs are we expecting from Romania to facilitate the continuation of this process of negotiations on a higher level? Sometimes it seems that in the case of both Slovakia and Romania, there is a better understanding on a foreign ministerial level than what is later confirmed on a higher level.

[Jeszenszky] Indeed, the foreign ministerial level is very satisfactory. Foreign relations are traditionally conducted by foreign ministries. In recent years, however, some kind of summit diplomacy has come to the forefront, but the meetings of prime ministers and presidents are always prepared by foreign ministries. Therefore, when the foreign ministers understand each other and manage to agree, the final word can then be said on a higher level. The real question is what steps Romania will take after my recent visit, and I hope that the implementation of these measures were promoted by the recent meeting because many things were said here that have not been said before. I do not believe that another higher level meeting could do more to promote this.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Does this also apply to Slovakia?

[Jeszenszky] The situation in Slovakia is not quite the same because the president's sphere of authority in Romania is much more powerful than in Slovakia. In Slovakia, Prime Minister Meciar has a much more direct say in politics, including foreign policy. In Romania, since the time of Titulescu [foreign minister before World War II], the Foreign Ministry has been deciding foreign relations. Romania has a good professional diplomacy that did not have any problems switching from the Ceausescu line—that was very unpleasant even for them—to the current line that advocates cooperation with the West.

Balladur's Realization

[MAGYAR NEMZET] How is it possible to reconcile our requirement for NATO membership with the acceptance and warm reception of the Balladur plan? According to many Western analysts, this plan appears to have been drawn up to increase France's role and it offers different security guarantees to Central Europe than NATO does.

[Jeszenszky] Both NATO and the Balladur plan try to contribute to Central Europe's stability in some way. These are different means. NATO is a military alliance while the Balladur plan would be an agreement with international legal powers. Rather than trying to reregulate the border issue, the Balladur plan actually tries to settle the situation of national minorities in a reassuring way. Hungarian foreign politics welcomes this because this is the first time since the peace treaties after World War II, when an international decision to accept obligations has become tangible that would settle and improve the situation of the many tens of millions of national minority members living mainly in the former communist countries. Precisely the south Slav crisis proved that this is a very serious issue. At any rate, the whole south Slav conflict erupted around the Serbian minority in Croatia. It is important to bear this in mind but not because national minority problems are always bound to turn into wars—this is a lie. Even now, we have heard statements that the justified demands of national minorities also present a threat. This is not true. It also takes two to make a war and, other than the south Slav region, I do not see any governments, majorities, or minorities—apart from the Soviet region—that would think that it has to use armed force to enforce its rights or suppress the justifiable demands of national minorities. It is an important recognition that just because something does not threaten with armed conflict, it does not mean that it does not exist. This has to be resolved. We will have calm and stability when West European norms and mentality prevail in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is often forgotten about in the West, the West European minorities do not have as much trouble and problems as the Central and East Europeans do. It is not a problem there if a national minority or ethnic group wishes to hoist its flag, sing its anthem, speak in its own language, or write the name at the end of the village that has been used by everyone for a thousand years. I often see that the Western partners cannot even imagine what kind of fundamental rights the national minorities do not have and what kind of basic goals they have to fight for. The Balladur plan reflects a kind of recognition of this and I appreciate this a great deal.

Statistical Office Reports Fall in Grain Harvest

AU2709090093 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 24 Sep 93 p 8

[Report by "v.i.": "The Grain Balance of the Central Statistical Office—Moderate Yields"]

[Text] Although the area planted with corn was 7 percent larger than the year before, the amount of grain harvested was 20 percent less, a Central Statistical Office report says. The many years of drought are the main reason for this. For example, it is worth mentioning that the amount of rainfall in May was only a third of the hundred-year average. In many places, the drought damage was made worse because farms did not carry out plant protection work because of the lack of financial resources. This reduced the yield and the quality of the produce.

Just over 3 million tonnes of wheat was harvested. This is three quarters of the 1993 amount, although the area planted was 17 percent more this year. The rye yield was 112,000 tonnes, representing a 16 percent decrease. Barley showed the largest decrease. The 1.1 million-tonne national harvest was only a third of the 1992 amount.

It is interesting that the best yields were reached in the county of Baranya and the worst in the northern part of the country. In Pest and Jasz-Nagykun counties, the average yields were also worse than the average of many years.

Smallholders Sign Pact With 1956 Association

AU2709081793 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 23 Sep 93 p 5

[MTI report: "The 1956 Association and the Smallholders Sign Indivisible and Brotherly Alliance"]

[Text] Today the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKgP] and the 1956 Association have formed an indissoluble and brotherly alliance, FKgP Chairman Jozsef Torgyan announced at a joint news conference with 1956 Association Chairman Sandor Racz at the FKgP Headquarters in Budapest on 22 September.

Jozsef Torgyan said that their goal was to win next year's elections and thus put an end to the "process of robbing the nation" and lead the Hungarian people toward real democracy and civil prosperity. Jozsef Torgyan also announced that Sandor Racz had joined the FKgP.

Sandor Racz announced that the 1956 Association had been searching for a party to support in the elections for a long time. They finally chose the Smallholders because, in their opinion, this organization represents the nation's interests most firmly. According to Sandor Racz, the past three years have not provided an acceptable answer to the challenge of the change in the regime. According to Sandor Racz, the "destruction of the nation" continues at present. As an example, he said that "some people want to pull the carpet out from under the Hungarian people's feet." Sandor Racz pointed out that their alliance with the FKgP should encourage everyone to cooperate and, thus, Hungary can be saved from final destruction in 1994.

SLD Requests Meeting With Walesa

LD2809172593 Warsaw PAP in English 1701 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 28—Head of the National Election Committee of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz on Tuesday [28 September] answered the Sept. 22 letter of Lech Walesa but did not provide a list of three names of candidates for the position of a prime minister the president had asked for.

Speaking at a press conference, spokesman for the alliance Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said Cimoszewicz had written that "The SLD is deeply convinced that the best understood needs of the country call for our direct cooperation."

In the letter, the SLD informed the president about the talks on the formation of a ruling coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Union of Labour (UP). "The only groupings who in public statements of their representatives have not voiced the lack of interest in the talks on that issue."

"We would like to have an oportunity to present to you the content, scope and possible effects of achieved agreements, in person," Cimoszewicz wrote.

The press spokesman neither denied nor confirmed that PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak may be the candidate for a prime minister. The candidate will be presented during a meeting of a SLD representative with the president, Siemiatkowski claimed.

Walesa Demands Nominations

LD2809210493 Warsaw PAP in English 1955 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 28—"President Lech Walesa keeps waiting for a concrete response of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] to his letter."

In his letter the president raised the question of the nomination of three candidates for the office of prime minister, which should be made by the group which has won the elections, reads a communique of the president's press office released on Tuesday [28 September].

"A meeting concerning the appointment of the prime minister is surely indispensable but not sooner than following a clear answer from the Democratic Left Alliance," the communique stresses.

SLD, PSL Reach Preliminary Coalition Agreement

LD2809140893 Warsaw PAP in English 1352 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 28—Leaders of the Polish Peasant party (PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Waldemar pawlak and Aleksander Kwasniewski, respectively, reached preliminary agreement on the possibility and purposefulness of forming a joint government coalition after talks held in Warsaw at Tuesday noon, an SLD official, wlodimierz Cimoszewicz told newsmen.

The SLD and PSL leaders discussed the establishing of a joint PSL-SLD government coalition and the results of the to-date work by experts of the two parties, read a communique issued after the meeting.

Cimoszewicz also added the SLD would inform the Polish president about all the decisions on Tuesday. The SLD National Electoral Committee started its meeting at 1400 hrs to prepare a letter to the president.

SLD Surprised by PSL's 'Evasive Response'

WS2809140193 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by D.P.: "Government Coalition in Question"]

[Text] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has asked the president to delay the deadline for proposing their candidate for prime minister until Tuesday, 28 September. On Tuesday at noon, SLD is supposed to decide whether or not it will embark on the mission of forming a government and who will be its candidate for prime minister.

The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Union of Labor [UP] gave their responses on Monday to letters received from Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz concerning the participation of both parties in a government coalition formed by SLD.

PSL declared that it is ready to "make it possible for a government formed by SLD to be established and [PSL would] support in the parliament all changes that would be favorable to the people, even if it were a minority government." UP stated that it would issue a concrete declaration on Tuesday, that is, after its party's National Council meets.

The SLD National Election Committee, surprised at the PSL's evasive response, suspended its session. SLD Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski defined the PSL statement as dry, enigmatic, and self-contradictory. He also said that it looks like PSL wants to stall for time. The leaders of both parties met on Monday night to clarify the situation.

UP Council Sets Conditions on Forming Government

LD2809185193 Warsaw PAP in English 1801 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 28—The National Council of the Union of Labour (UP) supported at its meeting in Warsaw on Tuesday [28 September] the idea of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) taking the initiative of establishing a new government.

The UP Council said Poland's interest required that the new government should correct the state policy in tune with social expectations but at the same time it should be reliable for foreign partners. "It would not be good if there was a belief that Poland was reconstructing authority structures from before 1989," the UP Council stressed.

The UP Council defined conditions under which the UP would be ready to take part in the establishing of a future government having stressed the change of the privatization policy, equal chances for private and state sectors and a national programme designed to find a cure for unemployment.

UP Council members expressed their concern over the latest declarations made by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) on the continuity of economic policy which "made them doubt the leftist character of the alliance."

The UP Council also granted powers to conduct coalition talks to Ryszard Bugaj, Aleksander Malachowski and Wieslawa Ziolkowska.

The UP Council adopted a resolution in which it expressed deep anxiety about President Lech Walesa's statement in which he spoke about the possibility of resorting to "Yeltsin's option" if Polish reforms are endangered.

"We believe that nothing can justify statements which are clearly marked by a threat of unconstitutional actions," the UP Council said.

Bugaj Suggests UP, PSL Take Initiative

WS2809113993 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by E.O.: "Correspondence Coalition: UP and PSL Take the Initiative"]

[Text] Ryszard Bugaj, chairman of the Union of Labor [UP], forwarded a letter to Waldemar Pawlak, president of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], on Saturday [25 September]. He suggested that both parties take the initiative in forming a government. A programmatic condition made by Bugaj was for a new socioeconomic policy. According to Bugaj, this proposal was well received by PSL. The UP leader also proposed that they, as initiators, begin talks with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Democratic Union [UD].

"Together we have 173 seats, which is more than SLD has; we have also drawn some conclusions from this," said UP Deputy Chairman Wojciech Lamentowicz.

It is worth recalling that the initiative to form a government has already been taken by SLD, the largest group in parliament. On Saturday, UP leaders received a letter from Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD), officially inviting them to form a government. SLD leaders will wait until Monday for an answer.

Program Instead of Personnel Matters

As we found out, the talks that have been held so far were confined almost exclusively to personnel matters, that is, to the issue of filling key positions in the ministries. However, UP does not want to be part of a coalition dominated by SLD. This means that it does not want to take part in forming a government, the composition of which would mirror the configuration of forces in parliament.

According to Bugaj, there are ministerial positions that should not be filled in line with the government-parties system, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, government coalition parties should control economic ministries, such as the Central Planning Administration, Ministry of Industry, and Finance Ministry.

At the Saturday session of the UP Presidium, it was agreed that after the National Council session (which will take place on Tuesday, 28 September), a packet of substantive proposals would be discussed. These proposals would concern changes that are most important for UP, primarily in the socioeconomic arena, and perhaps also changes in the political system. According to UP, the changes that they are going to propose are a logical consequence of the election results. As Wojciech Lamentowicz said, this packet of proposals will be the basis of a nonsecret debate on the future government's program, regardless of whether or not UP takes part in its formation. He also added that programmatic consultations should not be held behind closed doors.

Test for the Coalition

UP also intends to consult with trade union centers; the results of these talks will condition its stand on possible participation in a government coalition.

"The criterion for our stand on the possible government coalition will be based on whether or not this coalition is able to meet the voters' challenge," said Karol Modzelewski, honorary UP chairman.

According to Modzelewski, the election verdict is clear—the continuation of the economic policy that has been pursued for the past four years is, from the political point of view, no longer possible, let alone the economic side of things.

"We have a chance to reasonably change this policy; this is possible because the matter was decided in the ballot boxes and not on the streets. It would be a suicide of democracy if we did not take advantage of this chance," said Modzelewski.

The honorary UP chairman said that the party does not have any irrational prejudices against SLD. Both parties may disagree, first of all, over programmatic issues. UP does not intend to condition its attitude toward the largest parliamentary group based on its origin. This would be an ideological approach.

Asked about the possibility of forming a coalition with UD, which says that the direction of the economic changes that have been made so far is the only possible direction, Karol Modzelewski said: "The continuation of this policy is not possible after the elections. Either UD recognizes this reality and wants to take part in the government coalition, or it does not. We would like it to be able to reach a compromise on economic issues. We would like this very much, because Poland needs a strong government."

Mazowiecki Views Talks With SLD on Sejm Posts

LD2809155993 Warsaw PAP in English 1452 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 28—Leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Democratic Union (UD) agreed during consultations held in Warsaw on Tuesday [28 September] that the Sejm presidium should be composed of Sejm speaker and three deputy speakers, UD leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki said at a news conference on Tuesday.

The UD is of the opinion the post of the Sejm speaker should not be given automatically to a representative of the biggest Sejm floor group.

The UD and SLD also agreed that the Sejm presidium should be composed of members of 4 parties that have won the biggest number of seats in the parliament.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki avoided answering a question concerning a candidate for the post. He said the proposal put forward by leader of the Union of Labour (UP) Ryszard Bugaj to offer the post to him (Mazowiecki) was a nice gesture but he stressed that it was not very realistic in the present Sejm composition.

When asked about his opinion concerning "Yeltsin's option" that President Lech Walesa had said Monday he would resort to if Polish reforms are halted, Tadeusz Mazowiecki said "this was a political metaphor as there is not such a situation in Poland as in Russia." He also stressed the UD believed that parliamentary solutions should be respected.

SLD's Kwasniewski on Coalition, Walesa, UD

WS2809140093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25-26 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, an SLD component, by Ewa Kaszuba; place and date not given: "It Will Turn Out That Communists Are Quite Civilized People"]

[Text] [Kaszuba] In one of the first statements following the elections, you said that the best type of coalition for Poland would be an alliance between the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Democratic Union [UD], which is the best partner for the West. Taking into account UD's refusal to take part in a government created by the left wing, will you now implement the backup plan?

[Kwasniewski] More effort must be put into trying to form a coalition with UD. On Tuesday [28 September], we will have a meeting with UD's leaders and we will return to that issue then. Poland needs a stable government. It can be based on a broad coalition of political forces in the Sejm. Elements of compromise regarding party programs can also be agreed upon with UD. At the same time, because of their international position, UD could play a significant role in continuing what has been achieved in recent years and what determines our contacts with the world. Still, I understand UD's arguments. They lost while having a popular prime minister. Today they have to ask themselves some fundamental questions concerning their place in Poland's political spectrum and future. Despite that, UD's statement seems premature. UD is a kind of party which acts slowly when quick action is required, and they act very hastily in situations when one can wait. That is exactly the way it happened in this case. Still, solutions must be sought which will ensure a stable government in Poland.

[Kaszuba] You, SLD, have adopted a policy of not saying anything before the coalition talks end. In the beginning, one could see that as a way of giving UD some time to think things over. Right now, however, one could assume you are silent because you are eager to come to agreement and form a government with anybody.

[Kwasniewski] We won the elections in an obvious, unquestionable way, which forces us to take seriously the situation in which we find ourselves. The election results are proof of a shift to the left, they show that society is expecting change, not rowdy change, because all those who offered populist, rowdy, or obsessively anti-leftist programs, lost. These elections gave us the answer: Reforms—yes, but without "Solidarity." That must be respected and conclusions must be drawn from that. We are drawing the following conclusions. For the reforms in Poland to be implemented, and for society to get a sense of their positive effects at the same time, and to do all this the right way, we need a stable government, we need time, and we need very professional, consistent actions. That is why we made the offer to the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the Union of Labor [UP], and we will repeat the same offer to UD. We strengthened that with talks by experts, to see what parts of the different programs may be regarded as common, and where compromises would have to be reached. We have few differences with UP, while they are more serious regarding PSL because we both appeal to different groups. We talk primarily about the budget sector, while PSL talks primarily about peasants. Here is where we will have a problem, because shortly there will not be enough money for both of these areas. We want to be sure after consultations, as to whether our partners are seriously willing to draw conclusions from the elections and to involve themselves in forming a stable government, or else whether they think that this can be done through the old method of juggling

on the fringes of a majority. We are not interested in that, at all. In that case, we will become a very strong opposition. Then we will be trying to implement our program as an opposition party, and at the same time we will be preparing for the next elections from a very convenient position. For us, the issue of being included in government is not a question of personal or even political ambitions, although the election results signify an end to the era of regarding the left wing as a very suspicious partner. On the other hand—all the partners must know this—we are determined while undertaking the cofounding of a government. We are well aware that there are two options—either this government with our participation will achieve success, it will gain new social support or at least maintain the current one, or else we are facing the prospect of a political nothingness. Our risk factor is incomparably higher than PSL's, UP's, or any other party's. We are not afraid of that, but the point is that this situation makes it imperative for us to think very seriously and clearly—either yes or no. We cannot afford to behave in a confusing manner because that would mean the beginning of the end.

[Kaszuba] So what are SLD's minimum requirements, both politically and economically speaking, which you will not give up, even at the cost of being in the opposition?

[Kwasniewski] Clarity of the arrangement. The coalition must be based on a clear coalition agreement which would be known to society. We are creating a government, we know who the partner is, we have adopted a specific program, with varying degrees of specificity, of course. It should also be an arrangement of professional people forming the government. It would be an enormous mistake to try to count the ministerial posts proportionately, and to recognize them as ascribed to specific parties.

[Kaszuba] But you, SLD, do not want to give up the economic ministries.

[Kwasniewski] We want the ruling to be professional. The point is not in who will head the economic ministries, but in whether we will be sure that the people we appoint can do the job. Of course, we will negotiate and argue about including certain people. However, we approach staff issues quite flexibly and we view them as issues of the last order of importance. But again, it is hard to imagine a winning political party giving up everything for unexplained reasons, giving up the post of Sejm speaker to satisfy someone's invocation of a highly debatable tradition, giving up the prime minister's post because someone is very eager to have the post, or giving up the post of Senate speaker because there is someone of the right age to take the post.

[Kaszuba] So even if UP agreed to be the mediator between you and UD, you will not surrender the post of prime minister or the government's formation in return for becoming a coalition partner?

[Kwasniewski] That is a very theoretical kind of question. If UD agreed to join the government, UP would not have to act as mediator. We should talk, but while debating the government's shape we would undoubtedly look for the best people.

[Kaszuba] But the problem is also in who forms the government.

[Kwasniewski] That is very important, and anyone who has witnessed at least some politics knows that the prime minister is not an insignificant figure, especially because under our constitutional system, in which the prime minister wields significant power. The most important requirement is that the prime minister be someone who can do the job, but the choice of a specific person will be the condition ending negotiations.

[Kaszuba] You still decided to reply to the president's letter on Monday, and judging from statements by SLD leaders, only one name will be presented, not three as requested by President Walesa. Are you taking a chance and are you willing to risk initiating the first conflict?

[Kwasniewski] Conflicts should be avoided, and we would not like this issue to be the source of one. The president himself has reminded us of a valuable lesson in his letter—I do not know whether he did it deliberately or unintentionally—by writing that he wants to act in a similar manner as in 1991, when the task of creating a government was entrusted to Bronislaw Geremek. None of us would like to be in Professor Geremek's position. First of all, it is a waste of time, and secondly, attempting to do something which is doomed to failure is terribly disappointing. That is why, while respecting the Constitution according to which the first move is up to the president, we want to come up with a proposition. First, the holding of consultations within SLD; second, holding a session of the Chief Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic; third and most important, we must have a preliminary idea of the coalition. If we had an absolute majority, the only problem would be whether to deliver three names or just one. But because it is a question of coalition arrangements, we will, with full honesty, present the kind of candidate who will have a real chance of successfully completing the mission at hand. I think this is exactly the essence of the president's proposal, and ours as well. Contrary to the opinions of various people who have tried to prompt me, I think that the president is interested in SLD cofounding a government, in accordance with the election results. Perhaps I am going too far in my interpretations, but this is what I believe.

[Kaszuba] There are rumors that it is you the president is favoring.

[Kwasniewski] I do not know that, but I have known the president since 1989, and despite differences of opinions on various issues, there is some kind of bond between us. At least we are capable of talking to one another, there was never a problem with that.

[Kaszuba] Considering some recent public appearances by SLD leaders, one could have a feeling that not all of your ideas are fully polished. First, we had Jerzy Jaskiernia talking about the necessity of enacting a new constitution and of limiting the president's powers, which is clearly provided for by your constitutional draft, but then you denied all that the following day. Then we had Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz expressing his doubts as to Poland's joining NATO, talking about a need for wide-ranging discussions on the topic, whereas you yourself have no reservations. These are not minor differences.

[Kwasniewski] The fact that SLD has many leaders, many people with strong personalities, is fortunate, even though it is also a certain problem for us. Individual statements are one thing—although they are not contrary to SLD's general ideas—whereas official statements are another thing. Our position on NATO—and this is what Cimoszewicz talked about before the elections—is open. Europe needs a security system, and NATO is today the only concrete military institution. So if NATO—within which internal debates are going on—will be part of a new European security system, our presence there is simply indispensable. We have to talk about this because up to now we have been excluded from these talks. Regarding a constitution, we do indeed have a problem. Our draft, similar to those of PSL and UP, and which is not a secret, positions the president and his prerogatives in a different light. Under our concept of the political system, the president is an umpire among political forces, he is a stabilizing force for the political arrangements, and so he is less of an executive authority because executive authority is entrusted to the government. The joint draft constitution put forward by PSL and UP has a similar scheme. Both of these drafts were submitted for debate in the previous parliament. We then had 64 people in the National Assembly, PSL had a similar number, and we were aware that the drafts would be subjected to negotiations to which pro-presidential drafts were also submitted. We had no prophets among us, so how were we to know that a few months later our drafts would be in a position to acquire the constitutionally required majority without a problem? So I decided that to avoid confusion, we had to come out and say that we respect the situation defined today by the Little Constitution, that there can be no debate on this topic until the president's term of office is over, and that we are interested in a solid relationship with President Walesa. What we are suggesting for a constitution concerns the president in general, and we treat seriously whatever is linked to the current president, in accordance with legal provisions currently in force. There have been no attempts on our part to try to reduce the president's term of office or his powers.

[Kaszuba] You, SLD, have decided to form a government, but the mission could fail, taking into account the terms set by your partners. What will happen then? You will be in the opposition; then what?

[Kwasniewski] It will be an enormously strong, united kind of opposition; clearly and critically evaluating the government's actions. Unless these elections are regarded by the parties in parliament as a serious warning signal, and unless a new rule for action is adopted—for clear, open, pragmatical, and professional action—we will face an erosion of the parliamentary system, a weak government, and some ever-more-dangerous phenomena outside of the parliamentary arrangements. These elections are not a misfortune or a danger, they exhibited society's enormous maturity which excluded all kinds of extremism. Therefore, creation of a stable government should be an absolute priority; an arrangement which will not be capable of forming such a government will end up as a serious defeat for those trying to accomplish it. Under the current political arrangement, one cannot form a stable government without SLD. We are people who, on the one hand, have had much political experience, and a lot of patience on the other hand. Even if there are attempts today to form arrangements without us, it amounts to going around in circles. If after these election results, everybody would decide to cast us aside, our slogan for the next elections would be clear: "One must rule with an absolute majority." That is the only chance to make our partners face reality.

[Kaszuba] During interviews with foreign journalists, you repeated the phrase "don't worry" quite frequently. Are you not afraid that if it comes to forming a government, you, SLD, will have to keep repeating that— what is more, you will have to keep backing that up with action—to foreign partners. Western commentaries are expressing a wait-and-see attitude.

[Kwasniewski] Facts will count more than that. I am happy because of the fact that these commentaries have not had an overly dramatic tone.

[Kaszuba] Perhaps it is because events in Moscow have overshadowed the events in Poland.

[Kwasniewski] The events in Moscow have overshadowed us with their global significance. From our standpoint, developments over there are a big problem because anxiety over these events may reinforce certain stereotypes in the West. If someone in the West writes that communism is returning to Poland, it must be someone who has never seen communism, and what they write is rubbish, anyway. There is nothing that could be called communism in our actions, thinking, or political needs. So that is why I say "don't worry" to journalists, to get away from the stereotype which prevents some people from seeing Poland under completely different conditions. In 1993, people did not vote for or against the communists, instead what they voted for was a different kind of government than what has existed until now; one which will be able to implement reforms in a less-painful manner for the people.

[Kaszuba] That is the only way you can explain this to Poles.

[Kwasniewski] What else can I do? If a government is formed, only facts will count. Western governments will see very soon that they are dealing with competent partners on the Polish side; people who know what politics are about; who have experience in international contacts; who have been to the IMF, the World Bank; who went through training, practice, and seminars in these institutions. Then it will suddenly turn out that the communists are quite civilized people.

[Kaszuba] And the fact that you do not say "be happy" to anyone—is that modesty, a realistic approach to life, or caution?

[Kwasniewski] A little bit of all those things. I would like to be able to say "be happy" after a government with our participation has been in office. One should be careful when making joyful forecasts because being in power in Poland is difficult, but I believe it can really be efficient. Contrary to many journalists, I am not a defeatist.

Kwasniewski: SdRP Against 'Strong' President

AU2809123493 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Sep 93 pp 202-203

[Unattributed interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP); place and date not given: "We Are Realists"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Kwasniewski, do you still have your old Communist Party membership card?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, but I forgot where it is.

[DER SPIEGEL] You can now take over again with the old guard. To what extent will you reverse the reform process?

[Kwasniewski] The well will not run dry, cats will not start to bark. We do not want to take back reforms. Communism is finished for good. We are for the free market and a stable zloty. Those who still want the central planned economy have to be idiots, and there is no place for them in our camp.

[DER SPIEGEL] How can reform policy work with former Communist Party functionaries, state trade unions, and generals?

[Kwasniewski] I am upset about the prevailing cliche in the Western countries: We are all communists. I am afraid that we still need a lot of time to get rid of the prejudice and prove that we are no longer interested in the old system. You must not forget that even in the so-called reform parties there are politicians who used to sit on our side of the roundtable in the past.

[DER SPIEGEL] Most of your members have been recruited from the former Polish United Workers Party, PZPR.

[DER SPIEGEL] The PZPR had 2 million members, some 50,000 of whom are now in our party. They always represented social-democratic values.

[DER SPIEGEL] That is hard to believe when looking at people such as former government spokesman Jerzy Urban.

[Kwasniewski] As a newspaper editor, he is the greatest capitalist of them all. Moreover, such people are not in our leadership.

[DER SPIEGEL] But they give you the money. Many Poles suspect that the old cadre will move into the important posts again and then sabotage reform policies.

[Kwasniewski] Such fear is unfounded. I have held my own with my pragmatic program, and the election result proves me right; no revenge against Solidarity, experts into the government. The position of the reformers has even been strengthened.

[DER SPIEGEL] You want to shape reform in a way that prevents social hardships. However, there is no money available for it. Will you be able to keep your promises at all?

[Kwasniewski] We have not made many promises; we are realistic. We need a stable government and we need time. This is the only way to improve social policy.

[DER SPIEGEL] What level of debts will you tolerate? If the budget deficit gets too high, you will place important IMF and World Bank credits at risk.

[Kwasniewski] The deficit will remain more or less at the current level, which has been accepted by the IMF. We will not risk any adventures.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where will you take the money from?

[Kwasniewski] First, we will stimulate the economy, which will take a long time. Second, we want to collect taxes more effectively than in the past. Third, we want to get the gray area of the economy, where a lot of money disappears, under control. Fourth, the customs authorities are working badly. If we improve work there, we can considerably increase revenues in a short time.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you not risk cutting the first buds of the economic upswing by pursuing a rigorous tax policy?

[Kwasniewski] Those who invest should pay less taxes in the future. Moreover, we want to use authoritative experts, irrespective of party membership. A cadre revolution will break out only among unable and lazy public servants.

[DER SPIEGEL] What are the next steps in the sphere of privatization?

[Kwasniewski] We supported mass privatization, which was adopted by the Liberals in the previous legislative

term. We welcome foreign investment. However, we do not want the armament and transport industries to be privatized.

[DER SPIEGEL] That means that you will go on financing unprofitable enterprises as in the past.

[Kwasniewski] We will try to convert the greater part of our armament industry to the production of civilian goods.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you seeking EC membership?

[Kwasniewski] Yes. We would like to negotiate a concrete time so that we can prepare ourselves for it. I fear that unless contacts between the European Community and us will not soon bear fruit, things will become very dangerous for us. Between rich Western Europe and the poor Eastern states, an economic wall is emerging that will be much more difficult to overcome than the political wall.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you seeking NATO membership, too?

[Kwasniewski] NATO is the only existing real military system. Membership in a reformed NATO is very important for us. However, we do not want symbolic participation, we want a concept. We are greatly interested in a new European security system.

[DER SPIEGEL] You have to rule with a president who has always fought the left. Can that work at all?

[Kwasniewski] Since the Solidarity camp suffered a severe defeat, the left will be able to introduce a new constitution, which is most unpleasant for Walesa. However, the president must respect the result of a democratic election. Moreover, Walesa wants to run again in 1995. If we are responsible for the economic and social situation, it is easier for him than if Solidarity were in power.

[DER SPIEGEL] You can strip him of his powers through a new constitution.

[Kwasniewski] Our concept no longer provides for a strong president. As of now, he should only serve as a moderator between the various groups of society. Other parties of the left think along similar lines. Maybe we can agree on a deal: He supports us and we will be accommodating as far as the constitution is concerned. We are pragmatic and ready for compromise.

President's Spokesman Views New Government

WS2909080093 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Interview with Andrzej Drzycimski, press spokesman for Polish President Lech Walesa, by Piotr Swiac in Warsaw on the "Directly from the Belvedere" program; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Swiac] The president's prediction that a left-wing arrangement will prevail has come true. Indeed, a very strong left-wing contingent will be present in the future parliament. Taking that into account, does the president intend to accept the election results, their mathematical expression that is, passively, or does he want to have some kind of active influence?

[Drzycimski] The first thing which I think is the most important one—even before the elections the president announced that from among three candidates for prime minister, one coming from the winning party or coalition would be selected. That is the first thing. Secondly, the president emphasized many times that under the situation which arose in Poland, there is no possibility for any one party to form a government on its own. A coalition must be created. Right now, coalition talks are in progress. One must assume they will continue for a long time. Third, one must also remember that only 51 percent took part in the elections. Some say it is only 51 percent, others say that is enough. These three elements determine the shape of this first week, as it were, during which many things happened—big political international developments, as well as our internal events. What also happened was that the election results were such a surprise for many commentators. The president predicted them.

[Swiac] Was Thursday's [23 September] meeting with the Presidium of the Democratic Union [UD] here at the Belvedere in fact a meeting to form a government coalition without the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]?

[Drzycimski] No, no. That was simply a postelection conversation, generally speaking, on the current situation. UD is the strongest party which was on the opposite side of the Round Table in relation to the communists. The president kept emphasizing during these conversations that he wants to be a guardian of the reforms which took place after 1989. I suppose this theme will appear several times over the next few days. These reforms can be summed up in that first of all, we have a full democracy; secondly, we already have a functioning free market, open borders, and a possibility of become a member of various international organizations. That is what the president wants to safeguard. He wants to be the guardian of the transformations which have occurred.

[Swiac] What kind of a scenario do you predict when it comes to choosing a new government?

[Drzycimski] From the constitutional standpoint, the way it looks is that there are several possibilities of installing a government. The first move is up to the president. The president nominates a candidate but we have to remember, as he has already said, that he wants to have three candidates from which he will select one. By the way, this is what he did right after the 1991 elections when the victorious UD acquired the right to come up with a candidate and then the president spoke

in favor of UD's candidate. But the president can also nominate any other candidate he chooses.

[Swiac] Including Andrzej Olechowski?

[Drzycimski] He can nominate any candidate. But we must talk about real possibilities here. It is not just a question of putting forth a certain candidate, because one has to be able to see whether the arrangement, which the candidate is bringing along with him, has any chance of leading to a coalition. A coalition must be formed.

[Swiac] So this raises the question: Would an arrangement, such as the one the president spoke about earlier, be possible; namely, an arrangement of nonparty experts [words indistinct]?

[Drzycimski] Certainly not initially. Certainly not at this stage. There is now a chance of forming a government, a coalition kind of government. We do not yet know what its composition will be, but there is still a chance and it must be tried. Then we will have the parliament submitting their candidate. There are still several stages to go through and only in the end does this whole thing finally come back to the president. Then the president has the initiative in that he can form a so-called presidential government for a transitional period.

[Swiac] The president said that the left wing does not constitute a threat to Poland if it does not have Moscow's support. Has the president not changed his mind, taking into account the recent events in Moscow?

[Drzycimski] The current situation in Moscow is Moscow's internal situation, it is Russia's internal situation. We can watch things develop calmly, we do not have to watch it with anxiety like we did before.

[Swiac] Still, I think the situation in Moscow is not being perceived calmly in Poland. We witnessed consultations between Prime Minister Suchocka and the foreign affairs minister.

[Drzycimski] Yes [words indistinct]. The president talked on the phone already in the first hours, he also talked to Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, he talked to the prime minister, to Internal Affairs Minister Milczanowski, and to General Wilecki. So one could say there is full, peaceful control of what is happening.

[Swiac] Definitely supporting President Yeltsin?

[Drzycimski] There was very significant wording in the president's letter, in his statement, when he voiced his full confidence in Russian President Boris Yeltsin. It expresses confidence in the direction of reforms in Russia, because that direction is important to us. It is all the more important because conversations between both presidents, the Polish and Russian presidents, were the kind of conversations in which both gentlemen could openly put all their cards on the table. There were no major differences between the presidents. Decisions of a political nature were an expression of this, the NATO issue among others. So it is as if it were a completely new image, a new image of a new Russia, and a new image of a new Poland.

Poland is the first country in East-Central Europe to establish very close contacts with West Europe. In this situation, within this arrangement of an axis already created by the foreign ministers of our three countries [Poland, Germany, France], we have just had a meeting of the three presidents for the first time, and they had an opportunity to discuss all the issues associated with this part of Europe, as well as many others. Among other things, during their conversations and discussions, the presidents also discussed the future of East-Central Europe. Among the problems which surfaced, there was the issue which was the most lively issue at the time; namely, the developments in Russia. This meeting was enormously significant because the three countries have different perspectives, as it were, but at the same time they play a very important role in their political, diplomatic, and economic relations, the two countries [Germany, France] within the EC, and Poland in East-Central Europe. I think it is a meeting which we will appreciate fully after some time has passed. It is too early to evaluate it now, as it were. Visits on the highest level by presidents, kings, and prime ministers, open up various opportunities. The important thing is now what will follow, whether we will be able to provide incentives to each other and find those solutions which are the most important. The thing is to follow visits by presidents and kings with meetings among ministers, entrepreneurs, company chiefs, and representatives of cities and regions. Then specific issues are solved. I think there are already many positive phenomena happening in this regard, although one wishes there were more of these kinds of measures.

Article Views SLD Policy Positions

AU2809142293 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 24 Sep 93 pp 10-11

[Article by Piotr Pacewicz: "Alliance, Improve Your Ways"]

[Text] Jerzy Jaskiernia announces the introduction of a presidency based on the German model. Aleksander Kwasniewski corrects that, saying that the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] neither wants to shorten the president's term of office nor does it wish to reduce his powers, but in the same breath, he says that the president should be an arbiter because that is what he is best at.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz stresses that the SLD will keep the promises that it made to Polish women and will ensure that the anti-abortion law conforms to European standards.

Leszek Miller announces that the question of the concordat will be examined once a constitution has been passed.

Kwasniewski and Cimoszewicz make some ambiguous remarks about changing the head of the National Bank of Poland [NBP].

Miller announces the adoption of a charter on social and economic rights containing a clause about the right to work and a decent wage. He also talks about levying taxes on economic activities pursued by the Catholic Church.

Ewa Spychalska says that the OPZZ [National Trade Union Confederation] will not support a government that will fail to honor its election pledges.

The SLD rejects the Union of Labor [UP] proposal that the speaker should (traditionally) be a member of the peasant party as well as idea number two, that the speaker should be Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

The SLD demands that both speakers should be drawn from the ranks of the SLD.

When the UD [Democratic Union] announces that it will remain in opposition, Cimoszewicz asks ironically why the UD should bother to say that because no one has proposed anything to the UD so far.

All these are public statements made in influential media. Apparently, behind the scenes, SLD politicians are saying something different, but who hears what is said behind the scenes?

The SLD is off to a bad start, behaving as if it were still in opposition or still fighting an election campaign.

If we make an assessment of the SLD's first week, then we can see that the SLD acted provocatively, was offensive, and undoubtedly incurred the displeasure of:

the president (the German model of the presidency is simply an affront to Lech Walesa);

the Catholic Church and the Vatican (the concordat is a matter of key importance for the church and an important element of the pope's new evangelization program);

the liberals (tinkering around with the NBP [National Bank of Poland] upset their sense of economic order);

the UD, which particularly dislikes being treated condescendingly, although it sometimes behaves that way itself.

The SLD is starting with—and this surprises me above all—ideological issues or even ones of principle. In addition, it presents itself as a partner who is sure of himself and not particularly disposed to making concessions. It is as if it had failed to notice how delicate its own political position is.

For the sake of being fair, it has to be stressed that the export version of the SLD is faring much better. Kwasniewski is turning up everywhere in interviews in which he seeks to convince the West that, in general, there will be no changes of a more substantial kind in economic policy. He stresses that the SLD is flexible on the question of privatization, although he talks about excluding entire sectors (including banks) and a mixed economy as a general indicator.

This is where [SLD member Leszek] Miller begins to poke his nose into the whole business. Asked about our aspirations to join NATO, he says yes, that is fine; but first of all, he would like to know why NATO exists and whether it is still necessary. He reminds one of a bachelor who talks about his feelings but questions the sense of the institution of marriage. Yet, marriage should matter to a bachelor, especially since the young lady is capricious and not particularly willing.

Of course, we find ourselves at the opening stage of the game, the stage of first gestures and words, but the effects of such first moves are the same in politics as in life.

Why has the SLD started the way it has?

The opposition habit of engaging in rhetoric might explain part of it.

The finely crafted Sejm speeches delivered by Cimoszewicz or Kwasniewski directed against authoritarian gestures on the part of the president or in defense of democracy were very much to the point when others were in the government. But why should Walesa be provoked now? Especially since the president has done nothing that could wrong the SLD. On the contrary, he has announced that he will respect democracy. However, opposition habits dictate that one should knock the president. There has already been some friction over numbers: Walesa wants three candidates for the post of prime minister and the SLD is proposing one.

Something that cannot be excluded is that there is some jockeying for position going on within the SLD itself. SLD leaders are trying to outdo each other in being more papal or, perhaps more accurately, more anti-papal (antipresidential, anti-UD, and antiliberal). If Cimoszewicz says something, [SLD Sejm Deputy Jerzy] Jaskiernia tries to outdo him, then Miller has to come out on top, then [Chairwoman of All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement Ewa] Spychalska says something, then Kwasniewski cannot allow himself to come out worse and then that mobilizes Cimoszewicz.

The efforts to outdo each other—I am in the realm of conjecture all the time—might be part of a struggle within the SLD and would thus be directed at party activists. However, this should not become the kind of infighting that the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] thrived on (infighting that was like some caricature because that party was isolated from society) and is also something that has occurred in the short history of parties termed center-right, parties that sought to outdo each other in being anticommunist or more radical in general. I think that there is something much more important behind this infighting—namely, a feeling of having certain duties toward the electorate.

SLD leaders are afraid of disappointing their supporters and this is what gives rise to such statements as: We promised Polish women....

Yet, this might also conceal a serious misunderstanding, which we are already familiar with from post-"Solidarity" governments. That is, the expectations of SLD voters—if these suppositions are correct—above all concerned things becoming better in a material sense, more secure in a social sense, and calmer in a political sense.

The fact that SLD politicians are placing the constitution issue first, instead of taking advantage that they received from the previous government in the form of the very left-wing (in the best sense of the word) Enterprise Pact, may not only be received badly by the SLD's political opponents but also by its supporters. People will say they are arguing over words once again, especially since there will be a big fight over the constitution and a battle with the Catholic Church, it is not at all certain how the SLD's main potential ally, the PSL, will behave. It is worth noting how fond Pawlak is of using the word "right wing" in relation to his own party. Pawlak knows his peasant farmers.

However, I think that the third reason for the SLD's arrogance is the most important one. Success is going to the SLD's head and it is behaving as a victor who can dictate terms to others.

What is its success about?

The composition of the new Sejm shows that the left has scored a crushing victory. Someone might conclude that the Hanna Suchocka government and previous cabinets as well as the entire Sejm or president have only continued to exercise power because they became carried away with doing so. In June 1989, the nation allowed itself to be swept away by anti-communist emotions for a while, then became gradually disenchanted with "Solidarity" and its heirs, and has now thrown itself into the embraces of groupings that have their roots in the Polish People's Republic.

Is that really the case? Of course not.

At this point, I would like to assure readers that I am not writing this to raise the spirits of the supporters of post-"Solidarity" parties or to deprive SLD supporters of a feeling of triumph. I do not want to come up with the same kind of sorry arithmetic as Zbigniew Brzezinski, who calculated that every fifth Pole did not back the "communists" and then added that only half of the electorate voted. That would mean that the SLD would govern (if it will govern) against the will of 90 percent of Poles, the suggestion being that they are true Poles.

One has to look the electoral truth in the eyes: The post-"Solidarity" parties have suffered quite a compromising defeat. However, one should note—and I think that the SLD is making a mistake in this respect—the simple truth that people placed votes in the ballot boxes not seats in parliament.

An analysis of those votes provides an entirely different picture of social attitudes, expectations, and prejudices than the clear-cut picture provided by the present Sejm or Senate. Some might say that social attitudes only count during election campaigns, then cease to count, and all over the world there is a schizophrenic division between policies before and after elections: Politicians seduce society before elections, then forget about society, and play things out among themselves.

That really is how parliamentary democracy becomes perverted. However, for goodness sake, that may be allowed to happen (although it should not, and over a longer period of time can have unpredictable consequences) in stable democracies, but not here where democracy is so weak.

A real picture of political attitudes cannot be ignored by the SLD all the more because it is about to start governing while having partners at the top who are unfavorably disposed toward it at the very least: the president, the Catholic Church, the post-"Solidarity" parties, the West, which will want to wait and see, and—this is vitally important—the media, while at the bottom there is "Solidarity," which is threatening to stage strikes, and the so-called center-right, which has learned to use the arguments of the streets.

The SLD should really take account of what was in the ballot boxes.

Let us start by counting the level of support for the big losers.

Parties that were in the current governing coalition—the UD, the KLD [Liberal-Democratic Congress], and "Fatherland"—received 21 percent of the vote altogether. If we add the electorate of the presidential BBWR [Non-Party Block in Support of Reforms] to that—that is, 5.4 percent—we get a total of 26.4 percent.

Today, one can speculate on what would have happened if the president's preelection proposal of forming a "reform coalition"—supported by him and, in all probability, the Catholic Church—led by the popular Hanna Suchocka had been accepted.

Many people—including myself—considered the idea of an electoral coalition composed of the UD, KLD, and the ZChN [Christian-National Union] dangerous for Polish democracy and severely criticized it. I would still defend the thesis that this kind of monster block would delay the process whereby political life can assume some form of order, but it has to be conceded to Walesa that who knows if such a movement would not be effective.

Who are those supporters of the UD, KLD, ZChN, and the BBWR who are divided over so much? All four parties, which have lately been involved in the government of the country in one way or another, declared: Let

us carry on doing the same as before without a general change of political elites in contrast to the SLD and other opposition parties, which called for things to be done differently and for people to be changed because they had failed to prove themselves.

Of course, there might be doubts about including the BBWR in the "continuation" camp: It did, after all, start out as a movement that pressed demands and promised to bring "new people" to the fore. However, the BBWR is a presidential formation above all and its main "ideologist," Andrzej Olechowski, stated clearly that the basic direction of reform was to be maintained .

Apparently, many people voted for "Fatherland" because of their Catholic sentiments, not because they supported the present reforms. However, supporters of the ZChN and Aleksander Hall's conservatives clearly came out for continuing with the present course.

The "continuation" formation lost totally against the left, but it lost in terms of seats. In terms of votes, it was almost a draw.

The supporters of the SLD were 20.4 percent of those who voted. The 7.3 percent who voted for the Union of Labor (however sad that might have been for its leaders who had worked for "Solidarity" in the past) should be added to that. That gives a total of 27.7 percent.

Both parties decided on a market with a human face. But with the UP, this face contained more socialist features.

Many SLD supporters voted for "their own" people through fear of decommunization or, should we say, out of habit. Many voted "against the continuation of the reforms" rather than "for the left wing." For general analytical purposes, this has no major significance, but for the purpose of estimating the SLD's strength, it is important because an electorate of convinced "SLD people" will be more faithful than an electorate that only voted for that party because they want greater calm and security. This latter group may quickly become disappointed.

Even though the PSL shares the same roots as the SLD and the biographies of PSL and SLD people are similar, it is difficult to consider the PSL as the same kind of opposition as the SLD. The PSL rather appears to be a protest party of farmers.

The two peasant parties, both using the same initials PSL and ideologically similar to each other, together won 17.8 percent of the votes. Such is the strength of the voice of the farmers protesting against the reforms. As long as we have overpopulated rural areas, this electorate will continue to count.

A PSL-SLD alliance, which is bound to occur, is neither evident nor straightforward. Each party has an entirely different electorate, and each electorate is suspicious of the other.

Let us attempt to describe those who call themselves the "center-right wing." These have a long way to go before they become a firmly centrist or conservative political formation. They willingly refer to nationalist or Christian values. They extol a leadership type of party and are fond of expressing dismay and claiming that they have been wronged. Their objective consists mainly of combating "reds" or "pinkos." They want to complete the revolution, a word that even Jaroslaw Kaczynski has begun to use recently.

The Confederation of Indepedendent Polnd [KPN], PC [Center Accord], and the RDR [Coalition for the Republic] together gained 12.9 percent of the votes. Perhaps one should call them "right-wing revolutionaries."

Linked to this formation are the more political fragments of Solidarity, especially the milieu of Maciej Jankowski. Marian Krzaklewski also appears to be heading in this direction.

The SLD can "count" on these "right-wing revolutionaries." Moczulski in the Sejm, the Center Accord in the street, Olszewski in interviews, and the KPN during strikes—they will all shout in a loud voice: "Down with the commies."

On the other hand, such groups as the Ursus branch of Solidarity, led by Zygmunt Wrzodnak, are extremely populist formations that deserve the name "dreamers" [oszolomy]. Party X and the Farmers' Self-Defense together gained 5.5 percent of the votes.

The difference between the "dreamers" and the "center-right wing revolutionaries" is considerable, but it is mainly a question of numbers.

The frustration of the "right-wing revolutionaries" and their loss of support are forcing them down to the level of the "dreamers." A dreamer's political advancement may raise him to the status of a "right-wing revolutionary" and he will be satisfied, provided this raise in status is high enough.

It appears from all these calculations that the structure of Polish votes does not correspond to the structure of party representation in parliament.

One may ask why the Sejm looks the way it does. The answer is a banal one. The reason is, quite simply, the election code, which encourages the formation of coalitions. This, of course, has its price, for parties risk having their image tarnished and their leaders have to give up some of their ambitions and prejudices.

The PC and RDR have not incurred these costs because of the ambition of their leaders. The KPN, more militant than it used to be, is not suited to the role of a unifying force, although prior to the elections, its leader, Moczulski, proposed a center-right wing alliance, probably so he could more easily claim that he represents such an alliance in parliament.

The UD and KLD also failed to reach an alliance with each other.

Because the parties did not want to pay the cost of forging an alliance, the voters paid it instead. Those voters with any knowledge of the election code had to decide whether to risk wasting their vote or to vote for the strongest party. Parties behaved like traders at a market: "Over here, please. The others have goods that will soon go rotten."

The UD's conduct vis-a-vis the KLD is bound to be remembered by both parties for a long time and will not facilitate cooperation between them.

It looks as if the SLD is faced with a difficult task because its election support (based on the number of votes not the number of seats) was not so great. What is more, the SLD electorate is unstable. Any awkward remark made by Leszek Miller to the striking miners or railroad men (after all, strikes are not going to come to an end) may result in the loss of, say, 1 percent of the SLD's voters.

The SLD victory has created an entirely new situation that is difficult to deal with. The winds of history are blowing Solidarity people out of the Sejm, and their place is being taken by many former "comrades." Some writers and politicians cannot come to terms with this situation. They hope that the SLD will collapse from the very outset, like a sprinter negotiating the first hurdle. Others think that only an alliance with the SLD will save Poland from disaster. I would like to discuss both views.

I genuinely wish the SLD success and not just because the rules of democracy require this. After all, the people voted for the left and now the left should rule. No serious-minded person should emulate the way of thinking of Jan Olszewski, who said on the eve of the elections that a left-wing Sejm would not represent Polish society and that a new Sejm will have to be elected.

I repeat, everyone knew the rules of the game. They played the game and now they have to accept the result.

I also believe that it would be better for Polish democracy if the SLD and the left wing, in general, do not suffer a rapid or spectacular defeat. On the contrary, the left wing requires a limited success. As a Polish citizen, I want an effective government, although I do not think I could ever actually endow it with my affection.

As is usually the case in democracy, this success cannot be a total success, especially because the country's economic situation, despite its gradual improvement, remains as difficult as the SLD's political situation.

I think the best scenario for Poland is a pragmatic government consisting of the SLD, PSL, and the UP, although one cannot detect any pragmatism in the SLD for the time being. The UP would not feel very comfortable in such company, but it could smooth out contacts with the post-Solidarity parties. For the time being, the UP is saying that it will not enter into any government without the UD. Will it change its mind after the meeting of its leadership on Saturday [2 October]?

It is certain that some neglect in the economic sphere might occur with a left-wing government, although I do not think the market is in danger. Perhaps some economic ideas will catch on. In any case, we will eventually find out what has caught on and what has not. At this point, let me recall Jacek Kuron's Enterprise Pact.

I do not believe that such a left-wing government—pragmatically avoiding clashes with powerful partners and rivals and projecting a suitable image of Poland abroad—can last four years, even if it achieves moderate economic success. I do not think the new Sejm will last that long either. The left-wing's position is too weak and society's support for it is too small.

However, it would be better for Polish democracy if the left wing and pragmatic formation made a serious attempt to govern. That would be the final stage of the long and surprisingly difficult education process we are going through. In the next elections we would vote without left or right-wing illusions and sentiments for the first time, without any longing after Solidarity or attachment to the republic.

We already have the potential electorates of several of the main political parties that could govern Poland. There are chances that in the next elections there will be three or four strong political blocs to choose from: a centrist one (the UD with the KLD and perhaps some form of BBWR); a Christian-Democratic one, a left-wing one, a peasant one, and a "right-wing revolutionary" one. One hopes that the non-left wing parties will learn from the mistakes they have made.

Nevertheless, my scenario of the left wing producing a capable government is unlikely. Fortunately, it looks as if the UD has not agreed to a "broad coalition government." That would have been political suicide for the UD. In any case, with its small strength in parliament, its influence on such a coalition would have been negligible.

By entering into successive exotic alliances, the UD would subject its supporters, especially those with more right-wing views, to further heavy trials. Not just the UD leadership, but the entire UD needs a rest from the government and a certain shift in priorities. Until now, Geremek, Kuron, Mazowiecki, Suchocka, and Rokita [prominent UD members] have devoted their entire time and strength to the country, not their party.

The SLD's intensive work "among the grass roots" shows how much a party can achieve when it is in opposition. The UD would manage even better in such a situation because it enjoys the support of the media.

Many observers fear that the SLD, lacking the support of the UD with its negotiating skills, will be exposed to a concentrated attack from the communists. That would mean the end of the SLD, resulting in a parliamentary

crisis and the danger of a presidential government. What is more, with the current general confusion, the collapse of the left wing following a sharp struggle could result in an election win by Lepper's Farmers Self-Defense and Tyminski's Party X next time.

As the general frustration develops, the sympathies of voters tend to shift away from logical parties, via moderately populist ones, toward extremist ones. The situation is somewhat like that of a pendulum—left, right, left, right.

Also possible is a non-party government, a government of experts, or even a government without the SLD. The SLD would take advantage of such a situation, saying "Look! We won the elections but they do not want us in parliament!"

The SLD would be even better served by a Yeltsin-type scenario in which the parliamentary majority enters into a conflict with the president and the president either tries to dissolve parliament or a protracted state-mate occurs. The SLD would emerge from this as the victim of a coup against democracy, which is exactly what it would be.

So a lot depends on what the president does. For the time being, he has said that "he will provide an SLD prime minister and later on will get by somehow."

The SLD has many enemies, but right now it seems to be its own greatest enemy. It is behaving with self-confidence and arrogance as if it failed to understand its political situation and was incapable of counting its votes.

Perhaps the SLD is playing a political game and deliberately annoying others so that it can consolidate itself in power and do even better in the next elections. That is a mean thing to do.

BBWR Hopes To Integrate 'Rightist Parties'

WS2809153793 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by Kazimierz Groblewski: "BBWR a Pro-Presidential Association; Not Yet a Party"]

[Text] The Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] has decided not to dissolve. It is going to transform itself into an association. Andrzej Kozakiewicz, one of its founders and President Lech Walesa's economic secretary, says that it will be a pro-presidential association. In the future, BBWR may become a full-fledged political party.

According to Andrzej Olechowski, informal leader of BBWR, the founding committee of the association will ultimately be formed next week. On Monday [4 October], BBWR parliamentarians are supposed to meet with President Walesa.

"BBWR has created an opportunity to overcome many divisions. This idea was supported by the approximately 700,000 people who voted for BBWR. Therefore, we decided to found an association," said Andrzej Olechowski after the Monday meeting of the founders of the BBWR Election Committee, which will soon be dissolved. When asked why BBWR is not becoming a party, Olechowski answered: "It would be difficult to establish a party with the name 'Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms.' The formula of an association is better and more capacious."

"There are many parties, and we still have time for that," said Jerzy Eysymontt, one of the 16 BBWR deputies.

"After the self-government elections in 1994, if need be, BBWR will transform itself into a party," stated Andrzej Kozakiewicz after the Monday meeting. His comment on relations between the president and BBWR was the following: "They are perfect, as usual. BBWR will be a pro-presidential association, as will the bloc's deputies' club." Asked why BBWR decided not to disband despite earlier statements that it would dissolve after the elections, Kozakiewicz replied: "Because the atmosphere there is nice; we like each other."

According to him, the association will be supported by subscription fees ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 zlotys per year. There will be no shortage of money, because, according to him, several million people will join BBWR—for example those who did not vote at all.

"We want to remain open," explains Andrzej Kozakiewicz. He believes that BBWR achieved success in these elections. Now, as the only rightist group in the Sejm, it wants to offer other rightist parties an opportunity to integrate, to join the association.

We asked politicians of the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD] and the Christian-National Union [ZChN] if it is possible for their parties to join the BBWR association.

"As a collective member of BBWR? This does not seem very likely to me. However, why should I rule out the possibility? We certainly must find some way of unifying the Polish right wing. It is really hard to tell whether it will be this one," said Jacek Merkel of KLD.

Miroslaw Jakubowski of ZChN: "It is rather unlikely that rightist parties will soon come together in such a simple way. I would approach this idea very cautiously. I do not think that ZChN would approve this option for unifying the right wing. However, there are certainly different opinions to be heard, as often happens in a large party."

Krzaklewski: Solidarity To Become 'More Radical'

LD2809184393 Warsaw PAP in English 1628 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Gdansk, Sept. 28—"Solidarity does not accept the new political system established after the elections," Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski said during a break in the meeting of the presidium of the Solidarity National Commission in Gdansk on Tuesday [28 September].

Krzaklewski added that in the present situation Solidarity would become more radical but he stressed his trade union would operate within limits imposed by law.

The presidium of the Solidarity National Commission discussed on Tuesday the returns of the parliamentary elections. The elections will be examined also by a meeting of the presidium with chairmen of the union's boards, to be held in Gdansk on Wednesday.

As the government did not implement agreements signed with Solidarity, the presidium intends to adopt during today's meeting its stand on the issue and to discuss the minimum wage for the fourth quarter of 1993.

Council of Europe Approves Republic's Membership

AU2809170593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1443 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/9/1993—The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved by an overwhelming majority of votes (7 against and 11 abstentions) the report of the Political Committee on Romania's application for its admission to the Council of Europe as a full member. During the 2 hours of debate 29 parliamentarians took the floor, of the 50 announced, most of them bringing into relief the positive aspects of Romania's evolution after December 1989 in point of democratisation, reform and the instatement of the rule of law.

After the result of the voting was known, Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe said: "This approval, obtained by a large majority of vote in the Parliamentary Assembly favourable to Romania's joining the Council of Europe is in fact a historical decision."

Government Issues Communique

AU2809181393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1738 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/9/1993—"The decision the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken with a clear majority to recommend Romania for admission to the Council of Europe has been a matter of satisfaction for the Romanian Government," reads a communique issued in Bucharest on September 28. "The act of justice for Romania represents an important moment, it is a sign of the recognition of Romania's Europea.1 vocation, of the essential changes undergone by the Romanian society as a whole, the Romanian people finds moral support in it to consistently further democratic reforms and fortify the state of law and safeguard and guarantee human freedom and dignity. We are sure that today's decision of the Parliamentary Assembly will soon be approved by the Council of [Foreign] Ministers, so that Romania be able to attend the 8-9 October conference of the Council of Europe to be held in Vienna. We thank all those who have supported Romania and give assurances once again that the Romanian Government will keep to all the commitments it made when Romania asked for membership."

Deputies Express Satisfaction

AU2909105193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0755 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1993—"The Chamber of Deputies of Romania's Parliament has learned with satisfaction of the favorable vote given by the Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg on Romania's admission to full membership in the Council of Europe," reads a statement endorsed by the chamber's plenum on September 28. "Aware of the historic significance of this vote," the document reads, "which means the recognition of the Romanian people's European vocation and of Romania's due place in the community of democratic states, the Chamber of Deputies hereby appreciates the efforts of the Romanian political parties and personalities who, by their activity, have made it possible for this to happen.

"The event is the more significant as Romania was among the first East-European countries to have applied, as early as the spring of 1990, for membership in the Council of Europe, in a wish for integration in the new European structures.

"We are confident that Romania, as a full member of the Council of Europe, will prove its democratic potential," the statement concludes.

Iliescu Comments

AU2909105993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0825 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1993—"It is a moment and reason for general satisfaction that crowns a period of political efforts made at the level of the state bodies, the executive, the parliament, and the political forces that have campaigned all this time to make Romania's stand understood," stated President Ion Iliescu after the vote in favor of Romania in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Appreciating "this moment of lucid thinking and political realism that has materialized in the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe", President Iliescu expressed his hope that "the Council of Ministers as well, will ratify this decision, and the soonest at that, so that Romania may be present at the first summit of heads of state and government due [8-9 October] in Vienna."

President To Keep SRI Head in Office

AU2809113093 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 23 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Stefan Nicolae: "Magureanu Is Going, Magureanu Is Coming"]

[Text] After certain political leaders took it for granted that Virgil Magureanu will be removed from his position as head of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], here is the latest news, according to which, after a thorough and just examination, President Ion Iliescu, overwhelmed by a spirit of justice, made the decision. Thus, Virgil Magureanu will be reappointed to the position of SRI general director. The signing of the respective decision should have already taken place shortly after the parliament debates on the SRI Report, during which an anomaly was stressed, namely that the head of such an important and powerful institution is performing his work in semi-legality.

Although, according to certain indications and declarations "professor" Magureanu seemed determined to give up this position (probably in exchange for something more desirable), it seems that the president persuaded him to stay. Is it possible that for this election his professional qualities or the numerous services that he has already performed for those in power were taken into consideration? Or, as one can assume, does Mr. Magureanu know too much to stand aside?

In any event, the SRI director has already received the most important "approval" to stay in his seat. If the interests require it, the Parliament's voting machine will again be put into operation. Thus, from this point of view, he has no reason to be concerned.

Increase in Unemployment Rate Reported

AU2709200893 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1753 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 27/9/1993—The unemployment rate stood at 9.3 percent on September 27 as against 9.1 percent on September 20. Of the 1,053,453 reported jobless, 976,892 were granted unemployment benefits or support allowances.

Bucharest counted 16,584 unemployed on September 27, of whom 30,900 were paid benefits or allowances.

Agreement Lists Assistance Projects for Moldova

AU2809132793 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 23 Sep 93 p 6

["A Helping Hand to Moldova"]

[Text] On the basis of the agreement concluded between the Government of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, it has been established that, apart from urgent fuel and mineral oil deliveries, Romania should allocate a 3.5 billion lei credit for financing the following actions: a) Supplying the necessary equipment for the first manufacturing line of welded pipes for the Falesti sanitation plant; b) joint planning and construction of the Balti-Ungureni-Iasi natural gas pipe; c) geological research and the exploitation of natural gases in Enichioi and Viktorovka; d) repair of the ships Sovata and Stefanesti, which have been put at the disposal of the Republic of Moldova, and ensuring spare parts for them; e) 65 motor trailers offered to the Republic of Moldova and ensuring spare parts for them; f) repair of the Radauti Prut-Lipcani bridge; g) contracting and delivery of publications and educational material; h) printing and delivery of textbooks for pre-academic education; i) financing 60 research projects; j) joint sports and youth actions (worth 210 million lei); k) building a village museum in the Republic of Moldova. It has also been agreed that the two sides may restructure these actions and change the sums of money envisaged for them in accordance with priorities emerged in the process.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 29 September

WA2909170593

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Bosnian Assembly votes to accept peace plan with conditions ... Bosnian Presidency member Abdic urges Muslims in western Bosnia to disobey Bosnian President Izetbegovic over autonomy initiative ... Governing party denounces Serbian Radical Party leader Seselj's no confidence motion ... UNPROFOR retracts charge that Croatian troops fired on UN troops.

POLITICAL

ASSEMBLY ACCEPTS PLAN WITH CONDITIONS (Sarajevo Radio): Bosnian Assembly votes to accept new peace proposal but only if territories captured by Serbian forces are returned. Prior to the vote, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic said that such a condition imposed by Muslims would be "tantamount to a rejection" and that the Serbs would "move forward in consolidating their state." (AU2909141993, LD2809171393)

ABDIC URGES MUSLIMS TO DISOBEY IZETBEGOVIC (TANJUG): Western Bosnian leader Abdic calls on Muslims in region to "disobey orders" from Bosnian President Izetbegovic to abandon initiative to form autonomous province, denounces decision by convention of Muslim organizations for wanting to continue "the holy war" until "final victory." (LD2909002793)

SOCIALIST PARTY BLASTS SESELJ (Belgrade Radio): Calling him the "embodiment of violence and primitivism," governing Socialist Party of Serbia denounces Serbian Radical Party leader Seselj after he introduced parliamentary motion of no confidence in Serbian Government. Socialists charge Seselj "contributes to Serbia's isolation" by "ceaselessly spoiling" Serbia's relations with its neighbors, calls his economic proposals "absurd." (AU2809170493)

UN PROTECTION FORCES

UNPROFOR RETRACTS CHARGE AGAINST CROATS (AFP): UNPROFOR statement retracts charge that Croatian forces fired on UN troops while they were evacuating wounded French soldiers in southern Croatia, says accusation based on "inaccurate" field reports. (AU2809210093)

Izetbegovic Addresses Assembly on Geneva Plan

AU2809210493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1416 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Speech by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic addressing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Allow me now to present my personal dilemmas when it comes to accepting or rejecting this peace offer. This is how I would (?categorize) reasons for and against accepting (?the peace solution). At this moment [words indistinct] circumstances:

The reasons for accepting. I have here nine reasons:

First, the continuation of the war [words indistinct] to endanger the very biological substance of the people. Many have been killed, maimed, and expelled. Accepting it could put an end to the suffering of the people, as its rejection would mean almost certain continuation of the war, even though its acceptance does not necessarily mean peace.

Second, because of the [words indistinct], the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is (?condemned) to defensive warfare, [words indistinct] further loss of territory and an even weaker negotiating positions in future.

Third, Europe and the world will not intervene militarily. The lifting of the arms embargo, although not ruled out, is still not very likely.

Fourth, the attacks by the HVO on the Army have opened a second front [words indistinct] and war turned the aggression by Serbia into a civil war in the eyes of the world, a clash of, as they say, three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fifth, the number of refugees is increasing and not decreasing. Their general status is very [word indistinct]. Our people are gradually [word indistinct]. Time is not on our side in this respect.

Sixth, [words indistinct] warnings that the humanitarian aid will be halted if the war efforts continue to endanger the UNHCR staff. However, (?one thing is) certain, our people would not be able to survive without [words indistinct] of food and medicine.

Seventh, winter is coming. Our people are mostly in the cities, and they do not have reserves of food and fuel. The chetniks and the HVO are holding the villages and the roads, and they get some kind of help from Serbia and Croatia. They will have a hard and unpleasant winter, but ours will be unendurable.

Eighth, the international guarantees are very likely, even though at the moment they are not quite certain. In any case, they should be the condition for our (?possible) signature.

Ninth, the situation in Russia is becoming more difficult. If developments continue in this direction, [words indistinct] from Bosnia. I do not think any explanations are needed as to what that would mean in this situation.

[Words indistinct] against the acceptance of the document.

First, the ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though carried out through war and aggression, is legalized in this document. [words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The instruments are built into the agreement to prevent this but, although they are useful, they are not sufficient. [words indistinct]

Second, [word indistinct] regions that used to be populated by the majority Muslim population and ethnically cleansed in the war, are to remain in the attacker's possession. The opposing sides do not (?envisage) the return of territories but just their exchange. In my view, this is the most significant fault of the solution on offer that cannot be disregarded easily.

Third, a part of the offered territories (?is also) in a strategic encirclement. The roads, railways, and rivers, particularly in Herzegovina and central Bosnia, are crisscrossed. The agricultural (?land amount to) only 20-22 percent of [words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The fourth reason that (?compels) me to reject such a document is the fact that the force of the attacker, the military and economic force, particularly the latter, have been seriously damaged. The morale of their army, because of the crimes that have been committed and our unexpectedly strong resistance, is mainly low. However, the motivation of our soldiers is strong, and our military industry can produce amounts of weapons that are not insignificant, and [words indistinct] the logistics blockade.

And fifth, the so-called realities are against us, but many peoples through persistent struggle won over (?these) realities. Justice is on (?our) side.

Therefore, I have presented nine reasons for and five against. This does not mean at all that there are more reasons for accepting it than rejecting it. [words indistinct] reasons is not equally valuable. [words indistinct], it appears to me that one reason (?becomes) sometimes stronger and [words indistinct] (?fact). [applause]

Karadzic: Conditions Tantamount to Rejection

LD2809171393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Banja Luka, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska, said in Banja Luka today that the Muslim decision to sign the peace agreement conditionally was tantamount to its rejection.

Speaking to journalists, Karadzic stressed that the Serb side is ready to sign the peace agreement document and

to cooperate with all its neighbors. "I think that the time has come for peace. Those against peace will have to bear the consequences," he said.

The republic of Srpska president went on to add that "in the light of some signals from the Muslim side that there would be no signing, he could not, at this particular moment, say with certainty if peace would be reached." According to him, in that case, there would be no new negotiations or concessions and "if others do not wish to sign the peace agreement the Serbs do not wish to wait any longer."

"The Serbs will do nothing to escalate the war, regardless of whether the Muslim side signs the agreement or not. However, the Serbs must move forward in consolidating their state, and we can no longer wait," Karadzic stressed.

Asked by a TANJUG correspondent to comment on the proclamation of the autonomous province of western Bosnia [by Muslim member of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Abdic on 27 September], Karadzic said: "That is an internal matter for the Muslim national community and the Muslim republic. Abdic most likely sees great economic potentials for his province, and we will not interfere. In other words, we have nothing against the Muslim republic being organized territorially in the way it suits them best."

Asked about the effects of the latest events in Russia on the peace process in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karadzic said that he hopes the Russian events will not have a negative effect on the peace process, and that they are Russia's internal matter. He believes firmly that Russia will emerge from these events much stronger, and that regardless who is in power there, the republic of Srpska will respect the will of the Russian people.

Abdic Appeals to Muslims To Disobey Izetbegovic

LD2909002793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2330 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Petrovac, September 28 (TANJUG)—Moslem leader in the Cazinska Krajina, an enclave in western Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fikret Abdic called Tuesday night [28 September] on the citizens of this region to disobey orders of leader of Bosnian Moslems Alija Izetbegovic and his followers.

Izetbegovic ordered Tuesday a military rule in the Cazinska Krajina after Moslems in this enclave proclaimed autonomy opposing Izetbegovic's war option.

"I call on the citizens of western Bosnia to disobey orders asking the population to remain in total isolation, because Izetbegovic wants to subject all the citizens to his own arbitrariness and illusions that he is a great statesman and leader of all the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Abdic said over Croatian television.

Abdic called on the citizens of the autonomous province of western Bosnia (APWB) to listen only to the advice and orders of the APWB leadership, "because our common goal is an end to war and life together in freedom."

A moderate Moslem politician, Abdic has on several occasions publicly accused Izetbegovic of pursuing a warmongering, suicidal policy for Bosnian moslems, as by sacrificing their lives he rejected every peace plan to achieve his idea on creating a Moslem-dominated unitary, fundamentalist Bosnia.

Izetbegovic declared "unconstitutional" the decision proclaiming the APWB, taken by some 400 delegates of the newly-formed constitutional assembly of the new province, and called on the loyal Moslem units in the region to cancel such a decision.

To prove the that the Cazinska Krajina must separate from the rest of the territory which under the Geneva peace accord on union of Bosnia-Herzegovina would go to the Moslems, Abdic cited also the decision of the Convention of Moslems in Sarajevo Tuesday for the "holy war to continue until final victory."

The Convention of Moslems, a parallel Moslem assembly whose session immediately preceded the Moslem parliament session, decided that the geneva peace package be accepted on condition the Moslems be returned the "forcibly taken territories."

This condition, according to the Moslems in the Cazinska Krajina, practically meant rejection of the peace plan and continuation of war with a view to creating a unitary Bosnian state, which is not accepted by either the Bosnian Croats nor the Bosnian Serbs—the other two parties in the civil war in this former Yugoslav republic.

'Clashes' Reported

LD2809181793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1625 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Petrovac, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—There has been a deceptive lull on the Bihac battlefield for several days now. However, the simmering cauldron of the Cazin Krajina has boiled over in the aftermath of the decision to proclaim the autonomous province of western Bosnia yesterday.

The decision has been received enthusiastically by 100,000 citizens who signed Abdic's initiative, while a smaller number of people, mainly from the town of Cazin, dispute the creation of a western Bosnia province. According to local Muslim media, this led to numerous clashes between Abdic and Izetbegovic supporters in Cazin.

All local radio stations in the Cazin valley have interrupted their regular programs today and are constantly broadcasting statements and appeals by certain political bodies and Muslim leaders. [passage omitted]

The Muslim Bihac radio has broadcast a statement issued by Ramiz Drekovic, the commander of the Fifth Corps of the Muslim army, who appeals for "calm, patience, and restraint" among his soldiers.

Drekovic particularly calls on his soldiers who signed Fikret Abdic's initiative for the creation of a western Bosnia province to return to their positions to defend the borders.

'Military Dictatorship' Reported

LD2809134793 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Late last night Alija Izetbegovic issued a command imposing military dictatorship in the entire territory of western Bosnia in response to the proclamation of the autonomous province of western Bosnia yesterday, [Bosnian Presidency member and western Bosnian leader] Fikret Abdic's office in Velika Kladusa said today.

Izetbegovic personally issued the order to Ramiz Drekovic, the commander of the regional forces, without consulting the state presidency as the commander in chief or the parliament as the highest body of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Early this morning Drekovic issued a command imposing a curfew and called on the citizens to remain in their homes. He also issued a command imposing strict censorship on all media. Radio stations in Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa, and Bosanska Krupa have to follow a strict joint program scheme and all stations have to use Bosnia-Herzegovina radio as the only competent source of information.

Reports from western Bosnia must affirm the struggle for liberation, integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and its army as the most important achievement of the people, the command says.

The imposition of military dictatorship has caused unprecedented indignation among the people of the Cazin and Velika Kladusa municipalities. The number of people in the streets is increasing and they are protesting against Izetbegovic and Drekovic. We have not received any updates from Bihac as both Radio Bihac and Radio Cazin have been occupied. [passage omitted]

Mladic Meets Briquemont, Warns of 'Catastrophe'

LD2809182793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1658 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Banja Luka, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Lieutenant Colonel General Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the army of the republic of Srpska, said in Banja Luka today that "NATO forces should adhere to their founding document" and "are undesirable beyond the member countries."

Mladic said this after talks with General Francis Briquemont, the UN peace force commander for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stated that, according to reports available to him, the Muslim side does not wish to sign the peace agreement. He went on to say that in this case the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina will turn into a catastrophe. Mladic added that Serb land would be defended by the Serbian army and Serbian sons.

Mladic said he hopes adequate solutions will be found to guarantee humanitarian aid deliveries to all who need it. He went on to add that he expects the international community to show understanding and lift the blockade, the effects of which have been threatening the civilian population most seriously.

In conclusion Gen. Mladic explained that other topics were also discussed during his talks with Briquemont.

Gen. Mladic said that Sarajevo—which he described as the largest Serb city in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina—is of priority concern for the Srpska republic regardless of whether the peace agreement is signed or not.

Gen. Briquemont expressed optimism and a belief that peace will be finally achieved. He noted that it will be more difficult to implement the agreement than to obtain signatures for it. He repeated that without peace the coming winter could be catastrophic.

Lukic, Prlic Comment on Cooperation Talks

LD2809210593 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Report by correspondent Smiljko Sagolj]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] A meeting was held today in Celebici between representatives of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna and the republic of Srpska. Everyone was satisfied with the course and conclusions of this one in a series of meetings, as was confirmed by prime ministers Vladimir Lukic and Jadranko Prlic in their statements for Croatian Television.

[Begin recording] [Lukic, identified by caption] Certainly we are on the threshold of a period of peace, but there are many issues that need to be dealt with, namely, personal safety and the safety of citizens' property must be ensured in all areas, we must ensure that trade, the exchange of goods take place, because good neighbors can never live without that, and this will therefore be one of our immediate tasks.

[Prlic, identified by caption] We also discussed today possible ways of assistance, primarily providing the unhindered passage of convoys to the Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia, and in this respect I can express my satisfaction with what has been done so far, and what will be done in the future. These talks should also be seen in the context of the overall efforts to calm the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croats, that is, the Croat

republic of Herceg-Bosna, want its neighbors in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina to be people open to cooperation and negotiations to ease tensions. We would simply like to be good neighbors.

[Lukic] I must say that the most important issues are the cessation of military actions, establishing trust, and peaceful borders, contacts at the borders. Citizens should be able to have normal contacts across the border. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Most Fronts 'Quiet'; Children Killed in Maglaj

AU2809195093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Excerpts] After several days of more fierce fighting, today was relatively quiet on most fronts. Even the free territories of Brcko, Gradacac, Kladanj, and Konjic, had a quiet day. However, the territory of Maglaj, Tesanj, and Novi Seher experienced a heavy day, which was characterized by infantry, tank, and artillery attacks by the aggressor that resulted in some civilians being killed and wounded. Four children were killed and 13 persons were wounded more seriously. The aggressor fired over 300 shells at Maglaj today. The aggressor is also bringing new hardware and manpower. [passage omitted]

On the territory where the 5th Corps is deployed, the Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Otoka regions were shelled. The Mostar region was somewhat quieter today, although bombs were again fired today on Sjeverni Logor, Santiceva Ulica, Blagaj, and Bijelo Polje from the positions of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. Two fighters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were killed and four wounded.

In the zone of responsibility of the 3d Army Corps it is significantly quieter than in the last few days. In addition to the provocations, Zenica was also attacked with howitzer shells fired from Vitez.

The Tuzla region is quieter. Two women were killed by shrapnel of the aggressors' shells. The free territory of Doboj was shelled and seven persons were seriously wounded. The fighting is still going on in Gornji Vakuf. The aggressors shelled the free territory of Zvornik. The territory of the Sarajevo District of Stari Grad was occasionally shelled from the aggressors' positions.

UN Spokesman Says Tension 'High' in Kiseljak

AU2909110593 Paris AFP in English 1059 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 29 (AFP)—Two people were killed and six wounded overnight when several hundred civilians tried to cross the Sarajevo frontline under cover of darkness, a UN military official said Wednesday [29 September].

Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Aikman, spokesman for the United Nations Protection force, said the attempted crossings at the airport, both in and out of Sarajevo, were a regular nightly occurrence with civilians running a gauntlet of snipers to cross the tarmac in a bid to leave the besieged city or bring in goods from the outside.

The airport, located on one of the frontlines between Bosnian Moslems and Serbs, is controlled by UN French troops who are supposed to prevent any crossings in what is a declared neutral zone.

Meanwhile fighting continued between Moslem-led and Croat forces, mainly in central and southern Bosnia, Aikman said.

In the centre of the country, the town of Vitez was heavily shelled Tuesday, with steady firing back and forth across the main east-west highway near the town.

There was also fighting in the Gornji Vakuf area, to the south.

In the Kiseljak area west of Sarajevo, there were also several exchanges of small arms fire between Croat and Moslem forces.

Aikman said tension was especially high in that area, held by Croats, because the territory is supposed to be handed over to Moslems under the proposed Geneva peace plan currently being considered by the parliament in Sarajevo.

In the south, there was "very heavy shelling" of Jablanica and limited shelling in Mostar, the spokesman said.

In Sarajevo itself, in addition to sporadic shelling, there was "sniper fire to a very significant level" throughout Tuesday, he added.

Energy Shortage Expected in Sarajevo

AU2909115793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] The Kakanj-Jablanica transmission line, which was shelled yesterday, has been badly damaged. A group of Elektroprenos servicemen is already in the field and repairs are underway. The extent of the damage is such that this transmission line is expected to be reconnected only in a few days' time. During this period Sarajevo will be supplied only overnight, with 2 to 3 megawatts of electricity.

There is still no water. Only the Pivara spring is functionings.

Gas pressure is below 0.5 bar and most of Sarajevo is not receiving this source of energy. Sarajevogas still does not know the reason for such a weak supply of gas.

Velepekara last night baked bread for 10 local communities in Sarajevo as well as for certain hospitals, public accommodation places, soup kitchens, and other priority users in town. The biggest problem at the moment is the shortage of oil, and the delivery vans might come to a halt tomorrow already.

RSK Warns UN Against Meeting Croatian Demands

LD2809161893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1405 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Slobodan Jarcevic, the foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina, expressed his hope today that the United Nations would extend the peacekeeping forces' mandate in the zones under their protection since last March, despite Croatia's demands.

At a news conference in the international press center in Belgrade, Jarcevic described Croatia's demands as an attempt to coerce a decision out of the UN that would practically enable UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to disarm the Serbian people while annexing the RSK, which used to be an integral part of Yugoslavia, to Croatia.

If the Security Council votes in favor of Croatia's demands, or even partially responds to them, and if the peacekeepers cease performing their duties, the RSK will defend itself, he warned. [passage omitted]

Charge That Croats Fired on UN Troops Retracted

AU2809210093 Paris AFP in English 2043 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 28 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) acknowledged Tuesday [28 September] that it wrongly accused the Croatian Army of having fired at UN peacekeepers on Saturday.

An investigation showed that "at no time did Croatian troops fire directly on UNPROFOR soldiers during the incident," in which two French troops were injured in a minefield in southern Croatia.

A statement said the facts given in a denial by a Croatian Army commander Monday had been "verified as fully accurate by (Canadian) Battalion Commander Lieutnenant-Colonel James Calvin," UNPROFOR said in a statement.

The original report, issued Sunday, was "based on field reports which have now proved to be inaccurate," the statement said, adding "UNPROFOR regrets the relay of erroneous information."

Sunday's report said Croat soldiers attacked French and Canadian UN troops Saturday as they were evacuating two French soldiers wounded in a mine explosion in Medak, southern Croatia.

General Jean Cot, commander of UN Forces in ex-Yugoslavia, made a strong protest to the head of the Croatian Army, General Janko Bobetko, over the incident.

Bobetko denied the charge, saying his troops fired into the air to signal that UN peacekeepers had been hurt and that Croatian soldiers afterwards provided an ambulance and guaranteed its safe passage out of the area.

Krajina's Hadzic Predicts SDS To Take Power

AU2909113093 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 28 Sep 93 p 5

[Report by J. Simic: "Cut in Government and Army Leadership"]

[Text] "As supreme commander, I will carry out radical staffing changes in the army leadership and the government. The reason for this is the recent developments on the Lika front."

This is what Goran Hadzic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, said yesterday [27 September], two days before the scheduled republic of Serbian Krajina assembly was due to meet on Thursday in Beli Manastir. According to the president, the public will be informed today about the names of the people in the army leadership and the government who were to have been dismissed yesterday evening.

The main issue on the agenda of the republic of Serbian Krajina assembly session will be the political and security situation in Krajina. The debate is expected to be very animated.

"I expect that the original Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] will finally take power at the session on Thursday. That is necessary as our party holds all the responsibility. By the way, there are three more SDS parties in the republic of Serbian Krajina, together with the original one, and I call on all their members to join us," Hadzic said.

Commenting on the recent demand by the SDS of Krajina, led by Milan Babic, who is seeking the removal of Goran Hadzic, the president of the republic of Serbian Krajina briefly said that it was only a small branch, which had been using every opportunity to try and seize the presidency.

As for announcements that the assembly session in Beli Manastir could be postponed, Hadzic said that it would only be possible if military operations were to prevent the arrival of the deputies. Even in that case the session would still go ahead on Thursday with the deputies from Slavonija, Baranja, and western Srem.

On the other hand, Mile Paspalj, chairman of the republic of Serbian Krajina assembly, said that consultations on the coming session were still under way. Like Hadzic, he, too, expects an animated debate. Asked whether there could be a rift among the deputies because of the policy implemented by the republic of Serbian Krajina leadership and the tragic events on the Lika front, Paspalj said that this should not happen at any cost.

"Unity is at the moment the highest patriotic duty and no deputy should forget that," Paspalj said. "Anyway,

the deputies have no right to behave any differently from our fighters, and people from Benkovac, Obrovac, and all the way to Beli Manastir are at the moment fighting on the western Dalmatian and the Lika fronts."

[Box, p 5]

Borders Before the Aggression

Hadzic assessed the situation on the Lika front as stable, particularly after three strong units of the Krajina army had been deployed there.

"There is no other demarcation line except the one that existed before the recent Croat aggression on our territory. Everything else, shifts or concessions of any kind and at our expense, is out of the question," Hadzic claimed.

Ploce Council Warns of 'Spontaneous Resistance'

LD2809202893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Because of the Muslim leadership's constant and undisguised pretensions to an outlet to the sea in the Ploce region of the Croatian littoral, and its misinterpretations of the talks conducted aboard the British aircraft carrier Invincible, a special session of the Ploce town council was held in Ploce today.

The participants discussed the status of Ploce in light of the interstate negotiations on the establishment of the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following discussions that lasted several hours and were attended by Jure Buric and Luka Siljeg, the prefect and deputy prefect of Dubrovnik-Neretva county; the leaders of local political parties; the deputies of the Dubrovnik-Neretva county assembly; members of the Ploce town council; Ploce Mayor Josko Damic; and Ratko Giljevic, the president of the town council, a unanimous decision was reached on the following:

A delegation from Ploce, headed by the mayor, will acquaint the office of the president of the Republic with the decision that there shall be no territorial concessions regarding the port of Ploce, as an integral part of the Republic of Croatia, in the international negotiations on the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The free zone in Ploce port is at the disposal of any international entity for the conduct of foreign trade. No negotiations whatsoever on the leasing of any part of Ploce port, nor any other concessions in this respect that can in any way affect the sovereignty of the port and of the Croatian state as a whole, can be held without the consent of the people of this region or without consideration for the decisions of the town council. It has been assessed that any further negotiations on territorial concessions to the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina could result in the spontaneous resistance of the people of this region, according to the conclusions from today's special session of Ploce town council.

Situation of Bosnian Refugees Viewed

AU2809202093 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 17-24 Sep 93 p 7

[Article by Lidija Krslak: "On Whose Back?"]

[Text] According to the information of 25 August, there are 526,034 refugees and displaced persons from the territories of the former Yugoslavia on the free territory of the Republic of Croatia. The number of the registered refugees is 249,199, to which, according to the estimates of the experts, another 12 per cent should be added to account for those who are illegal refugees, so that the total number rises to 279,049.

The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Government of the Republic of Croatia says that 95 per cent of this number are Bosnians and Herzegovinians, 65 per cent of whom are Muslims, and the rest mostly Croats. The ratio of the number of Muslims and Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina now living as refugees in Croatia changes with the speed of the daily political and military events, especially after the conflict in central Bosnia and the exodus of a great number of Croats from the region.

"Green Cards" Extended

In early September, refugee status was extended for the next three months, which is, after the reregistration in March, the third extension of the green refugee cards. In that period, each refugee is obliged to have their card verified once a month at the municipal social work center at which they are registered.

The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Government of the Republic of Croatia will continue to approve transit through Croatia to all persons and groups meeting the requirements, that is, holding an affidavit of a third country, a visa, or a certificate stating that the issuing of a visa for a country for which it is necessary is underway. In that respect, the Office representatives say that there is a need to be very cautious, as Croatia has been accused by the foreign press of thus carrying out, and helping, ethnic cleansing. Mr. Josip Esterajher, assistant of the senior secretary, says that there is a paradoxical situation in which Croatia is at the same time accused of having closed borders and of helping the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an example, he stated that, one to three times a week, convoys of expelled Muslims and Croats from western Bosnia (Prijedor, Sanski Most, Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiska, Dubica....) continue to arrive at Novska, to which the foreign public does not react at all, while when this situation happens with Ljubuski and Capljina, then Croatia is, with stormy comments, accused of participating in ethnic cleansing. Stating this example, Mr. Esterajher also said that "the arrival in Zagreb of 640 refugees by bus from Ljubuski, from the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, in late August, (they were Muslims) was not organized by, or even known to the Government

Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees," and this office is therefore not involved in any ethnic cleansing.

Only Igasa

Accepting new refugees to the Republic of Croatia is possible only in the case of reuniting families, and this is where maximum understanding is displayed in each particular case, said the Office representatives.

Croatia spends $62 million a month on the displaced persons and refugees. According to the not-so-recent information, $18 million of this amount is spent on the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This figure does not include the health care and education expenses. About 20 per cent of the refugees and displaced persons are accommodated in hotels, workers' rest homes, and at camping sites. The accommodation expenses are covered by the King Zvonimir Foundation, 96-97 per cent of which is financed from the Croatian budget, and only 3-5 per cent with the donations of Croatian emigrants, foreign charity organizations, the UNHCR, and so on.

As far as special donations for the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, that is, the Muslims, only one donation has arrived through the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of Croatia, from Igasa, which was $1.6 million, spent on arranging the camp in Gasinci and several hut settlements in Zagreb. There are some 20 Islamic humanitarian organizations in Zagreb, which, however, do not give financial aid for the accommodation that the Office provides, but instead provide other kinds of help to the refugees (for instance, family packages).

Commenting on the remark that only refugees of Muslim nationality were moved from the hotels on the coast, the Office representatives stated the information that 25 per cent of the people moved from the hotels are of Croatian nationality, and that the move took place in only 40 hotels in Istria. All the Muslim refugees temporarily accommodated in facilities that are inappropriate for winter conditions, that is, in tents or huts without heating (in Obonjani and Gasinci), will be promptly provided with the adequate facilities, said the Office representatives. Continuing the same practice, the future solutions to all the problems regarding refugees, as well as policy-making, will be dealt with by the Government of the Republic of Croatia, while the Office will continue to suggest and offer measures that they consider most suitable.

Commenting on the recent visit of Dr. Mohammed Mohsin, the assistant secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and his meeting with Professor Adalbert Rebic, director of the Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, Mr. Esterajher denies there being a direct connection between this visit and the recent action of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs, that is, the search of humanitarian organizations, remarking that the purpose of the visit was to encourage and promote humanitarian activities, and to jointly solve certain problems of particular humanitarian organizations. They discussed the genesis of the conflict of the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dr. Mohsin asked Dr. Rebic to intervene in the supply of the humanitarian aid to the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and invited him to visit Jeddah. The Office representatives say that there are about a hundred humanitarian organizations in Croatia, and, for many of them, the Office has no information regarding their helping the refugees. Commenting on the rumors that some Islamic humanitarian organizations were moving from Croatia, the Office claimed that, though they were in contact, they had no official reports of such a withdrawal, and that Croatia welcomes any humanitarian organization acting in accordance with the Law on Humanitarian Organizations.

Unsubstantiated Attacks

Considering the mechanisms of cooperation with the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its institutions in Zagreb regarding the refugees, the Office said that they were generally satisfied, but that it could be much better, especially, as they say, regarding the unsubstantiated attacks on Croatia, for instance that regarding the departure of the group of Muslim refugees from the Makarska Riviera to Pakistan. The decision that they should go to this country was made by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Croatia was accused abroad of expelling refugees for which it had provided accommodation. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which made the decision, did not react to these attacks. The Office representatives say that, in all these cases, it is forgotten that Croatia has, for a very long time, been taking care of a quarter of a million of its own displaced persons, for whom there is very little interest abroad.

Drnovsek on Economic, Political Priorities

AU2709213693 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 18 Sep 93 p 22, 30

[Interview with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Janez Markes; place and date not given: "Preservation of Political Stability Is a Must"]

[Excerpts] [Markes] We have heard rumors of an imminent accelerated economic cycle in autumn, especially regarding the privatization that concerns rehabilitation of banks. What success do you anticipate and how do you plan to act in case of possible "social explosion" that cannot be ruled out due to tightened economic circumstances?

[Drnovsek] I anticipate that privatization will kick off in these months because all the formal bases, all signatures, and the methodology, too, have been prepared. It is now companies' turn to propose and carry out their plans for privatization; I hope that revision procedures which are not supposed to stall privatization will also commence soon. I cannot say that I expect some spectacular results from privatization in the coming months. Privatization is merely a precondition for investments and reanimation of the economy over the next few months. I hope that our sufficiently flexible privatization model will produce quick results; however, nobody can anticipate how privatization will "take off." In other countries as well as here it is difficult to give exact forecasts as to when the measures of responsible management will produce results—in companies and throughout the state. I hope that this will happen as quickly as possible, however, we cannot bypass the phase of privatization.

Of course, we are in a rather awkward position because we are in between two systems. We must hold on and implement the privatization processes in full. Social tensions might also escalate during this period. People want faster results, which of course cannot materialize because privatization, that is, a more efficient economic system, is only in the process of being established while we are simultaneously facing concrete loss of the Yugoslav market and a recession in the world and in Europe. The mere fact that there are no greater pressures on the standard of living and social circumstances is actually a considerable success in itself. If the social tensions escalate, the government will simply try to pursue its hard policy. We are trying to regulate the matters with collective agreements and we continue our efforts for the signing of a social pact. The government is aware that there is no other choice but to continue in this direction, and if we must endure social pressures we shall endure them.

[Markes] How will this look concretely? Do you have a strike wave in mind?

[Drnovsek] I hope that we will avoid it, that we will be able to explain matters in a satisfactory manner. If a strike wave takes place we will have to face it and persist, as the government cannot yield to any sort of chaos and anarchy.

[Markes] When do you envisage the lowest point of recession? Have we perhaps already reached the lowest point?

[Drnovsek] No economist dares to give an exact forecast. Various institutes have established that the production revived in July. The next few months will show whether this revival will continue. The revival is usually connected to the issue of salaries—if we prevent the explosion of salaries then the revival of the economy will continue; however, if the salaries increase too much then the growth might falter. Here we return to the initial question: It will be very important how successful the government is with its income policy and in holding back social tensions. The government economists and the institute for macroeconomic policy have forecast that at the beginning of the next year we are supposed to achieve the first minimal economic growth which will be, true enough, merely symbolic. They anticipate a percent or two of the domestic product. Everything depends on two factors, first if privatization will run smoothly and second, if the world recession will not be too grave.

[Markes] In one of the interviews you said that you wished to keep the government outside the debate about history, outside the symbol debate. It seems, however, that the pragmatism, which is otherwise an attribute of good politicians, in the Slovene case returns in a form of affairs as a double boomerang. What political realignment do you foresee in the future, especially in the light of moves on the right after Jelincic? How firm is your government?

[Drnovsek] This is a complex question. The issue of the past and symbolic issues are very much present nowadays. I know that we must deal with them and take a suitable stance toward them, but I also think that it is vital and only possible that we try to exempt the government from these debates and that we try not to transfer various debates and divisions onto the government. The government should deal primarily with economic affairs and current events, and this should be its fundamental task. This represents the element of political stability and without this Slovenia will not escape crisis for a long time. If the governments and elections change too frequently we will be rocked by economic and social crises and the world will conclude that we are not a mature state. Finally, this is soon mirrored in the economy. My pragmatic stance, therefore, originates from the need and conclusion that some processes must continue and that distribution of political influence, which is behind these symbol debates about the past, can be advantageous for individuals, groups, or parties, but, globally speaking, political instability is a catastrophe for Slovenia. Escalation of tensions and polarization would lead to greater political crisis at a very awkward moment and circumstances. I am thus trying to alleviate these tensions and neutralize them as much as I can and keep the

coalition out of it. Once this is no longer possible, I will take certain measures. For as long as we can work and gain time for the economy and its transformation, I will do this. If the above mentioned consequences do take place then changes will probably first take place within the government coalition, perhaps some partners will be changed, which should result in a new situation that would, so I hope, last longer, at least until the next elections.

[Markes] You are now talking about cadre combinations in principle. Do you have something concrete or new in mind? So far you have not been making any concrete statements about it.

[Drnovsek] You will probably understand that in my position I will be the last to say this concretely as I would have to concretely implement this in such a case. I would only emphasize that there are various possibilities and combinations within the coalition. Beside my position of trying to steer clear from the symbolic issues and issues of the past I have emphasized very clearly that the biggest shock that the coalition suffered so far in the realization of economic tasks aimed at the future is connected to the United List and its blockade of the government income policy in the spring. The United List on that occasion curtailed the validity of the law on salaries, which undermined the economic policy. This is dangerous for the present coalition. The coalition was not formed to shed light on the past, as the parties actually find it difficult to cooperate in the present team. The coalition exists for the sake of a faster and as effective as possible economic readjustment. If somebody is stalling here, I consider this to be a serious issue for the coalition. I stated this clearly in the spring and I will seriously raise this question again if a similar situation reemerges.

[Markes] I would nevertheless return to symbolic issues. I am thinking of the arms affair. This week MLADINA published a theory about the hints from the Arabic world that it would no longer trade with Slovenia if it continues "discovering" contingents of arms meant as aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This, therefore, represents a direct influence on the economy.

[Drnovsek] This affair is not merely a symbolic one and I did not have it in mind. I was rather referring to some other issues concerning the past, for example various celebrations. The affair is real and it must, of course, interest the government. Interpretations like the one you have mentioned are possible and perhaps such consequences are also possible. However, we must weigh other consequences, too. We must be aware that many countries are involved in arms trade although this does not become public. Slovenia must choose between the bad reputation that it might acquire if it trades in arms and between the fact that somebody might reproach us for standing up against such trade or transit. We must ensure that this will not happen anymore. I think that Slovenia must not be a suspicious country. It is very important —and I have demanded from the ministries to act in accordance with this stance—to clarify that the state is not involved in all this: If somebody did this he did not do it in the name of the state. As a state we will not hide and protect anyone. Therefore, we must clarify the affair as it has concrete consequences for the future. It is important that we are serious and responsible in prevention of such affairs. [passage omitted]

[Markes] Here we return again to the issue of symbolism. A polemic on the independence of the judiciary has developed parallel to the affair. This issue was raised by an intervention of Janez Jansa. By the way, in Italy [President] Scalfaro is also criticizing the judiciary for its inefficiency. You are "drawn into" symbolism here as this a burning problem behind all affairs that have their roots in the past and concern the entire issue of democracy.

[Drnovsek] The government has taken a clear stance concerning this. I have tried to limit and calm down the conflict and on the other hand to put matters in a principled light. The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution and the government cannot interfere with it. The concrete positions that could be interpreted as pressure on the judiciary cannot be voiced either by the government or its representative. Of course we wish, and I have already said this publicly, that priority be given to these issues. The matters must be clarified. That is why I said regarding [Defense] Minister Jansa that I understood his actions that were in the function of accelerating the investigation, as a desire to resolve the matters as quickly as possible. This, of course, cannot be done by telling the court in advance who is guilty. Nobody can rise above the court in this sense, be it prime minister, president, or defense minister. [passage omitted]

[Markes] What are your formal and informal relations with President Kucan?

[Drnovsek] The relations are, institutionally speaking, normal. Sometimes I am portrayed as his rival, on the other hand some are trying to make me look like his possible ally. I try to concern myself with this as little as possible. The institution of the president of the state does not interfere with the prime minister's sphere too often. Sometimes there is a question of who is responsible for what, initially there have been some more in the foreign policy but then this has calmed down. There have also been ambiguities in the division of responsibilities between the president and defense minister, but this also we have resolved to a great extent. [passage omitted]

[Markes] Do you believe the theories that President Kucan has an extremely powerful businessmen lobby which shapes the fate of the government, parliament, and so forth?

[Drnovsek] I would say that he probably has quite a lot of influence. Nobody can influence the government directly. It is the political parties that can influence it with their power of deputies. Public opinion also influences it.

[Markes] Economically and politically speaking you are in the center, as you say. How do you see the development of the political center in the future and what are your forecasts?

[Drnovsek] In any case I am trying to set up and strengthen the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS] as a true party of the center. I am encountering various deviations which I am trying to prevent. Sometimes there are thrusts that wish to push the party more to the left. I would not accept this and I think that the electoral result comes as a result of the perception of LDS as a center party. I expect that the Christian Democrats will also be a center party, that is to say, a moderate center-right party, as is the case elsewhere in Europe. In this way we will be able to cover a wider center. The Peoples' Party will probably also consolidate itself as a center-right party. The parties are, of course, still in the process of consolidating and are suffering their internal tensions. The Democrats will with certain oscillation probably also remain in the center. It is hard to forecast how the integration processes will continue. The possibility of a link between the Slovene Christian Democrats and the Slovene Peoples' Party definitely exists, although it is clear that the differences are rather noticeable and that integration is not progressing quickly. On the other hand the LDS and the Democrats would fall in the family of parties, although there has been a lot of friction in the past. It is hard to say whether closer cooperation will materialize, but I would not rule it out.

[Markes] What about the Social Democrats?

[Drnovsek] They are in an interesting role now. I find it hard to see the connection with the United List here. In a certain period it seemed that they were getting closer but they probably will not find common ground. There will probably be a struggle between them as to who will cover the social democratic sector.

[Markes] Will your government last for four years?

[Drnovsek] I believe it stands a realistic chance of lasting for four years, with occasional changes in its composition in between.

[Markes] And you will announce them when you will carry them out?

[Drnovsek] That is correct.

Registration of Bosnian Refugees Begins

LD2709230193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2233 GMT 27 Sep 93

[Text] Ljubljana, September 27 (TANJUG)—Registration of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina began Monday in the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia.

Those who register will be granted temporary refugee status, others face expulsion from Slovenia.

Over the recent months certain Slovenian nationalist parties, trade unions and groups of individuals have frequently called for caring for the refugees to be discontinued. Certain political circles have indicated that the Slovenian authorities would even gradually begin returning the refugees or transferring them to third countries.

According to Slovenia's refugee office, there were in Slovenia more than 60,000 refugees from Bosnia at this time.

Other indications, however, state that there were no more than 35,000 refugees from Bosnia, while higher figures were being set out, as unofficially noted in Ljubljana, primarily in order to obtain larger funds and other aid from the international community.

Federal

Jovanovic, Stoltenberg Discuss Lifting Sanctions

LD2909004693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2238 GMT 28 Sep 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, Sept 28 (TANJUG)—International mediator on the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg has promised that he and his E.C. colleague Lord Owen will see to it that the question of sanctions against the F.R. Yugoslavia be resolved parallely with the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said on Tuesday [28 September].

During his talks with Stoltenberg at the U.N. headquarters in New York, Jovanovic reiterated the Yugoslav stand that the unjustified sanctions should be lifted parallely with the signing and implementing of a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sanctions were imposed on the F.R. Yugoslavia in May last year, because of its alleged involvement in the civil war between Bosnia's Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

But Stoltenberg and Jovanovic agreed that the signing of the Bosnian peace plan was uncertain since the Moslem side's decision was still unknown.

The so-called Bosnian Moslem assembly, which proclaimed itself the "only legitimate" Moslem parliament, decided on Monday to accept the Geneva peace documents only if the Moslems were given back all forcibly taken territories.

A final decision by the Moslem side is to be made by the parliament which met behind closed doors in Sarajevo on Tuesday. This was one in a series of ultimatums by Bosnian Moslem leader Alija, trying to undermine further negotiations and delay the signing of the peace plan.

Bosnian Serbs and Croats said they were ready to sign the plan, drawn up by Owen and Stoltenberg.

In New York on Tuesday, Jovanovic again met with his Romanian counterpart Teodor Malescanu who said that Romania's losses caused by U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia were enormous. He said Romania would, together with other neighbours, call for their lifting.

Jovanovic on Tuesday met also with Norwegian Foreign Minister Johann Jergen Holst and U.N. Security Council President Alfonso Raul Taylharadat.

Jovanovic said his collocutors agreed that the picuture about the Yugoslav crisis had changed. They praised Yugoslwia's peace efforts and said that the lifting of sanctions should be discussed in that context, he added.

Jovanovic Praises Clinton Speech on Yugoslavia

LD2809125793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1022 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] New York, Sept 28 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic on Monday [27 September] said that there are encouraging signs for a peaceful solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia and, paralel with this, for lifting the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. 'The reasons and consequences of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina are closely linked with the introduction of the sanctions and it is realistic to expect that the sanctions will be lifted simultaneously with the implementation of the peace agreement' Jovanovic told TANJUG.

The U.N. Security Council imposed strict sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia due to its alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia, which broke out over 18 months ago.

Jovanovic, who is in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly session, said that certain countries may try to find some new reasons to prolong the sanctions, but expressed hope that reason will prevail. He described U.S. President Bill Clinton's U.N. speech on Monday as 'correct' in relation to Yugoslavia and added that Yugoslavia's constructive role and efforts to establish peace should have been mentioned.

On Monday, Jovanovic met with the foreign ministers of Greece, Ukraine and Romania to discuss the prospects for a peaceful solution to the Bosnian crisis, the application of a peace agreement and the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia. We reached agreement about all this, he said. Jovanovic underscored Greece's major role as chairman of the European Community since January.

[Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian at 0226 GMT on 28 September transmits a similar New York datelined report on Jovanovich's speech states in part: "What Yugoslavia is most interested in and what it expects from the current session of the UN General Assembly is that the world organization plays a more assertive role in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the lifting of sanctions, the Yugoslav foreign minister said. Of course, there are numerous other global problems, but 'for us they are now of secondary importance,' he added.

"Asked what prospects for the extension of mandate of the UN peace-keeping forces in Krajina are, Jovanovic said: 'This cannot fail. The question is under what conditions.' He added that Croatia was also aware of that, and hence it has set 'unscrupulous' demands to gain as many concessions as possible.

"Asked to comment on U.S. President Clinton's address to the UN General Assembly, Jovanovic said that 'as far as Yugoslavia is concerned that was a very fair address.' It is true, he added, that there were reasons to mention Yugoslavia's very constructive role and efforts to restore peace, but after everything that has come from the

American side so far the very fact that this time 'we were not mentioned in a negative context' seems encouraging, Jovanovic said."]

FRY, Russian Foreign Ministers Discuss Sanctions

LD2909090793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0834 GMT 29 Sep 93

[Text] New York, September 29 (TANJUG)—Foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Russia Vladislav Jovanovic and Andrey Kozyrev met here on Tuesday [28 September] to discuss the developments in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

Kozyrev expressed Russia's readiness to urge a gradual lifting of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia simultaneously with the signing and implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement.

On May 30 last year, the U.N. Security Council imposed tough economic and political sanctions against Yugoslavia on account of its alleged aggression against the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ignoring the fact that there were no Yugoslav Army soldiers in Bosnia at the time and that the confronted sides in the civil war there were local Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

Retail Prices Rise 643.2 Percent in Sep

LD2909083193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1238 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—In comparison with August retail prices in September increased by 643.2 percent. This was stated at a news conference today by Mirjana Rankovic, assistant director general of the Federal Institute for Statistics.

For the first time after a long period of time a considerable drop in inflation was recorded. The increase of prices in September was reduced to one-third of the price hikes in August. [passage omitted]

The September daily inflation in Yugoslavia was 6.6 percent.

Serbia

SPS: Seselj 'Embodiment of Violence and Primitivism'

AU2809170493 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] We have just received the following statement from the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]:

The SPS is of the opinion that it is very good that [Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav] Seselj's party has shown its real face and that its attack on the Government has finally demonstrated that our refusal of any cooperation with Seselj was not a political trick, but the truth. His arrogance and criminal violence in using his private one-quarter of the assembly deputies, his subjects in the People's Assembly, to blackmail Serbia are the best expression of his political, as well as his ordinary, human morale. Even the one-quarter of the assembly seats that Seselj gained by deceiving the citizens of Serbia in the electoral campaign, during which he gave his support to the Serbian leadership.

Seselj's policy is at the opposite pole from the policy of the SPS, as well as at the opposite pole from the interests of the Serbian people and the interests of all citizens of Serbia. In his political conduct, Vojislav Seselj demonstrates an extremely primitive chauvinism, contributes to Serbia's isolation from the world to which Serbia should and does belong, makes its efforts to establish peace on the territory of former Yugoslavia difficult by ceaselessly spoiling the Serbian people's relations with other peoples living around us, incites a war-mongering atmosphere in Serbia and the FRY, and creates bad blood amongst the citizens of Serbia itself and the FRY, particularly inciting and creating hatred and conflicts toward citizens of non-Serbian nationality. With such a policy, he cannot represent a support to the Socialist Government, he can only damage its reputation.

Seselj's idea of total privatization and equal wages is absurd, but unfortunately also dangerous, as with uninformed people it creates a false hope of a way out of the crisis. Total privatization implies inequality and excludes equality. Equal wages exclude privatization. The society that he advocates is a foolish combination of feudal autarchy and (?war) communism. Such a thing is impossible to create anywhere in the world and it is fortunate that it is impossible.

Those people who protect war profiteers and attack honest and diligent people who are conscientiously doing their jobs have no right to speak about equality.

There is really an economic crisis in Serbia because of the war around it and the solidarity with Serbian people outside Serbia, because of which it is subjected to brutal sanctions. However, Serbia will not thereby put its fate into the hands of the criminals and war profiteers that Seselj's party is endorsing and helping. In the most dishonest way, in the pure struggle for power, Seselj's party accuses the SPS and the Government of economic and social problems that are an obvious consequence of the war imposed on the Serbian people and the unjust sanctions against our country.

The efforts made by the SPS and the Serbian Government in the struggle against crime excludes from that struggle everybody who wants to use their alleged participation in it to deny their own responsibility for crimes.

The SPS will do its best to establish and publicly expose Seselj's participation and his own contribution to the forming of paramilitary formations on the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian

Republic, the crimes that they have committed against the civilian population—be it Croatian, Muslim, or Serbian—as well as the criminal activity that Seselj and his associates have participated in.

We care about Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic of Srpska, and the Serbian people outside Serbia, but that is no reason for a Sarajevo would-be politician [politikant], such as Seselj, to preach to Serbia. The SPS is against violence and primitivism, therefore it is against Seselj's policy because he is an embodiment of violence and primitivism that must be hindered. It is no incident that, now that peace is before us, Seselj wants to destabilize Serbia. Seselj is afraid of peace because such people can surface only during a crisis and a war. In the interest of peace and stability in Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the republic of Serbian Krajina, the SPS will remain consistent in implementing its policy of development, democratic relations, national equality, social justice, and the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms of nations and all people. The future of Serbia is not dictatorship and fascism, but democracy and prosperity. All democratic political forces and all honest people in Serbia should join in the struggle against the evil personified by Seselj.

Seselj Contends Muslims Reject Geneva Plan

LD2909020193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1349 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, told TANJUG today that the decision by the so-called Bosniak Convention in Sarajevo means that the Muslims had really rejected the Geneva plan.

He described the Muslim condition "for all territories seized by force to be returned" as cynical, and asked: "Which territories have been seized and by whom? The Serbs never did this to the Muslims, all they did was to offer concessions."

Seselj pointed out that he is not surprised by the standpoints of the Muslim political representatives, who, he says "Were in a tight spot."

"I think that we are yet to see a real showdown in the Muslim leadership," Seselj said.

The leader of the Serbian Radicals contends that the Bosnian Serbs should withdraw all concessions given to the Muslims, declare the Geneva plan as being rejected by the Muslims, and proclaim the independence of the republic of Srpska.

Reporter's Disappearance Unites Opposition

AU2809121993 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 Sep p 5

[Report by M. Mikuljanac: "The Joint Disgust of the Opposition"]

[Text] Belgrade—The kidnapping of Dusan Reljic, correspondent of the weekly VREME, achieved what great social and state problems were unable to do—it united the opposition in Serbia.

All parties and associations that lifted their voices in reaction to the "Reljic case" uniformly condemned this event and called for Serbian authorities to urgently intervene and find out who is behind the kidnapping of the renowned Belgrade correspondent.

In the statement released yesterday, the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] assessed that the "Reljic case" has caused enormous damage to Serbia's state interests. "At a time when Serbia's international image is extremely negative—mostly due to the policy conducted by the Serbian regime—the government cannot allow such cases to additionally compromise our country," says the DSS, and stresses that this threatens constitutionally guaranteed human rights and freedom of the press.

The Independent Union of Radio Television Belgrade expects that the deputies in the Serbian Assembly will demand a debate on this and other cases of unlawful actions of this kind: "We understand the action taken against our colleague Dusan Reljic, who has proven himself to be a highly competent professional, as a threat to all correspondents and media employees who honor the rules of their profession," says the statement of the Independent Union of Radio Television Belgrade.

The Citizens Alliance of Serbia believes that the kidnapping of Dusan Reljic has opened up a new chapter in the authorities' relations toward Serbian citizens. "The showdown with the outside enemy seems to be over, and the time has come for a showdown with anyone who resists this regime in any way. The methods used have been taken from Latin American dictatorships, and it is only a matter of days when people will start disappearing without a trace."

We strongly condemn the kidnapping and harassment of correspondent Dusan Reljic, said Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], for BORBA. The authorities must guarantee the safety of all citizens, regardless of their political or ideological views, says the radicals' leader, and claims that all the rumors connecting the SRS with this kidnapping are a fabrication. "I am digging with all my might in order to unearth precise information about this case, but I am not getting anywhere," says Seselj.

[Box 1, p 5]

Against Anarchy

In reaction to correspondent Dusan Reljic's kidnapping, the Serbian PEN Center and the Serbian Writers Association have expressed, in a statement released yesterday, "a sharp protest against this type of harassment that is characteristic of anarchy and totalitarian regimes."

Dusan Cukic, president of the Yugoslav Journalists Association, said for TIKER that "there are grounds for suspecting that the kidnapping is a result of Reljic's writing." "We demand that the police immediately find who is to blame for the violence perpetrated against our colleague," said Reljic.

[Box 2, p 5]

A State of Powerful Police

"The kidnapping of Dusan Reljic is the latest act of audacity and terror against free-thinking people in Serbia. It is tragic that this despicable act does not elicit surprise. Today, Serbia is a country of powerful police and, at the same time, of no safety for citizens. In such a country, things unthinkable in democratic states become something quite usual." This is what Milan Komnenic, president of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Renewal Movement, wrote yesterday to Serbian Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic.

Minister Comments

AU2809134093 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 Sep 93 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Unnecessary Fabrication of an Affair"]

[Text] Belgrade—"This mysterious—whether real, or, according to some, supposed—disappearance of the correspondent Reljic deserves to be thoroughly investigated, all the more so since so many different, even incompatible things coincide with it. Until all the circumstances are investigated, there is no need for fabricating an affair; there is even less need for other concerns to take the place of a sincere and friendly worry about a colleague," said Serbian Information Minister Milivoj Pavlovic in yesterday's answer to BORBA's question as to what the Ministry had undertaken since it had learned that the correspondent had disappeared, whether it would insist that the appropriate bodies investigate the case, and whether it would do anything to prevent or at least limit correctly the growing verbal attacks on journalists.

"The Information Ministry, and the minister personally, will take immediate action as soon as they are notified by the VREME editorial board. According to the information we have been able to obtain, there can be no question of some new form of punishment for journalists, or a reinstatement of the law on 'libel' [verbalni delikt, the law criminalizing criticism of the state and officials]. Therefore, I am sure that Reljic could not have had the described misfortunes because of what he has written for VREME or other publications."

"If, perhaps, the 'Reljic case' has something to do with some business that is not connected with journalism, you must look for an explanation in some other place," states Minister Pavlovic in his answer.

Policy of 'Organized Supply' Questioned

93BA1486A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 93 pp 10-12

[Article by Vesna Kostic: "Cookies for Pigs"]

[Text] "Did you ever hear of flour for 17 million dinars?"

"Where would that be?"

"Nowhere, but it is cheap."

Now that the governments have prepared a "program for organized supply," we will very soon see whether this old joke will become a way of life for the population here. In any case, in the irrepressible flight of an economic policy whose principal motto is a return to the past, Yugoslavs will again be confronting ration coupons on the threshold of the 21st century.

In mid-June of this year, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic said with great pomp that "this people will not go hungry, there will be enough food; let no one dare to say that this people will go hungry." A month later he was saying that "Serbia will not be hungry," because there was a splendid wheat harvest. At the same time, there is no flour, oil, or sugar in the stores, the public is getting news more and more frequently that more and more people are committing suicide because they have nothing to live on nor anything to eat. S.R. (age 80), a retired schoolteacher from Pancevo, says that it was better during World War II: Prices did not go so high, pensions and salaries were received regularly, and she remembers that during one year of the war she bought 15 suckling pigs with her salary. She bought coffee, sugar, and flour with ration coupons. And now, under worse conditions, she will again use them to obtain supply in a country which is not at war.

Have our present governments decided on "organized supply" because there is not enough food, because it is too expensive for the public, or is there some third reason involved?

There Is Food and There Is Not

This year's wheat harvest is 46 percent larger than the one two years ago, and it is estimated that 3.3 million metric tons were harvested. There is also corn: The harvest was a million tons larger than annual needs. And sunflowers have been abundant: The experts say that there is enough for two years' consumption of vegetable oil, and they also say that oil producers are "sitting" on inventories. A permit was recently issued for the export of this foodstuff, which is ordinarily done only when domestic consumption is not threatened.

The situation with sugar and meat is not rosy. The sugar beets planted in the fields were 50-percent less than had been planned, and the drought took another 20 percent from the harvest. Based on past experience, there will be a shortage of about 100,000 tons for consumption, but

producers say that the shortage will hurt producers of sweets. In a year, the experts say, the peasants have cut back their livestock population to half. This is blamed on Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic, whose policy led the peasants to devastate their livestock herds. What is more, there have been no imports, and a large quantity of the meat here has ended up in processed meat products, for which earlier poorer quality beef from abroad was used. And when there is no livestock, there is also less milk.

It is obvious that there both is and is not food, but where is the food that does exist?

At the moment when Mr. Sainovic was saying that there was an abundance, the figures showed the following: In the first six months of this year, compared to the same period of last year, sales and purchases of wheat and rye were down 18 percent, corn 70 percent, potatoes 72 percent, dried beans 52 percent, tobacco 75 percent, fattened broilers 54 percent, eggs 22 percent, milk 32 percent, and (why not) brandy 74 percent. This indicates that producers, at least as far as the official government statistics are concerned, have been holding back goods, or they have been trading them through other than the legal channels.

We can assume with great uncertainty that in households there are immense inventories of all kinds of goods, including food.

The well-informed say that the government itself has in commodity reserves food enough for at least three months' consumption. Under the law, it is required to put those inventories on the market when there are disruptions, which up to now it has rarely done.

The Black Market

If the situation with quantity is not alarming, and this is true at least for some goods, why are the stores empty?

It should be remembered that over the past year, along with primary issue, the government has been using the freezing of prices of basic foodstuffs as a measure for conducting social welfare policy. Every few months, prices have been thawed and frozen, and this uncertainty has driven both producers and merchants to make calculations when it comes to putting their goods on the market. Or they look for salvation on what is called the black market. The other day, a liter of milk cost just slightly over 10 million in the stores, while at the open-air market it was selling at between 60 and 80 million. A kilogram of corn is about 70 million on the market, and its official price is one-fifth as much. Naturally, any normal person will turn to the open-air market in such a situation. Some will also go for export to the former Yugoslav republics (you can buy Serbian oil in Vinkovci) at considerably higher prices than those here. There is no decree of the government that can change that.

Incidentally, the best comment on the price policy of agricultural products (and not confined to them either) is the datum that out of a grain harvest of 3.3 million tons, the government purchased only 701,000 tons, and it planned two million tons (so much for the feasibility of using primary issue for those purposes). Perhaps that is the explanation of why goods have not come out of government reserves earlier: They would quickly be grabbed up at "popular prices," and the government could replenish those stocks again only by coercion, because no intelligent person is going to sell to the government for a song. If present reserves are emptied by the "organized supply of the public," will it resort to mandatory requisitioning in a few months?

At the same time, with this kind of control of certain prices, others have been formed freely. So far, as far as we know, the benefit has gone only to inhabitants of the village Donje Crnatovo near Zitoradja: The cooperative there was unable to sell Jaffa cookies because they were too expensive, and, because their shelf life had expired, it distributed them free to the peasants. Now they are feeding the hogs with them.

Even with the best will in the world, food cannot be cheap by decree. In some Serbian sugar mills, for instance, they say that they put more sugar into the planting campaign than they can get from the harvest. The calculation occurred because fertilizer, feed, chemicals for plant pest and disease control, and the rest given to the peasants was converted to sugar at the official prices. In addition, they are buying petroleum products on the black market (which means between two and three German marks [DM]), coke is being smuggled because of the sanctions and is more expensive, and they are paying between DM80 and DM100 per ton for coal. The merchants are complaining even now that the prices in the market basket are too low for them to be able to cover shipping costs, especially in the case of flour.

No matter which way you turn, the laws of a market economy are operating: They are manifested in the empty stores, in the reckoning done in German marks, in the holding back of goods because of the low price, and in the flourishing of the black market.... That being the case, then ration coupons are not going to change it. Because of hyperinflation and the mentality created by shortages, the public is turning all its money into goods, and that, incidentally, is altogether correct and rational behavior. The abundance of dinars and the frozen prices result in a disproportion between the immense demand and the small supply; only the market can bring them back into some provisional balance.

After the Sanctions

When all is said and done, it is clear that there are no sound economic arguments for going back to ration coupons (social welfare problems are solved partially, not generally).

The experts do not believe that the "organized supply" will last long. Dr. Oskar Kovac, professor, who incidentally is fairly close to the top Serbian political leadership, is convinced that this new "coupon package" of the government will be abandoned in a few months, which he backs up with the assertion that presumably it will have to respect the Constitution, which states that the Yugoslav economy will be a market economy. And Dr. Milutin Cirovic, a professor who is president of the Federal Economic Council, says that this country is sticking with the market orientation, while the coupons, according to him, are a temporary and transient phenomenon.

Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to look for the answer to the question of why the government is inclined to this solution in the sphere of politics. The sanctions (which are "unfair, genocidal, and still cannot hurt us"), supported by the total economic voluntarism of the present authorities, have brought this people, with all its dignity and celestial characteristics, to the verge of such misery that the government itself became worried about its own fate. So there was good reason to throw a crumb to the public which it could chew on until, it is assumed, the blockade is relieved following "cooperativeness" in Geneva. Some people are even saying that the Socialists are thinking about an early election, immediately after some of the sanctions are removed, because the television would give it all the credit. Before that, of course, they would "deal with Seselj" according to his own rules of the game.

Unfortunately, even that, if it proved to be accurate, is just another piece of evidence of the shortsightedness of those who are leading this country. First, because it can be assumed that a possible removal of the sanctions will be gradual and in inverse proportion to their importance. Second, because it will take more time than they think to arrive at a better life after the embargo is removed, precisely because nothing intelligent was done in economic policy while they were in effect.

And what has been done and what life will look like after the sanctions are wonderfully illustrated by the statements of Vera Kazic, director of Petrohemija in Pancevo, to EKONOMSKA POLITIKA. Asserting that for a long time now we have been staying alive by eating up the assets we had created over the years, Mrs. Kazic says that although her firm has been idle for a long time, the government is collecting all the charges as though it were operating at 96-percent capacity; from land rent and air to the contribution for earnings of employees who are on mandatory leave. Of the DM100,000 which they set aside for salaries, 70,000 go to the government and 30 to the workers. Following the most recent amendments to the tax laws, the ratio is shifting further to the advantage of the government. But for Petrohemija to start up in a period of 10 days, it needs to obtain energy (electricity, gas, and mazut) and raw materials (330,000 tons of primary gasoline, 10,000 tons of industrial salt...) with a cost of $20 million. Unless it is guaranteed at least two months of continuous operation, it does not pay the factory even to get started, because this is expensive. "Even if we have all that, we no longer have a market," Mrs. Kazic says. Because of the reduced market, as much as 90 percent of the output of certain types of Petrohemija's goods would have to be exported. But where? the director asks: "It takes us fivefold more time to get back to the market at low prices, with perfect quality and adequate guarantees." So much for the days after the sanctions are removed.

"And what is Sainovic expecting? That I am going to make bread at home with 25 kilos of flour. There is flour for pastry, not for bread."

It seems that there is nothing left for us except to leave off our reflection about the coupon package with the comparison of Nikola Sainovic, the present Serbian prime minister, and Marie Antoinette.

'Disastrous' Effects of Sanctions Examined

93BA1486B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 6 Sep 93 pp 15-17

[Article by Nenad Lj. Stefanovic: "Speed Promised Without Thinking"]

[Text] The real questions for those who are thinking about the sanctions are not "When will they end?" and "Will they end?" but whether one day it will be possible for anything at all to spring up from this murderous reality which the sanctions are leaving behind? That part of the former Yugoslavia which was not officially at war and on which not a single artillery shell has fallen is literally devastated. The barren ground which has been left in many areas of life by the sanctions of the international community, combined with the disastrous policy of the authorities here (long before the sanctions, it had pushed us onto the wrong road when it comes to civilization), and their consequences for many future generations can at times be even literally compared to areas covered with atomic dust. So, hunchbacked maiden, do not hope for too much!

When the sanctions against Yugoslavia were voted in the Security Council 15 months ago, there were obviously few people who even suspected what this country would go through in the future. Slobodan Milosevic himself spoke at the beginning about the "sanctions as a chance for restructuring our economy" and as all but the right flywheel for civilization, and then many months later, in the press release in which he abolished Vuk Draskovic, he mentioned the sanctions "which are killing our children yet unborn."

Following this logic from the highest place, at first there was incomparably more moaning about the fate of soccer players who could not play in European competition than, for example, the fate of scientists who had been dropped from all the world data banks and computer networks and had no possibility of keeping up with world trends in science. Someone even then made a rough calculation that the loss from dropping out of

world scientific flows was greater than if all fixed Belgrade bridges had been demolished at the same time. In the meantime, total losses resulting from the sanctions have probably grown to an amount that can be compared to the damage that would occur by demolishing several of the largest cities in Serbia. The demolished bridges, unfortunately, can serve as yet only as a metaphor of our total isolation from the world.

Aside from the economy, which is facing total collapse under the burden of several years of erroneous economic policy and the sanctions, the damage caused by the international blockade is certainly most obvious in the health service. Here again, there were many things that were creaking even before the sanctions, and the sanctions only helped to speed up things. Behind the hue and cry that the cruel world has cold-bloodedly and cynically been allowing us to die without medicine, there are sometimes even attempts to conceal the simple fact that the health service is not covered by the sanctions and that the money for drugs has been spent for other things. Leon Fuert, assistant U.S. vice president [as published] for national security affairs, who talked by satellite from Washington with a group of journalists and physicians sitting in Belgrade, recently took note of this on a Worldnet program. Fuert repeated several times that the sanctions were introduced in order to "influence Serbia's ability to finance the war," and his response to the quite specific remarks that 30 percent of the population has a diet below the minimum physiological level because of the sanctions, that a drop in blood hemoglobin below normal has been noted in 14 percent of schoolchildren, that the most sensitive categories of the population are more and more threatened by various diseases, that there are no drugs, was this: "The resolution on the sanctions explicitly allows the flow of food and drugs into Serbia and Montenegro, and, although the process of the sanctions has a corresponding number of steps which must be taken, it is functioning.... One of the recent figures which I saw indicates that 75 percent of the budget now under consideration will be allocated to the armed forces. That suggests to me that the government does have money, but decisions are made at the political level to channel those funds into the needs of the military establishment instead of meeting the needs of the population."

Only God Knows

In that same conversation, Leon Fuert, it is true, did attempt to minimize the fact that certain countries, out of a desire to apply the sanctions zealously, are in fact frustrating the pathways for humanitarian aid. Something of this kind has been pointed up in their appeal to the World Health Organization by representatives of that organization from Belgrade who have demanded that the UN Committee for Sanctions be informed of this. It said among other things in its appeal: "We feel a moral obligation to call the attention of the competent authorities to the tragic effects of the sanctions on people's health and the health system in the country in which we work. We have faced this in our daily work, our staff members are reporting this from the field, and this is the main concern of local health workers." One of the persons who signed that appeal is Dr. Hanu Vuori, a special representative of the World Health Organization, who said last week in an interview with VECERNJE NOVOSTI that for the present the population here, fortunately, in spite of everything, has escaped the more difficult infections which have threatened, but he also noted that God himself knows how they will get through the winter here. Dr. Vuori also believes that the health service here is surviving mainly thanks to exceptional individuals and their improvisations.

Dr. Slobodan Kostic, a pediatrician in the Institute for Gynecology and Obstetrics in Visegrad Street, confirms something similar in an interview for VREME. According to him, the death rate of newborn infants is only slightly higher than before the sanctions were introduced, but the mild increase can be related mainly to the influx of refugees and the genetic loads which many of them have brought with them. "At the moment," Dr. Kostic says, "this part of the institute is functioning mainly because we are supplied with everything essential to babies. But no one can predict with certainty how long that will last and how long it will be possible to get by with improvisations."

In the other departments and clinics of the institute, however, the situation is more or less similar to that in most of the other Belgrade hospitals. There are not enough drugs, gauze, thread, surgical gloves, chemicals for hygiene, and nutrition is worse than desperate. ("If we were to gather up all the drugs and medical supplies from all the hospitals in Belgrade, we would have a hard time putting together one decent hospital," was the description given the other day by Dr. Milena Jaukovic, president of the Committee for the Health Service of the Democratic Party.) The statistics indicate that recently there has been an extreme increase in the number of spontaneous abortions because of the shortage of hormone preparations to maintain pregnancy. Much the same is true of forced abortions. One abortion is being performed for every three births, which is an extremely high percentage, and, of course, this is not counting all those poor women who because they lack money go to the "old women with their distaffs." An abortion costs about 4 billion dinars (some 20 German marks [DM]), but the minimum costs of the newborn child are about DM1,000.

"The immediate consequences of the present situation such as the shortage of drugs or the general situation in our hospitals is not hard to recognize," Dr. Ruben Han, professor at the Institute for Nuclear Medicine at the Unified Clinical Center, told VREME. "From the standpoint of the future, we ought to be incomparably more disturbed by what is not so obvious to see now, and that is what will befall us in a few years."

Until quite recently, Dr. Han said, we had a system of immunization against diseases (vaccination), which kept up with the most highly developed world standards. That system is no longer functioning, and the program of

vaccinating children is not being pursued today, or is being carried out only partially. If in the future any of the epidemics of diseases we have already forgotten about returns, we will have unprotected age groups. The consequences can be disastrous, and that is why it is not a good idea to rely on the logic that "it probably will not happen." Tuberculosis is coming back, which we long ago thought was behind us once and for all, and our babies are getting the BCG vaccine less and less often. Soon the bills will begin to arrive in the form of various diseases because of the poorer and poorer life and bad diet. It will be manifested in an increased number of heart ailments and diseases of the blood vessels. Aside from prevention, Dr. Han adds, the situation is worse and worse with diagnosis as well. More than 90 percent of the most basic biochemical analyses are no longer done, which means that we will be late in detecting diseases and thereby also with the beginning of treatment. For many patients, the time lost in detecting the disease will be crucial. Under present conditions, even treatment itself is becoming extremely complicated because of the lack of quality drugs and is contributing to people's increasing impoverishment. It is most difficult for the chronically ill, who every month must set aside some 10 billion dinars or more for drugs.

Dr. Han has on his desk in the ward a picture postcard that has just arrived from Johannesburg, which was signed by several of his former students. They are informing him that they have managed to find a job and are sending their address, just so they do not lose touch. "In recent months," our informant said, "I have unfortunately been receiving similar postcards and letters frequently. No one seems to be taking this type of 'white plague' altogether seriously, but I am afraid that the 'yeast and substance' have left this country in a short time. And not only in the field of medicine. I have another 18 years before I retire, and I do not believe that by the end of my working life I will be able to make up what I have lost by being now in the second year of not following world achievements in the field that is my specialty. And what about the two women who are my assistants? They have just entered science, and they would be a credit to any clinic in the world for the knowledge they have, but for all practical purposes they are cut off from the world."

The Worst Combination

Jelena Pejic, M.A., assistant professor in the Department of International Law at the School of Law of Belgrade University, says that the economic impact of the sanctions depends on their inclusiveness, on the readiness of the international community to enforce them, and on the economic strength of the country against which they are directed. We obviously have the worst possible combination, and one day when all this is over, the damage suffered by the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] because of the sanctions will be difficult to compare with the losses suffered by countries who have gone through or are still going through a similar hell. The sanctions against the FRY, as the "institutionally expressed rage" of the international community against a policy, are the most all-inclusive in the practice of the United Nations up to this point, and at the moment, to use a basketball term, we are being subjected to a "full-court press." In the sixties, the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were fairly comprehensive, but neighboring countries were not ready to enforce them. South Africa's industrial potential was at one time such that the sanctions, as Milosevic foresaw it, unsoundly in our case, did in fact stimulate development of some branches of industry, above all the defense industry.

"The political objectives of the sanctions are to compel a change in the behavior of the government, but here again the effects are rather problematical," says Jelena Pejic. "Sanctions, as experience to date demonstrates, as a rule strengthen the sense of national solidarity because of the collective character of the punishment. If the regime also has well-developed propaganda and imposes its own view of the causes of the sanctions, hatred of foreigners and xenophobia are inevitably instilled in the people. So this wave of xenophobia in our country does not represent a precedent at all. On several occasions, for that matter, the example of Southern Rhodesia has already been mentioned, where the prime minister at that time, Ian Smith, managed to convince that country's white population that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a 'communist agent.' The people accepted that story. A similar mechanism is being used in our country when they talk about a world plot, so that all those who oppose this become traitors to the national interest."

VREME's informant also called attention to the illusions which have been spread in recent days that everything will automatically go back to the way it was when the sanctions are removed. In our case, Pejic says, it will obviously not happen the way it happened with Haiti last week, when the sanctions were removed on the recommendation of the UN secretary general. It will rather be a case of the sanctions being lifted silently bit by bit, and it does not pay at all to forecast how long that might last. Even if the Security Council decided tomorrow to free us of the sanctions, the return of the FRY to the international community will depend on individual assessments and economic interests of the various countries.

In the opinion of Dr. Bora Kuzmanovic, professor of social psychology in the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, aside from homogenizing the people still more, the sanctions have almost entirely incapacitated people's ability to recognize that it is not the international community that pushed us into our present suffering and stumbling. It only aided what the authorities began long ago. Our economy would have ended up the same way even without the sanctions, it would just have gone more slowly, Dr. Kuzmanovic said. Before the sanctions, people could still see that, but later the propaganda covered over all the blemishes of reality and directed dissatisfaction toward the external factor. That is the only way one can explain that there were certain signs of economic rebellion at the moment when our standard of living began to fall from DM2,000 to

DM1,800. Now that the bottom has dropped out, apathy has taken over and the logic that the government should not be touched during the sanctions.

"Only in that way is it possible to explain why the high degree of frustration does not lead to rebellion," says Dr. Kuzmanovic. "Nor, of course, should we underestimate the very widespread feeling of helplessness, nor the fear of the strong police apparatus, which is the only thing that has become stronger at a time when everything in this country has hurtled downhill."

The political damage caused by the sanctions, as Dr. Kuzmanovic put it, is inestimable. "The Milosevic regime may have the only real political profit from the sanctions," our informant said. "That is why I really do not understand the behavior of the West unless something altogether different is involved from what they say in public: Perhaps this regime actually suits them, because then they have an alibi to justify the strong measures they are taking. Or perhaps they have found in this government a suitable partner which they believe has sufficient power to influence the development of events and at the same time show a readiness to influence it with pressures and blackmail. In any case, up to now the sanctions have served the regime in covering all its mistakes. If they begin to loosen the sanctions, Milosevic will again know how to derive political profit. Then the story will be that the world has finally come to understand our ideas and objectives, that the time has passed when we had to suffer a bit on behalf of our national goals, and go on further, now that we have gotten what we wanted. Many people will buy that, although it would only be prolonging the agony."

This kind of possible political epilogue of the sanctions, according to Dr. Kuzmanovic, ought to drive the opposition to measure its strategy for the future well in order not to lose what it already has. It needs to weigh well every step so that nothing inadvertent plays into the hands of a possible fascistization of society, and at the same time they must not hesitate too much. Dr. Kuzmanovic does not in any case put too much stock in theories that the worst period for the government comes when the sanctions are removed and when the sobering up begins.

"Skillful propaganda will probably work even there. Before the war, we compared ourselves to the most highly developed, after the war some different benchmark for comparison will be offered us. For example, they will tell us—See how much better it is now than when we had the war and the sanctions? The people have shown themselves to be very adaptable. The end of the sanctions will not signify a moment of sobering up," says Dr. Kuzmanovic.

In answer to the question of what to do in that situation—to pack one's suitcases and set out for Johannesburg or Toronto, as has already been done by about 300,000 people, or to wait at least a decade or two for life to get back to normal here, Dr. Ruben Han replies:

"It is difficult to give a real answer to that question. If I belonged to the authorities, at least those health authorities, I would know what to do. I would go running around the world and literally get down on my knees and beg for help from those who can give it. What is all this talk about the 'chosen people' and lectures about 'dignity'? The situation is such that, if necessary, I would beg for help in the most humiliating way. If it goes on this way, there is no saving us, we are dead."

Macedonia

Commentary Discusses U.S. Military Presence

LD2809145293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1321 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 28 (TANJUG)—Two weeks ago, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.M.) demonstrated a sudden and unusual eagerness to hermetically seal its borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Only ten days before, an American contingent of 348 soldiers had left its base in Petrovac, near Skopje, and moved north.

It has not been difficult to find a direct link between the two events, especially since Skopje authorities have done everything to emphasize the role of the American unit in straining relations with the former mother-state. The servile behaviour of the Macedonian police and customs officials has been prompted by an open public military-diplomatic signal from Washington. Prior to that, all officials belonging to the political or military command who had been imprudent enough to state that there is no danger for the young state from the north, have been carefully removed from their posts. If they were right, there would have been no reason at all for the deployment of the symbolic but nonetheless significant American expedition.

Macedonian authorities were quick to calculate their losses since no one has made any promises, they do not know what they will gain in return. Estimates show that Macedonia stands to lose 1.8 billion dollars directly through the blockade of Yugoslavia, and that the closing of the vital roads to the north will place it in an even tighter blockade than that planned for Yugoslavia by its southern neighbour with the [words indistinct] unit. Appeals have therefore been made for compensation for the damage by way of rewarding the loyalty to the new friends, at least to the extent of preserving the market value of the national self-respect.

At this moment, our southern neighbor appears well stocked with consumer goods. There is no inflation and no classical buying fever which leaves the shelves depressively bare. Economic experts believe that the existing channels between the two states and the influx of cheap agricultural produce from the south of Serbia so far have contributed to the stability of the small market and that the blockade is sure to boomerang before long. Without a substantial, though still hypothetical dollar injection,

the blockaded F.Y.R.M. [words indistinct] a run on the shops will also [words indistinct], since the Macedonian economy cannot forever sustain the delusion of well-being and a national income of 3,000 dollars per capita.

What can this kind of welcome to the American troops mean, if even the most optimistic in Macedonia do not believe in any special generosity of the Americans. It is well known in Skopje that nearly none of the countries of the former Socialist camp, in spite of blandishing promises, has received a cent, and that any aid, given under draconian interest rates, has always been accompanied by humiliating terms. There is no reason to believe that Macedonia will be an exception, nor can any sudden and unusual financial generosity be expected from the newly-acquired uncle. It seems that this is another example of the classical marriage of convenience, which for the Americans is quite specific, and for the F.Y.R.M. somewhat unclear, but nevertheless passionately desired. The biggest power today, by its presence "between Tabanovci and Gevgelija", gains two completely contradictory, but logical goals.

These are very difficult to define publicly, but easily identifiable. Modern history actually does not know any convergence of cirumstances which would confirm that the presence of American soldiers has ever (?been) a guarantee of peace. The Americans have naturally never thought that they might serve as a peace guarantee, but they have insisted on being one. Therefore, the conspicuous presence of the Pentagon in the south of the Balkans implies provoking a crisis of large proportions, for the settlement of which, of course, those who have caused it are always called upon.

Against this vicious-circle logic, which contains a model for creating flash-points and then appointing forces which are supposed to put them out, the European military coalition cannot do anything else but grumble and draft major plans for the future. The more so since Somalia is growingly resembling Vietnam. American (?soldiers) are committing comical errors in their fight against the rebel troops, and very precisely hitting the civilians. Europe does not wish such a war on its own territory, while the F.Y.R.M. hopes to become a part of Europe by ushering in American troops through a military postern and diplomatic portals.

The firing range of "Krivolak", a desert of some one hundred thousand hectares stretching from Negotino-on-the-Vardar to Sveti Nikola, Stip and Radovis, is being mentioned as a bargaining chip between the F.Y.R.M. and the American Army. This vast area actually does permit all sorts of firing practice (the defunct Yugoslav People's Army has withdrawn, leaving behind its automatized rifle range) but it is still unsuitable for stationing a large number of [words indistinct] would necessitate enormous investments [words indistinct]. On the other hand, it is not quite clear what operative plan would justify such a concentration of forces in central and eastern Macedonia when estimates are changing daily and when mobile troops on powerful transport vehicles (?are) invariably preferred to expensive conservative bases.

Macedonia sees its interests in the possibility, albeit symbolic, of the American presence being a guarantee that the country will not be engulfed by war, wherever it might come from. This concept appears erroneous first of all because a transfer of war to the southern part of the Balkans does not depend on anyone's military authority, but on quite different circumstances, i.e., on the logic of the American engagement which always carries the seed of the possibility that it might provoke military conflicts.

In this case, is the main thrust of the war option pointed against Yugoslavia. Even for those inclined to set the torch to flash points, this concept could hardly stand up against an analytical list of reasons against, since such a step would lead directly to a Balkan war cataclysm.

This is wherein lurks the chief danger of the American engagement in Macedonia: Neither can it end with one unit of rangers, nor would the stationing of more troops bode well for anyone.

Kosovo

Rugova Stresses Right To Self-Determination

AU2909104793 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT Nr. 194 in English 27 Sep 93

[Unattributed report: "Excerpts from President Rugova's Interview in BUJKU"]

[Text] "The Balkans have once again returned to a position like that of 1918 in a political sense. It was Yugoslavia itself that brought it back to that point, as it was an artificial creation, as rightly emphasized by the U.S. Secretary of State Christopher some time ago. This return suits us, but only in a positive sense, and not in the sense of having a similar situation of devastating wars that had occurred at that time. Kosova will be first integrated within pan-Albanian processes, then in the Balkan processes, and in the European ones, with all its own features, human, natural, political resources, and it will not remain isolated. The activity we are engaged in now at the international, national, existential, and human rights levels, we will have to be ensued by such an engagement at the economic and political levels. The efforts The Albanians have made will serve as an important experience tomorrow, and as an example of how to solve national problems through peaceful means," said Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova in an interview with the Prishtina-based newspaper in Albanian BUJKU, published today (Monday).

"Institutionalization of life (in Kosova) has become difficult," said President Rugova, adding that it requires executive power which we hope to achieve in the future. "Present situation would best be served by a combined organized system. The convention of the (multiparty)

Parliament of Kosova is still open, but it shall be convened for it would facilitate further institutionalization of life," remarked Dr. Rugova.

To the question whether the Palestinian Israel agreement could serve as a model to the solution of Kosova issue, Dr. Rugova said that "this model can be applied to solve other crises in the world. The Kosova issue is a different one. Here we are dealing with a former federation which de facto has disintegrated. Kosova having been a constitutive part of this federation reserves the right to self-determination. We have said repeatedly that it was quite reasonable to ask that Kosova has its own status and that it decides for its own fate."

"In order to ensure human rights, certain framework and territorial, ethnic, state, and political guarantees should be needed for Kosova. Kosova today represents a flash point risking international peace, therefore based on the UN Charter it may be considered as a territory to be placed under UN protection. Naturally we have shown through our movement that we are very much interested in not having an armed conflict here, being aware of the consequences. We stand for peace, for a state and independence through political and peaceful means and agreement," said President Rugova.

Commenting on the possibility of division of Kosova, Dr. Rugova said that this would be unacceptable "because there is no area in Kosova with a Serb majority which could represent an enclave." He said that "ethnic states that are emerging will surely have repercussions in other parts of former Yugoslavia as already indicated at international fora concerning Kosova. We have raised this issue with the Geneva conference and we hope that it will be dealing with it."

Dr. Rugova also remarked that "a need for further organization and consolidation within the Albanian political parties in Kosova was felt not as a manifestation of a crisis in the movement but as an effort to find better forms of organizing life under current circumstances."

Persecution of Former Army Officers Continues

AU2909110793 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT Nr. 194 in English 27 Sep 93

[Unattributed report: "The Serbian Police Arrested a Former Yugoslav Army Officer"]

[Text] The Serbian police has been continuing with arrests and persecution of former Yugoslav Army officers of Albanian nationality from Kosova. Thus, the Serbian police arrested yesterday at the Hajvali village Zajm Berisha, a retired colonel and former commander in chief of the territorial defense in Prishtina.

Before the arrest, the police searched Mr. Berisha's home and confiscated a hunting rifle, though he had possessed a permit for it.

Vojvodina

Ethnic Hungarian Urges Participation in Conference

AU2909105693 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Sep 93 p 4

[Report by Z.S.: "Autonomy as Grounds for Talks"]

[Text] Novi Sad—Andras Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM], has sent a letter to FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] President Zoran Lilic, in which he expresses his views as presented to Willie Claes, chairman of the EC Commission, on the idea that has become known as the Balladur plan, according to which the EC "holds in high regard the basic premise of the plan on the equal treatment of the security of borders and the solution to the issue of minorities in Central and East Europe," and that "the acceptance of the concept of collective rights in the plan points to the realistic approach of the mighty in treating the issues of national minorities, and creates conditions in which a just and democratic solution can be found for each individual case."

Stressing these views, Agoston says in his letter to Lilic that he has proposed that Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia, be invited and allowed to participate in the international conference, and he simultaneously appeals to Lilic that he initiates the participation of our country at the coming EC conference. I hold the view, Agoston tells Lilic, that—despite the serious war propaganda that has been under way against the Hungarians since the outbreak of the civil war, when we stated that we did not want to participate in any way in the conflict of the South Slav peoples—the foundations for the coexistence of the Hungarians and the Serbs in this region have not been destroyed, and a just and democratic solution can be found.

Further on in his letter—with the appeal that Lilic should initiate Yugoslavia's, that is, Serbia's participation in the coming conference—Agoston calls for a dialogue in finding an agreement that could be verified at the said conference. As democratic and just grounds for dialogue, Agoston says, the DZVM is offering its own concept of autonomy.